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JAMES W. POULTNEY, JOHN H. YOUNG
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KEMP MALONE
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PARALLELISM OF THEME AND IMAGERY IN *AENEID* II AND IV.

Many recent studies directed toward the investigation and analysis of the structure of the *Aeneid* have furnished abundant evidence of the extremely complex and highly unified structural patterns upon which the poem is constructed. By "structure" or "structural patterns" I mean the organization of the poem as a whole—the system of relations, correspondences, antitheses, and balancing of various elements which serves to illuminate or intensify the meaning and effect both of the individual elements themselves and of the total poetic framework of which they each form a part. In a poem like the *Aeneid*, where profound insights and subtle perceptions pervade its entire fabric, we may expect the poet to utilize this tool of internal complexity and elaborate inter-weaving of motifs far more than direct statement, or even the time-honoured poetic devices of metaphor, simile, and the like. Indeed, the very nature of Vergilian poetry necessarily entails this more elusive, less obvious manner of expression; because of the complex significance and numerous levels of meaning which Vergil strove to incorporate in the *Aeneid*, a simpler and less involved style must have resulted in comparative crudity, in a haziness and a distortion of the poet's initial insights.¹

¹ Cf. R. Heinze, *Virgils Epische Technik* (3rd ed., Leipzig, 1915), p. 436: "Aristoteles hatte gelehrt, dass wie in der Tragödie, so auch im Epos Einheit der Handlung erforderlich sei"; p. 438: "Die zweite Forderung ist, dass die einzelnen Teile des Epos notwendige Bestandteile des Ganzen sein sollen." Perhaps the best statement in this regard is

Keeping this in mind, I should like to examine the second and fourth books of the *Aeneid* with a view to demonstrating, in terms of the larger poetic structure in which they are framed, the principal means by which a vital connection between the two is effected. Briefly, these means are the following: the figure of Aeneas himself, as it is illuminated in two contrasting situations; the pervading tone of tragedy and deceit continually present in both books; imagery and symbolism; the strong parallelism between the fates of Dido and Priam.

One might be surprised, at first, at the thought of there being close similarities or correspondences between these two books which seem, superficially at least, to have little enough in common. In recent attempts to analyze the structure of the *Aeneid* there has been no consideration of II and IV with specific regard to their relations to one another. G. E. Duckworth, in a recent article,² has shown that the *Aeneid* as a whole falls into two halves or panels, I-VI and VII-XII, with each book of one panel balanced by the corresponding book in the other; e. g. I bears close resemblance to and is balanced by VII, while the same is true for II and VIII, III and IX, etc. That the *Aeneid* does exhibit such a structure is, I think, hardly to be denied. But it will be observed that according to this analysis all of the odd-numbered books are balanced by others of the same kind, while the even numbers are balanced by other even numbers. Moreover, R. S. Conway³ has pointed out that, on the whole, the odd numbers "show what we may call the lighter or Odyssean type; the books with the even numbers reflect the graver colours of the *Iliad*."⁴ Duckworth later adopted this statement of

that of V. Pöschl, *Die Dichtkunst Virgils, Bild und Symbol in der Äneis* (Innsbruck, 1950), p. 6: "Ich wüsste keine, die besser zum Ausdruck bringt, dass Kunstformen nicht Gefässe sind für einen Inhalt, der eine von ihnen abgetrennte Existenz hat, sondern selber Inhalt, ja, nach Hebbels Wort, der höchste Inhalt."

² G. E. Duckworth, "The Architecture of the *Aeneid*," *A. J. P.*, LXXV (1954), pp. 1-15.

³ R. S. Conway, "The Architecture of the Epic," *Harvard Lectures on the Vergilian Age* (Cambridge, Mass., 1928), pp. 129-49.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 141. Cf. Heinze, p. 463: "Die Variation hat Virgil bereits beim ersten Entwurf des Gesamtwerks mit ins Auge gefasst. Die Bücher II, IV und VI stellen jedes in seiner Art einen Höhepunkt der pathetischen oder erhabenen Wirkung dar; sie sind durch die ruhigeren Bücher III und V getrennt, und man bemerkt wohl, wie wichtig es

Conway's and expanded it in working out his analysis of the poem's structure. Victor Pöschl,⁵ in his book on Vergil's symbolism and imagery, has seen the poem as divided into three sections: I-IV, V-VIII, IX-XII, which show an alternation of mood and theme between light and darkness—*Dunkel, Licht, Dunkel*. Except for some slight reservations,⁶ most readers would probably agree that this variation of light and dark tones in the *Aeneid* does exist. As a result, in the structural analysis of Conway, Pöschl, and Duckworth, II and IV fall more or less into the same general grouping. If, then, Pöschl is correct in considering I-IV as a unit, and Conway is right about the pervading tragic tone of the even-numbered books, we might have even further reason to expect some relation between II and IV, despite the great difference in their respective subject matter.

Dido, queen of Carthage, and the burning city of Troy represent two great "tests" which Aeneas must face before he can reach Italy.⁷ That is to say, in both II and IV he is faced with something more than the routine hardships and numerous delays which confront him during the whole period previous to his

auch von diesem Gesichtspunkt ist, dass V nicht unmittelbar auf III, und VI auf IV folgt."

⁵ Pöschl, *op. cit.*, p. 280: "Schmerz und Freude, Sieg und Untergang, Durchbruch der Leidenschaft und Triumph des Geistes, der Idee, sind nicht nur in kunstvoller Verschränkung verflochten, sondern sie durchdringen sich gegenseitig."

⁶ As Duckworth remarks (*op. cit.*, p. 7, n. 24), the activity of Allecto in VII is hardly in keeping with the supposed light tone of the whole section, and the victories of Aeneas in X and XII presumably keep the last section from being completely dark. Pöschl himself says, however (p. 280): "In einzelnen jedoch ist das Licht immer vom Dunkel überschattet, und aus der Finsternis bricht immer wieder das Licht hervor."

⁷ Cf. A. S. Pease, *P. Vergili Maronis Liber Quartus* (Cambridge, Mass., 1935), pp. 138, 146; Pease speaks of Dido and Turnus as the two great obstacles to the mission of Aeneas. Looking at the poem in an over-all perspective, this is certainly true. However, II and IV clearly represent the two major crises in the story before Aeneas arrives in Italy. In regard to the danger in IV, cf. Anchises' words to Aeneas in VI, 694: *quam metui ne quid Libyae tibi regna nocerent!* The sense of *nocerent* is somewhat ambiguous, referring possibly to the *ferocia Poeni cordia* (I, 302-3), or, more probably, to the possibility of Aeneas' yielding to the charms of Dido, remaining in Carthage, and abandoning his destiny altogether.

arrival on the new continent. Rather, in each of these books he is involved in a major crisis, either of which could have resulted in his failure to fulfil his destiny and carry his gods to Latium.⁸ It may, in fact, seem a statement of the obvious to say that II and IV represent major crises or tests for Aeneas, and yet some of the implications of this fact have often been overlooked. For by concentrating his attentions on the particular qualities of Aeneas' character and personality which the tense situations of the two books naturally evoke, as well as on important traits which appear constantly in Aeneas' behavior no matter what the situation or circumstances are, Vergil has succeeded in these two books in producing a fairly complete and composite picture of his hero. It is by no means my intention to be drawn into an elaborate discussion of Aeneas' "character" here, but rather to point up some aspects of Vergil's use of dramatic method—i. e. his method of developing Aeneas' character through the latter's own reactions to situations in which he finds himself involved.

As far as the situations themselves of II and IV are concerned, one is at first struck far more by their differences than by their similarities. As Troy is destroyed, we see Aeneas mainly as a warrior, as a dutiful son, a husband, and father. His duties here, his loyalties and obligations are obvious and clear-cut, while attention is focused on his prowess as a warrior and on his family-type virtues, his *pietas*.⁹ At Carthage, however, Aeneas is faced with an entirely different kind of problem—one in which

⁸ It may, in fact, be objected that just as the fall of Troy was, at least within the limits of tradition, a historical fact, so Aeneas' survival, which is the minimal necessity for the continuity of the story, is something that is never in doubt. But we must not confuse the position of the reader with that of Aeneas, who, in the course of Troy's capture, does not know whether he will survive or not. That he even expects to die is shown by his own words (II, 353): *moriatur et in media arma ruamus*. The importance of Aeneas' ignorance in this matter for my argument here rests in the reactions elicited from him during each of these crises.

⁹ Cf. R. Allain, "Une nuit spirituelle d'Énée," *R. E. L.*, XXIV (1946), pp. 189-98; Allain points out that Aeneas' *pietas* is strikingly eclipsed for a good part of the second book. This is true, however, only for the first part of II. Indeed, Aeneas' famous act of carrying Anchises out of the city on his shoulders became proverbial as a symbol of *pietas* in the highest degree.

his bravery and virtues as a warrior serve no purpose. The problems he must cope with are infinitely more subtle, and in their way, more dangerous because of their subtlety. It is a situation in which Aeneas must call for aid upon resources in himself far different from the ones which saved him at Troy, and the enemy he must resist is one which for a long time he fails even to see.

It is clear, then, that Vergil is presenting Aeneas in two different lights; he is building a multi-sided picture of his hero by placing him in these strongly contrasting situations which serve to focus attention on different facets of his character and personality.

In describing the character of Aeneas, it is a commonplace to assert that he is completely subject to the will of the gods, and that his actions are never motivated by personal desires; but that once he receives a command from heaven, he complies with robot-like alacrity. The following statement of G. Boissier may serve to illustrate this point of view: *Énée . . . est tout à fait dans la main des dieux, et tient toujours les yeux fixées sur cette force supérieure qui le mène. Jamais il ne fait rien de lui-même. Quand les occasions sont pressantes, et qu'il importe de prendre un parti sans hésitation, il n'en attend pas moins un arrêt du destin constaté pour se décider. . . . Il faut que la terre tremble, que le bruit des armes retentisse dans l'air pour qu'il accepte un secours dont il ne peut guère se passer. Mais une fois que le ciel a parlé, il n'hésite plus.*¹⁰

It is surely significant that the two most notable occasions on which Aeneas does not strictly conform to this rule are found in II and IV. In II (270 ff.), as Aeneas lies sleeping, the shade of Hector appears to him, bidding him take his household gods and flee the city, which is already in flames. An important part of Hector's message is to tell Aeneas specifically that after long wanderings he is to found a new city. Hector then brings to him from the inner part of the house the things he is to take away with him upon his final departure from Troy (293-7):

sacra suosque tibi commendat Troia penates;
hos cape fatorum comites, his moenia quaere
magna, pererrato statues quae denique ponto.

¹⁰ G. Boissier, *La religion romaine d'Auguste aux Antonins* (Paris, 1874), I, pp. 274-5.

Sic ait et manibus vittas Vestamque potentem
aeternumque adytis effert penetralibus ignem.

Hector is perfectly specific in these instructions, and since they are of greatest importance, the reader naturally expects Aeneas to be prompt in carrying them out. Moreover, the first person Aeneas meets after awakening is Panthus (318 ff.), who is carrying away his own household gods, something that should have reminded Aeneas of the words Hector's ghost had just spoken.¹¹ It is quite clear that the poet is emphasizing here the importance of Aeneas' immediate escape and the preservation of the sacred images. But when Aeneas, seemingly oblivious of everything that had just been told him, proceeds to ignore Hector's words for the greater part of the book, it is equally clear that the passage requires closer examination if we are to ascertain the poet's intention.

Homer tells us that Aeneas was not to die at Troy, but to go free after the city was taken. But for Vergil, something more than this was needed. It was a requirement imposed upon him that the ancestor of the Romans possess, in addition to the frequently emphasized virtues of *constantia*, *virtus*, and *pietas*, great military prowess as well. It was necessary that he recall the great heroes of the Trojan war, and be able to hold his own among them. But had Aeneas left Troy immediately, as indeed Hector had told him to do, his reputation as a warrior would have been seriously diminished; so instead we see him attempting to defend his city, even though against hopeless odds, an act which satisfies, at least in part, this important requirement.

But even the casual reader cannot help but notice this seemingly clumsy discrepancy between Hector's words and Aeneas' subsequent behavior. Surely a display of prowess by Aeneas does

¹¹ I am indebted for the source of a number of the following ideas to R. Allain, *op. cit.*, and Duckworth, "Fate and Free Will in Vergil's Aeneid," *C. J.*, LI (1955-56), pp. 357-64. Allain concerns himself chiefly with the problem of Aeneas' *pietas* in II (cf. note 9 above), and the significance of the *furor* which seizes his senses. Although I am taking a different approach and placing my emphasis elsewhere, I am basically in agreement with his major thesis, that Aeneas' experience with *furor* conveys a lesson which he never again forgets—that it is futile to act in opposition to the will of the gods or without their support. Cf. II, 402: *heu nihil invitis fas quemquam fidere divis!*

not necessitate disobedience on his part of divine injunction. Vergil could presumably have had Hector appear to him after he had already been fighting for some time, and thus satisfy the need mentioned above. One can only conclude that Vergil desired this discrepancy and deliberately inserted it. Here again, the motive can scarcely be mistaken; Aeneas, at least for the moment, is being dominated by strong emotions which drive out every thought except that of defending his city, and it is by no means the will of the gods which is uppermost in his mind at this point.

But is this the only thing which drives Aeneas into combat, making him oblivious of everything except the fierce struggle in which he is engaged? Certainly the motives mentioned above play a large part—patriotism, the desire to protect his family and city, etc. But Aeneas is here also in the grip of something very like the Homeric Ate. One of the constantly recurring words in II is *furor*, or *furere*, used specifically in reference to Aeneas. Describing his own state of mind, he says (316-17): *furor iraque mentem / praecipitat, pulchrumque mori succurrit in armis*; compare with this the words in line 355: *sic animis iuvenum furor additus*. Again, when Venus appears to Aeneas, she asks (595): *quid furis aut quonam nostri tibi cura recessit?* This same word is again applied to Aeneas as he madly searches for the lost Creusa throughout the burning city (771-3):

quaerenti et tectis urbis sine fine furenti
infelix simulacrum atque ipsius umbra Creusa
visa mihi ante oculos et nota maior imago.

Cicero defines *furor* as *mentis ad omnia caecitas*,¹² and this precise use of the word can clearly be seen when it is used to describe the Trojans dragging the wooden horse into the city (244): *immemores caecique furore*. The same word, thus defined, is also well used to describe Aeneas' behavior throughout the action of the second book, blinded as he is by this madness which seizes him. Moreover, that this is precisely what Vergil intended is indicated by Venus' words when she lifts the *cloud of darkness from his eyes*. Here the cloud of darkness is a visual and dramatic representation of the nature and effect of *furor* as

¹² *Tusc. Disp.*, III, 5, 11: *furorem autem rati sunt mentis ad omnia caecitatem*.

a condition in which Aeneas is no longer thinking of or seeing his higher duty (604-6):

aspice (namque omnem quae nunc obducta tuenti
mortalis hebetat visus tibi et umida circum
calligat, nubem eripiam.

Of course, the ostensible reason for Venus' removal of the cloud is to enable Aeneas to see the gods who are destroying the city—i. e. she is permitting him to see the true state of affairs. The idea of the removal of the *furor* with which I am concerned here lies on a second level, but is probably the more important of the two. *Mortalis* and *tibi* thus take on enlarged significance. On one level, Aeneas is the only mortal (*tibi*) who can actually see what the gods are doing. On another level, the human weakness (*mortalis visus*) represented by the *furor* is now removed, and Aeneas resumes a role in which his heroic qualities rather than his fallible humanity are most in evidence.

Again in IV we find Aeneas temporarily forgetful of the words of the numerous divine agencies through which much of his fate had already become known to him. He certainly knew before he arrived in Carthage what his destiny was,¹³ and yet it requires the action of the gods to force him to leave the city. *Fama* describes both him and Dido as *regnorum immemores*, as, indeed, they were. It would seem, then, that just as Aeneas was made to ignore for a time the instructions of Hector in II, for the reasons mentioned above, so here in IV his neglect of his fated purpose serves to emphasize him as a real, a not faultless person, with many of the sentiments and emotions of an ordinary man. It is in this way that some of the multiple facets of Aeneas' personality that were mentioned earlier in connection with the different situations of II and IV are again pointed up

¹³ Aeneas had already received information concerning his destiny from the following sources: Hector (II, 294-5); Creusa (II, 780-4); the oracle of Apollo (II, 94-8); the penates (III, 160-8); the queen of the Harpies (III, 253-4). The discrepancy between Aeneas' behavior at Carthage and his knowledge of his destined purpose has been most recently discussed by R. B. Lloyd, "Aeneid III, a New Approach," *A. J. P.*, LXXIII (1957), pp. 133-51; cf. also G. Howe, "The Development of the Character of Aeneas," *C. J.*, XXVI (1930), 182-93, and H. L. Tracy, "The Gradual Unfolding of Aeneas' Destiny," *C. J.*, XLVIII (1952-53), pp. 281-4.

by his temporary swerving from the path of duty on these two different occasions.

Parallel to the *furor* which blinds Aeneas for a large part of the second book, is the *furor* which seizes Dido and drives her to destruction in IV. This same word is used of her on at least ten different occasions, of which a few may be cited as examples:

- 65-6 Quid vota furemtem,
 quid delubra iuvant?
 90-1 Quam simul ac tali persensit peste teneri
 cara Iovis coniunx nec famam obstare furori.
 101 Ardet amans Dido traxitque per ossa furorem.¹⁴

Dido, too, is caught up in the blinding power of *furor*, just as Aeneas was caught up at Troy, although the results, significantly, are not the same.¹⁵ Here again the poet is giving the reader further opportunity for a sympathetic understanding of Aeneas, who is human enough to allow this madness to control him for a time, but who is heroic enough, Roman enough, if you will, to shake it off finally, and shoulder his burdens anew. This Dido is incapable of doing, for once the *furor* has taken control of her, she never succeeds in escaping it. It is here, then, that much of the significance which Aeneas' behavior in II holds for the tragedy of Dido in IV becomes apparent. It is with masterly technique that Vergil combined the heroic and the warmly human in Aeneas through the manipulation of the motif of *furor*, while at the same time underlining the poignancy of Dido's situation by the tacit contrast of her extreme helplessness, which was the result of her warm, impulsive nature, with the "humanness" of Aeneas which was, however, so carefully controlled.

¹⁴ Cf. 68-9, 283-4, 298-9, 433, 465-6, 501-2, 548-9.

¹⁵ There are, of course, important differences between the *furor* of Dido and that of Aeneas. It is the madness of warfare that the latter exhibits, while it is an Aphrodite-like power that falls upon Dido. In each case, however, the results and symptoms are essentially the same—a passionate and fatal preoccupation with a single goal or object, accompanied by a consequent blindness to other important considerations. Cf. the blind rage (sc. *furor*) of Turnus (VII, 415, 464), and that of Amata (VII, 348, 350, 375, 377, 392, 406). We have here, in fact, one of the major underlying tragic themes of the *Aeneid*—the opposition of reason, discipline, and order, as represented by Aeneas, against the vehement, even heroic, but blind and undisciplined passion characteristic of Dido, Amata, and Turnus.

At both Troy and Carthage, then, Aeneas temporarily goes astray, forgetful of duties and obligations by which he knows he is bound. In both situations Vergil is slowly developing the figure of his hero as a sympathetic and human, as well as a heroic character. That there is even more than a parallelism, in fact a real, meaningful connection between the two situations, is shown by the motif of *furor*, which is not only prominent in each case, but which receives much of its significance in IV from its previous appearance in II.

My remarks thus far have all been oriented toward a consideration of those relations between II and IV which are effected through Vergil's use of the figure of Aeneas and the motifs (*sc. furor* and neglect of duty) connected with it. But when one turns to the tragic themes which constitute the essential fabric of the two books, far more numerous and striking parallels appear.

Throughout the stories of Dido and the fall of Troy, there runs a constant, ominous undertone of deceit, trickery, and deception. In II, of course, it is the craft and treachery of the Greeks which is constantly emphasized. Witness the words of Aeneas when he first realizes that Troy is in flames (II, 309-10):

tum vero manifesta fides, Danaumque patescunt
insidiae.

The tale of Sinon is easily the master bit of deception in the whole *Aeneid*, while in his story, and throughout the subsequent action surrounding the fall of Troy, the name of Ulysses hovers like a shadow.¹⁶ Not once is his name mentioned in a situation where tradition required that he appear; it is simply dropped, again and again, to enforce in the reader's mind this theme of guile and treachery.

6-8	Myrmidonum Dolopumve aut duri miles Ulixi temperet a lacrimis?	quis talia fando
43-4	dona carere dolis Danaum? sic notus Ulixes?	aut ulla putatis
261	Thessandrus Sthenelusque duces et dirus Ulixes.	
435-6	Iphitus et Pelias mecum (quorum Iphitus aevo iam gravior, Pelias et vulnere tardus Ulixi).	

¹⁶ Cf. W. F. J. Knight, *Vergil's Troy* (Oxford, 1932), pp. 58-61.

762-3 custodes lecti Phoenix et dirus Ulixes
praedam adservabant.

But even the Trojans are reduced to this expedient. When Coroebus, after Aeneas and his little band have made their first successful sally against the Greeks, suggests they don Greek armor to disguise themselves, his words strike a familiar note (390): *dolus an virtus, quis in hoste requirat?*

As the time for Troy's destruction draws near, deception is practiced against the city even by the gods. Why are Laocoon and his sons killed, if not to confirm Sinon's words and remove any doubt from the Trojans' minds as to whether they should draw the wooden horse into the city? It may be objected, however, that the gods are playing here the same role they frequently have in the *Aeneid*, that of pushing the human actors in the direction they are already going of their own volition and represent, in this capacity at least, a second level of causation, and the inseparability of the human world from the divine order.¹⁷ It is, indeed, perfectly true that the Trojans, after hearing Sinon's story, were prepared to take the horse into the city in any event. But it seems far more likely that the real significance of this act of deception on the part of the gods lies in its connection with the larger pattern of deceit and trickery which is so much in evidence in the two books in question.

This same motif recurs frequently in the story of Dido. To go back to the first book for a moment, it will be remembered that Dido unknowingly takes onto her lap the god Cupid, who then proceeds to inflame her soul with love for Aeneas. Here again the reader may feel that the measures taken by Venus and Cupid are, strictly speaking, unnecessary, and that Dido could well be in the state she is at the beginning of IV without divine interference. But the gods do, nevertheless, victimize Dido, just as they did the Trojans, and in both cases, it may be remarked, they do so to insure the ordained march of fate;¹⁸ Troy must fall and Aeneas is to reach Italy, and in both cases the gods play mortals false to bring this about.

¹⁷ See Duckworth, "Fate and Free Will," pp. 358-9.

¹⁸ Venus' motive in causing Dido to fall in love with Aeneas, it will be remembered, was to prevent her or her people from harming him when he arrived in Carthage.

The exchange between Venus and Juno in the fourth book has heavy overtones of deceit, for the two goddesses are, throughout the poem, bitter antagonists.¹⁹ Juno's whole undivulged purpose is, of course, to keep Aeneas and the Trojans away from Italy. When the two goddesses part, Venus smiles, *dolis repertis* (128); she had, in fact, known from the beginning that Juno was speaking *simulata mente* (105). Venus, by the end of the book, certainly wins the advantage, and thus there is another correspondence which balances II and IV; Juno triumphs in the earlier book, Venus in the later one, and this alternation of victory between the two occurs elsewhere in the poem.²⁰

But the motif of deceit in IV is most strongly brought out in Dido's reproaches to Aeneas:

- 305-6 dissimulare etiam sperasti, perfide, tantum
posse nefas tacitusque mea decedere terra?
365-6 nec tibi diva parens generis nec Dardanus auctor,
perfide.²¹

The most obvious effect which the poet achieves with this motif of treachery, especially where the gods are involved, is to concentrate the reader's sympathy on the side of the victims. But in Dido's reproaches to Aeneas there is a deeper significance, of which I prefer to defer discussion, however, until I have examined Vergil's use of a striking image which occurs both in II and IV.

Fire is a dominant image in each of the two books, and is used both as a positive and a negative symbol.²² By "positive"

¹⁹ That the scene is drawn with a subtle humor does not lessen its effectiveness as another link in the chain of deception which this book contains. Certainly the pact between the two goddesses is too important both for the progress of the story and the general tone of *dolus* to be merely a comic interlude. Juno's hatred is too deep to be forgotten even for a moment. Cf. Warde Fowler, *Virgil's Gathering of the Clans* (Oxford, 1918), pp. 39 ff.

²⁰ See Duckworth, "Architecture of the *Aeneid*," p. 12; one of the points he uses to illustrate the correspondence of I and VII is that in I Venus prevails over Juno, while in VII it is Juno who prevails over Venus.

²¹ Cf. IV, 421-2, 541-2.

²² For a detailed discussion of this same image from a different approach, see B. Knox, "The Serpent and the Flame. The Imagery of the Second Book of the *Aeneid*," *A. J. P.*, LXXI (1950), pp. 379-400.

I mean favorable, by "negative" unfavorable to Aeneas and the Trojans.

The flames that consume Troy, and the torch used to signal the Greek fleet, need no comment in this regard, and clearly fall on the negative side. But in the midst of these destructive flames two omens appear, both encouraging, and both in the form of fire. The first is the flame that appears over the head of Ascanius (679-84), the portent which convinces Anchises that he must accompany Aeneas away from the city. A few moments later, in answer to a prayer from the old man, a second fire omen appears (692-7):

Vix ea fatus erat senior, subitoque fragore
intonuit laevum, et de caelo lapsa per umbras
stella facem ducens multa cum luce cucurrit.
Illam summa super labentem culmina tecti
cernimus Idaea claram se condere silva
signantemque vias.

In both these cases, and especially the latter, the use of fire as a favorable omen is highly significant, for it points out, as it were, the path that Aeneas and his followers are to follow—it shows the direction in which Aeneas is being driven by the fates—*signantemque vias*.²³ At the same time, however, the reader is never permitted to forget the flames that are destroying Troy, and so fire takes on this double significance; it serves at once both as a favorable omen and as an agent of destruction.

In IV the image of fire centers chiefly around Dido, where it possesses a threefold significance. It represents, first, her love for Aeneas, then her subsequent hatred, real or imagined, and finally reaches, through the interplay of these two extended metaphors, its climax in the queen's burning pyre where the fire images both from II and IV converge into a single scene which bears the accumulated impact of the dominant image.

The image of the pyre haunts the scene from the time of the first book. In the first passage there where Venus' plans for Dido are explicitly stated, there is a remarkable example of foreshadowing in which all three facets of the fire image significance are united (I, 673-4):

²³ Servius produces a rather fantastic explanation of all the symbolism he believes is involved here. However, his first words on these

quocirca capere ante flammis et cingere flamma
reginam meditor.

From the beginning, then, the scenes are all laid against the looming back drop of the pyre, and much of the dramatic force of the other uses of the image depends upon it.

In the first part of IV fire is consistently used to express or represent the passion of Dido:

2 vulnus alit venis et caeco carpitur igni.
54 his dictis impenso animum flammavit amore.
66 . . . est mollis flamma medullas.²⁴

Before long, however, the significance of this "fire" abruptly changes, and becomes the rage and passionate excitement of Dido when she learns of Aeneas' intended departure.

300-1 saevit inops animi totamque incensa per urbem
bacchatur.
362-4 talia dicentem iamdudum aversa tuetur
huc illuc volvens oculos totumque pererrat
luminibus tacitis et sic accensa profatur.

However, despite the seeming hatred which at times seems to overwhelm her, it is important to realize that Dido's love for Aeneas remains to the end, if we are to grasp the full significance of the final scene, where both aspects of the image, the hate and the love, are united. In the passage immediately preceding her death, the rage has left Dido's words, and a tone closely approaching tenderness has again crept into her voice (659-60):

dixit, et os impressa toro "moriemur inultae,
se moriamur" ait. "sic, sic iuvat ire sub umbras."

In the following lines the pyre breaks into the picture and begins to dominate the entire scene (661-2):

hauriat hunc oculis ignem crudelis ab alto
Dardanus, et nostrae secum ferat omina mortis.

Earlier, as the image was moving ominously toward this climax, Dido, in a statement which caught up and continued the sinister import of Venus' threat in I, spoke to Aeneas in words which

lines may be worth remarking: *stellae huius cursus ita significat Troianos conglobatos ad domum Aeneae Idam petere.*

²⁴ Cf. IV, 23, 101.

distinctly evoked the image of the pyre (384), and which served to maintain the significance of the fire image on all three levels, while at the same time revealing and re-emphasizing the direction in which the story was moving:

sequar atris ignibus absens.

In terms, therefore, of the unconscious foreshadowing by Dido in these last words, and the double import of the fire image regarding her feelings, the image reaches its culmination in the flames of the pyre, where the fire becomes symbolic of Dido and all that she represents. United in this fire one sees both her love for Aeneas and her final curse and call for an avenger. The pyre underlines and concentrates into a single image all of the anguish and pathos of Dido's tragedy and marks, as did burning Troy, the end of something that Aeneas loved, but which the gods and his destiny drive him to desert. He leaves the blazing pyre as he left the flames of Troy—both times he leaves unwillingly, and both times the gods force him to do so.²⁵

But at the same time the pyre is a positive image. As has already been pointed out, Dido and Carthage represented the second of the great tests which Aeneas had to face before his arrival in Latium. When the pyre goes up in flames that second danger has been passed—Aeneas has successfully undergone the second trial as he did the first, and the flames which now consume the body of Dido symbolize, cruel as it may be, his success in the face of this second ordeal and, something that is perhaps even more important, the power of the forces that are moving behind him.

It is at this point then that the two fire images from II and IV converge to point up and broaden the implications of the scene. As Aeneas sails away toward Italy, he is headed once more in the direction the fates would have him go; and as in II he learned the direction he was to take from the shooting star which fell onto Mt. Ida, so here this same image of fire pointing his way and symbolizing his journey is caught up and continued by the pyre of Dido.²⁶

²⁵ For a discussion of Aeneas as an unwilling subject under the pressure of his own destiny, see Heinze, *op. cit.*, pp. 301-2. *Volentem fata ducunt, nolentem trahunt.*

²⁶ Cf. Servius (Dan.) on line 662: *et bene infausta omnia imprecatur ei, quia ad novi regni auspicia properat.* It must be admitted that the

In connection with the motif of Aeneas' departure, both from Troy and from Carthage, his final words with Creusa in II and with Dido in IV deserve a brief examination.

The loss of Creusa is, of course, necessary, both for the Dido story and for all of the action in the second half of the poem. But the same may be also said for Dido, for much the same reason, because her desertion is as much a part of the scheme of things as is the loss of Creusa. Although when his wife appears to Aeneas for the last time she is performing the important mechanical function of informing him of some of the further trials he is to face, she makes the scene a memorable one by reason of the rather wistful pathos of her final words. But when Aeneas tries to clasp her, her shade eludes his grasp, and leaves him *multa volentem/dicere* (790-1). Aeneas' last encounter with Dido is quite the opposite of this; instead of a picture of his future greatness she leaves him a curse. Behind the towering, forceful figure of Dido the shadowy Creusa is almost forgotten; but when the queen had uttered her parting words to Aeneas, she was then taken by her servants to her chambers, leaving him *multa parantem / dicere* (390-1). In addition to the verbal similarity between the two passages, one's attention is caught by the fact that both expressions occur in exactly the same place in the hexameter line. The words *multa volentem* or *multa parantem* are placed, in both cases, at the end of the line, while *dicere* both times begins a new one. Considering the circumstances this could hardly be accidental. Moreover, the shift from *volentem dicere* in the case of Creusa to *parantem dicere* in the case of Dido is a remarkable example of brief, but penetrating psychology. What it amounts to is an implicit comparison between Aeneas' relations with each of these two women.

connection between the falling star and the pyre of Dido is not nearly so striking as that between the pyre and the flames of Troy. The use of fire, however, as an omen connected with Aeneas' destiny is continued later in the poem. Cf., for example, the flaming arrow of Aescetes (V, 519 ff.) and the appearance of the flame upon the head of Lavinia (VII, 72-7), an omen which recalls the similar experience of Ascanius in II. On the other hand, the immediate result of the fire portent as well as the other ominous warnings experienced by Lavinia is to forestall her marriage with Turnus, and thus concerns Aeneas only indirectly. Moreover, the significance of Aescetes' arrow is not clear. For a discussion of the difficulties of this passage, see Heinze, pp. 165 ff.

With Creusa he was obviously unrestrained, relaxed, and perfectly sincere; for when the moment of their parting came, words quickly rushed to his lips—too many, in fact, for him to have time to utter them all. But one has the impression that he was never completely at ease with Dido, and when, in one of the supreme moments of her passion, she pours a torrent of abuse upon him, he presents an almost ridiculous figure as he stands before her, *planning* what he is going to reply.²⁷ It would be difficult to find a better example either of the economy or the eloquence of Vergil's art.

In returning to the motif of *dolus* which permeates II and IV, we may now consider the further significance of Dido's accusations against Aeneas that I spoke of earlier.

In a number of ways, Aeneas repeats at Carthage an experience much like the one he had on the night of Troy's

²⁷ These lines have been much discussed. Cf. A. Cartault, *L'art de Virgile dans l'Énéide* (Paris, 1926), pp. 321-2: "Elle interrompt brusquement l'entretien, laissant Énée dans la situation ridicule que Virgile ne lui épargne pas, de quelqu'un qui aurait bien des choses à dire, mais qui n'en trouve pas le moyen." E. K. Rand, however (*The Magical Art of Vergil* [Cambridge, Mass., 1931], p. 360), interprets Aeneas' actions here as arising from fear of hurting Dido further, and R. Austin (*P. Vergili Maronis Aeneidos Liber Quartus* [Oxford, 1955]) puts forth a similar interpretation. There is much truth in this point of view, but I feel the scene takes on both greater significance and added emotional impact through the almost pathetic contrast of Aeneas' clumsy outward behavior in this "situation ridicule," and the terrible struggle within himself, a struggle which gives his character its most profound and tragic expression. Cf. G. Carlsson, "The Hero and Fate in Virgil's *Aeneid*," *Eranos*, XLIII (1945), pp. 117-18. Pöschl has described this inner conflict with great sensitivity (p. 74): "Die schmerzvolle Entsagung Äneas besteht nicht in dem Verzicht auf das Glück der Liebe, sondern darin, dass er sich versagen muss, den Schmerz der Königen zu lindern, dass ihn die religiöse Pflicht gegen die Götter und Enkel zwingt, seine menschliche Pflicht gegen Dido zu versäumen." C. Buscaroli's attempt (*Il libro di Didone* [Milan, 1932]) to get around what he considers an undesirable picture of Aeneas here by treating *multa* as an adverb is unconvincing. He translates 390-1: "lasciandolo molto irrisolto per tema e mentre molto si disponeva a dirle." Cf. *Georg.*, IV, 499-502 (Orpheus and Eurydice):

dixit et ex oculis subito, ceu fumus in auras
commixtus tenuis, fugit diversa neque illum
prensantem nequiquam umbras et multa volentem
dicere praeterea vidit.

capture. Most of these parallels have already been discussed. Both times he leaves something he loves, and in each case it is his own personal destiny which forces him to do so. In both cases he temporarily forgets or chooses to ignore what he knows the gods require him to do, and both times his recollection of his fated purpose and his departure for Italy are marked by the image of fire pointing his way. But under the reproaches and imprecations of Dido, Aeneas is driven into a position clearly parallel, even analagous to, the role played by the Greeks at Troy.

It will be recalled that in II it was the treachery of the Greeks that was constantly emphasized; but in IV it is Aeneas who is repeatedly accused of faithlessness. His first words in II, in a passage already cited, after he realized that Troy was betrayed, were (309-10):

tum vero manifesta fides, Danaumque patescunt
insidiae.

Compare with this the words of Dido (IV, 373): *nusquam tuta fides*, or again (597-9):

 en dextra fidesque,
quem secum patrios aiunt portare penatis,
quem subiisse umeris confectum aetate parentem!

In connection with this, the reader may refer to other statements of Dido (305-6, 365-6) cited above. Aeneas is the stranger who comes to a foreign land. While he did not, as did the Greeks, arrive with hostile intent, he nevertheless leaves the queen dead, just as the Greeks left Priam dead, and both the Greeks and Aeneas leave with flames at their backs. A further significance of the flame image begins to emerge.

The implicit comparison between Dido and Priam in my last remarks leads me, finally, to a comparative examination of the tragic fate of these two rulers, where we find one of the most important and clearly delineated motifs connecting II and IV. It is here that the position of Aeneas at Carthage is most noticeably reversed from the one he held at Troy, and where this reversal is, indeed, the most ironical.

There is a heavy overtone of irony which runs through both II and IV. Sometimes it is brutally explicit, as when the Trojan children play about the wooden horse as it is being drawn

into the city (II, 238-9). But Vergil more often uses this irony in a more intricate manner by weaving it into larger scenes whose issues are greater, and whose implications are more far-reaching. It is this irony which he employed as one of his chief devices in uniting into a single motif the respective fates of Dido and Priam.

It was Priam himself who first ordered that the bonds be removed from Sinon's hands (II, 146-7):

ipse viro primus manicas atque alta levare
vincla iubet Priamus.

It is, again, Priam who welcomes Sinon and invites him to become one of his own people (148-9):

Quisquis es (amissos hinc iam obliviscere Graios)
noster eris.

In the first case cited above, the poet is obviously calling attention to the irony implicit in the situation with the emphatic use of the two words *ipse* and *primus*, while the words of Priam in the second example find a close echo in Dido's words of welcome to the Trojans in I (573-4):

urbem quam statuo, vestra est; subducite naves;
Tros Tyriusque mihi nullo discrimine agetur.

In both these cases a ruler generously welcomes a helpless stranger, and is in turn destroyed by the person whom he so received.

As Priam approaches his death, his extreme weakness and feebleness are dwelt upon (II, 509-11):

arma diu senior desueta trementibus aevo
circumdat nequiquam umeris et inutile ferrum
cingitur.

When, in a pathetic last effort, he casts his spear at Pyrrhus, the missile is weak and without force (544-5):

sic fatus senior telumque imbelles sine ictu
coniecit.

The corresponding weakness of Dido is not so explicitly stated, but is nevertheless to be understood. She is, indeed, as helpless in the grip of fate as was Priam, since she is no more successful in delaying Aeneas' departure than Priam was in halting the onslaught of the Greeks and of Pyrrhus. Moreover, when

Aeneas leaves, Dido realizes that she can no longer face without him the formidable neighboring tribes whom she appears to have handled capably enough before his arrival. Cf. 534-6:

En, quid ago? rursusne procos inrisa priores
experiār, Nomadumque petam connubia supplex,
quos ego sim totiens iam dedignata maritos?

Priam, just before his death at the hands of Pyrrhus, upbraids that young man for his cruelty, charging that he lies when he claims to be the son of Achilles (II, 540-1):

at non ille, satum quo te mentiris, Achilles
talis in hoste fuit Priamo.

Dido, too, accuses Aeneas of lying about his birth (IV, 365-6):

nec tibi diva parens generis nec Dardanus auctor,
perfide.

He could not be the man they say he is (597-9):

en dextra fidesque,
quem secum patrios aiunt portare penatis,
quem subiisse umeris confectum aetate parentem!

The clamor and wailing that arise in the house of Priam as Troy is destroyed closely resemble the lamentations described at the death of Dido. As the doors of Priam's palace are battered down, the rooms resound with the cries of women (486-8):

at domus interior gemitu miseroque tumultu
miscetur, penitusque cavae plangoribus aedes
femineis ululant; ferit aurea sidera clamor.

Compare with this the scene around Dido's pyre immediately after her suicide, where much the same kind of description is given (665-8):

it clamor ad alta
atria; concussam bacchatur Fama per urbem.
Lamentis gemituque et femineo ululatu
tectā fremunt, resonat magnis plangoribus aether.

It will be easily seen that the verbal similarity between these two passages is remarkable.

II

plangoribus *femineis* ululant
ferit *aurea sidera* clamor
penitusque cavae *plangoribus*
aedes

IV

femineo ululatu
it clamor ad alta *atria*
resonat magnis *plangoribus*
aether

Finally, as the body of Priam drops to the ground, the poet reflects upon his former greatness and good fortune (556-7):

. . . tot quondam populis terrisque superbum
regnatorem Asiae.

But now he sees his city destroyed (555-6): *prolapsa videntem / Pergama*, and falls, a headless and nameless trunk (558): *avulsumque umeris caput et sine nomine corpus*.

Dido, too, about to die, tearfully recounts all that she had accomplished during her lifetime, contrasting that former state with her present misery (655-8):

urbem praeclaram statui, mea moenia vidi,
ulta virum poenas inimico a fratre recepi,
felix, heu nimium felix, si litora tantum
numquam Dardaniae tetigissent nostra carinae.

At this point we may return to the first book again to examine a scene where the parallel fates of Dido and Priam are distinctly foreshadowed. I have already called attention to a statement of Venus (673-4) in which the triple meaning of *flamma*, i. e. the love and the hatred felt by Dido, as well as the pyre itself, is clearly to be seen:

quocirca capere ante dolis et cingere flamma
reginam meditor.

It is only a few lines later that the flames of Troy are mentioned in a verse packed with sinister double meaning. Ascanius, says Venus, is bringing Dido *gifts*, and those things that remain from the flames of Troy—*dona ferens pelago et flammis restantia Troiae*. One of these gifts is a robe of Helen, and the sinister implication here can hardly be mistaken. Would it be too much to suggest here a reversal of Laocoon's famous words (II, 49), *quidquid id est, timeo Danaos et dona ferentis*.

But the passage in I which has the most significance for the point at hand is where Aeneas stands gazing at the carved figures in the temple of Juno at Carthage. Here, in Carthage, the city of Dido, he is reliving incidents from the great war. The scene is dominated by the image of battle. Priam himself is mentioned three times, each time to illustrate his tragedy. The scene then shifts abruptly to Dido, and again we have her presented in close conjunction with the mention of the fall of Troy. Here, then, the tragic tale has reached its middle point,

and the story hangs in the balance between the fates of Priam and of Dido—the first already passed, the second yet to come. The past, present, and future are all combined into a single scene of immense tragic implications as Dido enters the temple where Aeneas stands gazing at the carved representations of the war of Troy. The two tragedies are placed side by side, with Aeneas the connecting link standing between them. Through the parallels already implicit between these two rulers, between these two tragedies, and the presence of Aeneas the catalytic agent which fuses them into a unit, the irony of the scene becomes almost unbearable.

But in returning to IV, the passage which serves as the ultimate crux of the parallelism between Priam and Dido, which makes explicit the latent implication of all that has gone before and crystalizes the reversal of Aeneas' role, comes in lines 669-71 where, following the lamentations of the women quoted above, *the scene around Dido's pyre is compared to the capture of a burning city*:

non aliter quam si immissis ruat hostibus omnis
Karthago aut antiqua Tyros, flammaeque furentes
culmina perque hominum volvuntur perque deorum.²⁸

Here the scene is completely dominated by the pyre. Aeneas has faded into the distance, and remains in the background only as a motivating force determining the actions of Dido. There is, of course, a great difference between a single individual's pyre and an entire city in flames, and yet, by the time the climax has been reached, this lone figure, this single individual, or rather, the *importance* and the *tragedy* of this one person have assumed enormous dimensions and can, indeed, easily bear the full weight of parallelism with an entire city.²⁹

²⁸ Notice the constant presence of the flame image here. Pöschl considers the significance of this simile to lie in the identification of Dido with Carthage itself, as the destiny of her city is represented in the flaming pyre (p. 124): "Das Schicksal Didos wird transparent und fließt mit dem Schicksal ihrer Stadt zusammen." A further example of the extraordinary richness of Vergilian imagery.

²⁹ Cf. Paratore's note on line 669 (*Virgilio Eneide libro quatro* [Rome, 1947]), where he cites Macrobius (*Sat.*, IV, 6, 1-5), "il quale cita il luogo virgiliano come esempio di *pathos* nascente dal fatto che *aliquid proponitur quod per se magnum sit, deinde minus esse ostenditur quam illud quod volumus augeri.*"

It is clear that Dido, through her close similarity to Priam here, draws further sympathy upon herself, and distinctly at the expense of Aeneas. The reader may well ask himself if Vergil is not going too far, for he has been consistently using the devastating irony of this parallelism to force Aeneas into what seems a distinctly unfavorable position. This view, however, ignores the fact that Vergil, as has already been pointed out, continually manipulates a number of emotional and intellectual currents simultaneously, especially in the more important scenes,³⁰ with the result that any attempt at such over-simplification must remain inadequate. A further example of such technique is to be found in a recurring simile in the second and fourth books which has direct bearing on our interpretation of the situation in which Aeneas finds himself involved in IV, and in terms of which his actions there must be interpreted.

Troy, as it sinks into ashes, is compared to a great tree which, after having been furiously chopped, begins to totter, and finally crashes to earth (II, 626-31):

Ac veluti summis antiquam in montibus ornum
cum ferro accisam crebrisque bipennibus instant
eruere agricolae certatim; illa usque minatur
et tremefacta comam concusso vertice nutat,
vulneribus donec paulatim evicta supremum
congemuit traxitque iugis avolsa ruinam.

In IV Aeneas, under the tears and entreaties of Dido and Anna, is also compared to a great tree, this time an oak, buffeted by the winds (441-6):³¹

ac velut annoso validam cum robore quercum
Alpini Boreae nunc hinc nunc flatibus illinc
eruere inter se certant; it stridor, et altae
consternunt terram concussam stipite frondes;
ipsa haeret scopulis et quantum vertice ad auras
aetherias, tantum radice in Tartara tendit.

The effect of these passages is unmistakable. Much of the significance of the simile in IV lies in the fact that there the tree does not fall; but the strength of this particular tree, and

³⁰ Cf. note 27 above.

³¹ Another much discussed passage; cf. Pease, *op. cit.*, pp. 367-8; for an excellent treatment, see Pöschl, pp. 75-8.

so that of Aeneas himself, is all the more strongly emphasized because the reader cannot help but recall the tree from II which was destroyed. Through the medium of the simile Aeneas is indirectly compared with the defeated city of Troy, and, by implication, with the role he himself played there. The implication is that Aeneas has increased in heroic stature, or perhaps more accurately, his heroic stature is receiving increased emphasis, and the tree which tragically fell in II now stands firm and will not go down a second time. Vergil, in his unobtrusive way, is again reminding his audience that there are larger and greater issues at stake here than just the relations of Dido and Aeneas.³² By juxtaposing the hint of these larger issues with the unquestionable taint of guilt on Aeneas, brought out by his resemblance to the Greeks at Troy, he is again pointing up two sides of his hero—his fortitude as against his personal nature which is by no means faultless, and thus succeeds in maintaining a delicate emotional balance as well as an enlarged perspective in this difficult situation.

The tragedies of Troy and Dido thus parallel one another, and form together the first tragic movement of the poem. Any attempt to analyze more fully the implications of the interrelations between these two books is, of course, beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say, however, that Pöschl's view of I-IV as a unit whose predominant cast is one of darkness, and the importance attached by Conway and Duckworth to the general similarity between the even-numbered books, are, at least in terms of II and IV, fully justified. This position is supported not only by the tragic tone of the two books, upon which they principally base their analyses, but even more by the numerous interlocking motifs connecting these two episodes which serve such similar functions in the story of Aeneas and his destiny.

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³² This particular simile is not, of course, the only means used by the poet to give the situation greater depth and wider implications. I have chosen it as an illustrative example only because of its immediate relevancy to my subject, as one of the connecting links between II and IV.

ISOCRATES' METHODS OF TEACHING.

In a previous note ¹ I foreshadowed further comments on the teaching methods used by Isocrates in his school. Despite a fair amount of recent discussion of the teacher and his work,² I have never seen any attempt fully to elucidate the actual details of these methods and their relation to Isocrates' general philosophical beliefs. Yet I feel such an attempt is worthwhile for two reasons. First, as Jebb ³ points out, "the school of Aristotle—in which rhetoric was both scientifically and assiduously taught—produced not a single orator of note except Demetrius Phalereus; the school of Isocrates produced a host. Why was this so? Clearly because Isocrates, though inferior in his grasp of principles, was greatly superior in the practical department of teaching." The methods of such a teacher are worth elucidating for themselves. Secondly, it may be of wider interest to observe Isocrates' teaching methods as the practical reflection of his broader philosophy—the aspect of him which is now receiving most attention. Such a study may add depth to our view of his teaching while giving a new insight into his philosophy.

Teaching methods vary with the subjects taught, and the subjects in a curriculum vary with the aims set before pupil and teacher. Isocrates aimed to produce statesmen; it would be so convenient if he had left us a list of the subjects his pupils studied to that end—but we have only inference to guide us. Burk ⁴ lists eleven subjects, to which one is quite entitled to add

¹ *A. J. P.*, LXXVIII (1957), p. 297.

² Notably, A. Burk, *Die Pädagogik des Isokrates* (Würzburg, 1923); W. Jaeger, *Paideia*, III (Blackwell, 1945); H. I. Marrou, *A History of Education in Antiquity* (3rd ed., Sheed and Ward, 1956); W. Steidle, "Redekunst und Bildung bei Isokrates," *Hermes*, LXXX (1952), pp. 257-96; E. Mikkola, *Isokrates* (Helsinki, 1954).

³ R. C. Jebb, *The Attic Orators*, II (London, 1876), p. 431.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, pp. 118-19. "Die Zahl der Fächer die in der isokratischen Schule der Verstandesbildung dienten, war freilich nicht gross. Es gab eigentlich nur ein Fach: die Rhetorik. Aber darin war eine ganze Reihe unserer modernen Unterrichtszweige eingeschlossen: Grammatik, Stil, Aufsatz- und Vortragslehre; Heimatkunde, Geschichte und Archä-

Geography, Political Science, perhaps Strategy; clearly there is no safe way of deciding exactly what subjects Isocrates taught besides formal rhetoric. In any case, while we may assume that such topics as I have cited would be discussed by Isocrates' pupils, one can hardly imagine that Isocrates conformed to the practice of a modern institution and taught each subject for a fixed number of hours per week with examination and credits at the end of the course. His "curriculum" was almost certainly ill-defined, within certain broad limits: he taught no mathematics (though he approved of the study as *γυμνασία τῆς ψυχῆς*)⁵—still less the other sciences; he taught the technique of oratory; and his pupils learned the matter necessary to form their political, social, and ethical judgements and to provide content for their speeches. Fortunately, for a consideration of his teaching methods, such broad limits are enough; these methods varied according as Isocrates was teaching how to compose a speech or what to put in it.

In the teaching of rhetoric Isocrates believed in the educational trinity of natural ability, sound teaching, and practice,⁶ which he had learnt from Protagoras.⁷ Of these three factors he regarded teaching as least important;⁸ and though he valued natural talent very highly, it is beyond the teacher's power to produce it. Therefore he concentrated his efforts on seeing that his pupils practised hard, and on prescribing and correcting what they practised. In a passage of the *Antidosis* (180-5) he compares the teacher of rhetoric to the *paidotribes*; the passage is of fundamental importance in illustrating Isocrates' method, and part must be quoted:

Ἐπειδὴν γὰρ λάβωσι μαθητάς, οἱ μὲν παιδοτρίβαι τὰ σχήματα τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἀγωνίαν εὐρημένα τοὺς φοιτῶντας διδάσκουσιν, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ὄντες τὰς ἰδέας ἀπάσας, αἷς ὁ λόγος τυγχάνει χρώμενος, διεξέρχονται τοῖς μαθηταῖς. ἐμπείρους δὲ τούτων ποιήσαντες καὶ διακριβώσαντες ἐν τούτοις πάλιν γυμνάζουσιν αὐτούς, καὶ πονεῖν ἐθίζουσιν, καὶ συνείρειν καθ' ἕνα καστον ὧν ἔμαθον ἀναγκά-

ologie; Jurisprudenz auf ihren verschiedensten Gebieten; nicht zuletzt Religionslehre, Lebensweisheit und Philosophie."

⁵ *Antid.* 266.

⁶ *Antid.* 187.

⁷ Cf. H. Diels, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, II (West Berlin, 1952), p. 264.

⁸ *Antid.* 192.

ζουσιν, ἵνα ταῦτα βεβαιότερον κατὰσχωσι καὶ τῶν καιρῶν ἐγγυτέρω ταῖς δόξαις γένωνται. . . . Τοῦτον δὲ τὸν τρόπον ἐπιμελόμενοι καὶ παιδεύοντες μέχρι μὲν τοῦ γενέσθαι βελτίους αὐτοὺς αὐτῶν τοὺς μαθητὰς καὶ ἔχειν ἄμεινον, τοὺς μὲν τὰς διανοίας τοὺς δὲ τὰς τῶν σωμάτων ἑξεις, ἀμφοτέροι δύνανται προαγαγεῖν.

Obviously, the techniques of the one teacher are in essence the techniques of the other; it is essential to examine with some care the techniques of the *paidotribes*.

In the first place, he does not teach a class of boys at once; the sort of mass gymnastic exercise one sees at a modern gymkhana is not found in the Athenian palaestra—any mass movements were restricted to military or choral drills. The normal teaching of a *paidotribes* with a class, as we can gather from vase-paintings, is to attend to one or two boys exercising, while the rest of the class either watch and listen or go on with their own exercises until he comes to them—the same procedure as is found on most athletic grounds today.

The athletic instructor takes his boys and teaches them, individually, the "schemata"—the holds and grips and throws of wrestling, the stances and moves of boxing, the positions and gestures of the other athletic events. One by one he explains these, and puts the boy into one position after another, always making sure that he can take up the position or make the move by himself, and exercising the pupil often in that particular move or position. He points out distinctions amongst the schemata and makes sure the pupil understands and is well practised.

This is only the first step. The pupil who has learnt individual moves and positions must learn to "string them together" (*συνείρειν καθ' ἓν ἕκαστον*), much as children learn to string together syllables, to read and pronounce polysyllabic words. Thus the pupil is exercised in fluency of movement, and may be set, say, to wrestle with another under the eye of the *paidotribes*. In the actual wrestling competition he learns to choose and employ and combine the individual holds and moves, to apply particular ones for particular opponents, to avoid those which expose his own weakness; and all this time the *paidotribes* is likely to halt the match and correct and show the proper way and put both competitors through further exercises on individual moves or combinations of moves.

How are these techniques applied to the school of rhetoric?

In the first place, the practice of individual tuition. Isocrates had a school of very few pupils—probably never more than eight boys at a time in all stages of the course. Therefore he could hardly fail to give them most painstaking and detailed attention. Furthermore—as in the palaestra—all could listen and draw profit from the particular instruction given to one.

In the instruction of the individual pupil, Isocrates still follows the same technique as the *paidotribes*. First he teaches the *schemata*, as he says (*Antid.* 183) “all the *idéai* used in a speech.” Hubbell in his study of Isocrates⁹ makes a full examination of the meaning of *idéai* (pp. 6-9), and proves, particularly from *Ep.*, VI, 8, that they are not just the divisions of a speech nor “the schemata of Gorgias (the figures of rhetorical speech) but the thought elements or ideas, as we should call them, which the orator has ready as part of his stock in trade” (p. 7). Jaeger¹⁰ sees in this teaching of patterns of thought the influence of Greek medicine. The comparison to a physician is as apt as Isocrates’ analogy of the *paidotribes*. Each, as well as the teacher of rhetoric, is teaching pupils to deal with limitless individual cases—of disease, of athletic rivalry, of intellectual conflict. Each makes and teaches a classification of those cases—types and symptoms of disease, build and grips of opponents, arguments and styles of speech; each teaches the total of techniques which may be applied in medicine, wrestling, arguments or oratory to prevail over each particular type. The pupil’s business in each case is the same—to diagnose the methods of his enemy and to choose the appropriate course of action.

Then Isocrates pits pupil against pupil in the rhetorical counterpart of the wrestling match. The pupil has previously composed sections of speech and even whole speeches—single speeches, spoken without opposition. In rhetorical competition he learns how to apply these arts of composition—“to choose and blend and arrange them suitably, to use them at the right time.”¹¹ Just as the wrestler learns by experience that a particular opening is best exploited by a certain type of attack, so the young rhetor learns what arguments are most convincing

⁹ H. M. Hubbell, *The Influence of Isocrates on Cicero, Dionysius and Aristides* (Yale University Press, 1913).

¹⁰ *Paideia*, III, p. 61.

¹¹ *Against the Sophists*, 16.

in a given case, in a given part of a speech, or against a particular opponent. Just as the medical student for all his book learning is incompetent until years of clinical experience have taught him to recognize and deal with ailments, so the pupil is no rhetor until he can stand up to the fire and cunning of an opponent in public debate, and vanquish him by the arguments and style of delivery appropriate to that particular case.

However, there were other subjects in Isocrates' curriculum besides composition. The pupils had to learn the merits of various literary styles, and had to be taught the necessary materials for forming sound political judgements. History, political science, geography, ethics, literary studies are included in the curriculum. The methods of teaching these subjects may be deduced from the fact that Isocrates' school was a school of political rhetoric. Inevitably, these studies were taught not for their own sakes as they are in a modern university, but for the help they could give to a rhetor in making decisions or influencing an audience. Being ancillary to rhetorical composition, the subjects were covered as composition required.

The simplest illustration of this principle at work is the method of teaching what I have called literary studies—that is, the analysis and stylistic criticism of literary works in verse and prose. This study in Isocrates' school is merely the complement of composition; the pupils see the excellence and faults of others and learn to imitate the one and avoid the other. The method of teaching could possibly be by lecture—Isocrates pointing out the merits and demerits of a given piece, the pupils passively taking notes; but it seems more likely that he would have encouraged the pupils themselves to criticize and discuss the pieces—the practice of group-discussion was a feature of the school on which I shall have more to say. The examples of the *Busiris* and Plato's *Phaedrus* present another hypothesis—that the pupils were given two works on a single topic (Polycrates and Isocrates on *Busiris*, like Lysias and Socrates on *Eros*) and asked to compare and discuss them in detail. In the *Protagoras* Plato presents the scene of Socrates and Protagoras arguing over the details of diction in a poem of Simonides; it would appear from Isocrates' encouragement of discussion and his attention to detail that the studies in literature in his school followed a similar procedure—with the pupils then embodying in their compositions the fruits of their discussion.

The subjects more concerned with content—history, ethics, political science, geography—were dealt with in a somewhat different way. These, after all, are merely the facts with which judgements are made. They were not elevated into the autonomous disciplines they are nowadays, requiring such dissimilar subsidiary subjects as archaeology, meteorology, and metaphysics. The *historiae* of Thucydides and of Hellanicus of Lesbos were both books requiring no specialist knowledge beyond the ability to read, nor any difference of mental approach that warranted a difference in methods of teaching or study; yet from one book the pupils learnt history, from the other geography. Since these subjects required no specialized techniques of teaching or learning, it seems likely that they were not so much taught to the pupil as read by him—and the knowledge employed in his composition. It is obvious from Isocrates' exhortations to Demonicus¹² and Nicocles¹³ to read the poets, and his discussion of written compositions in the *Evagoras*,¹⁴ that he had no objection to his pupils' learning material from books. There is certainly no evidence that he preferred the lecture method. Therefore it seems most likely that as the pupils' compositions came to require political knowledge or history, geography or an ethical message, Isocrates recommended the appropriate reading to them and supplemented this with his own knowledge or opinions.

This method does not necessarily mean that these subjects in Isocrates' school were dealt with in a careless and unscholarly manner—the school, after all, produced the major historians Theopompus, Ephorus, and Androtion. In the debates which were so much a part of Isocrates' teaching, naturally the advantage would go to the pupil with the more extensive reading, the more exact knowledge of the facts. Isocrates himself and all the school listened ready to correct and question—a procedure familiar to any student who has ever attended a tutorial, and a procedure certainly discouraging to inexact or inadequate scholarship. There is little reason to suppose that the criticism of Isocrates and eight or so keen-witted youngsters was much less

¹² *Demonicus*, 51. It would be out of place here to discuss the disputed authenticity of the *Demonicus*. It has little bearing on this essay.

¹³ *Ad Nic.* 13; cf. 3, 43.

¹⁴ *Evag.* 73-7.

stringent than Socrates' dissection of Lysias' speech in the *Phaedrus*.

Furthermore, the process would naturally give rise to speculation and reflection. The pupils were to find policies and advance them, and oppose them and find counter-policies. Minds could hardly be more keenly stimulated, striving thus over months and years—and considering always the same types of question, on constitutions or internal and foreign policies. Ethics and political science would especially flourish in such an atmosphere as the precepts of the moralists were adapted to contemporary conditions and to public as well as personal morality. Isocrates' own works provide examples of such speculation coming to fruition in the *Cyprians*, *Areopagiticus*, *Panegyricus*, and *Panathenaicus*.

It is important to realize that all these methods of teaching—by practice in composition, by literary analysis and discussion, by reading and competition—are accompanied by the most detailed attention and correction from the master himself and other pupils. In the *Antidosis* (206) he claims that one should be able to recognize the pupils of any good master, "men who have shared the same *paideia*," by a certain similarity amongst them; to achieve this in pupils would require incessant direction from the master. In the *Areopagiticus* (37, 47-8) he commends the old Athenians for continually correcting the young and in the *ad Nicoclem* (4) he laments the fact that princes have none to correct them—evidently he regards all education as a process of correction. Thus in listening to a pupil's composition, he would be preparing to correct not only his manner of delivery and the various points of literary style and rhetorical structure, but also the policy taken, the arguments used, and the facts on which those arguments were based; after the oration the pupil would hear these criticisms and corrections, the recommendations for further reading and further models to analyse and imitate, and the prescriptions for further composition which Isocrates would propose. In this way the entire course is centered on rhetorical composition, yet ensures not mere empty polish of technique but a breadth of knowledge and soundness of judgment such as to outweigh in educational value the purely vocational training provided.

A curious form of this constant correction is the practice of

group-criticism which seems to be a feature of the school. On at least two occasions in public speeches Isocrates describes how his own orations were scrutinized and criticized by his pupils before delivery. In the *Panathenaicus* he uses the story as an integral part of the speech: Isocrates describes how he was correcting the speech with his pupils, and sent for a former student, a Laconophile, who might examine the speech for truth or bias (*Panath.* 200). Most of the remainder of the speech is presented as the remarks of this ex-pupil and the replies of Isocrates. Again in the speech to Philip (17-23) he tells how his pupils had seen and passed judgement on the work before it left his hands for Philip's. Isocrates says that a teacher should supply models for his pupils (*Soph.* 18); but this is obviously something different. If the master would discuss with his pupils works in preparation or near to publication, it is safe to infer that such mutual criticism was a normal practice with the works of the pupils themselves. Thereby each gets the advantage of the help of all the others; and all get help and practice from every work composed in the school.

It is this last feature that is particularly significant in Isocrates' methods of teaching. Many of his other methods are derived from others: the systematic rules of rhetoric, the analysis of examples, the emphasis on practice—all these were part of the training given by the sophists of the fifth century.¹⁵ Certainly these sophists would have carefully corrected their pupils' efforts in rhetoric; but nowhere is there any suggestion that the pupils corrected the teacher, nor each other. Whatever the reliability of Plato's evidence, his pictures of the sophists are of authoritarian teachers, lecturing, expounding, indulging in close argument only to dazzle the unskilled, not at all relishing the more equal match with Socrates. Isocrates, on the other hand, positively seeks discussion—good-tempered, searching discussion, and group criticism.

This is not surprising when we consider his theories on the nature of thought and of knowledge. These theories may be concentrated in three words—*δόξα*, *λόγος*, *καιρός*—and the mean-

¹⁵ Marrou (*op. cit.*, pp. 53-6) gives a detailed picture of the teaching of these sophists. He treats them more sympathetically than Burk (*op. cit.*, pp. 22-3) who conceives them as giving an extremely authoritarian and illiberal training in formal rhetoric.

ings Isocrates attaches to them. The meanings and the theories are well known,¹⁶ but their exact integration with every detail of Isocrates' teaching methods does not seem to have been remarked.

Plato set *ἐπιστήμη* and *δόξα* in antithesis, and Isocrates continued it; but "the distinction usually drawn, in Plato for instance, between *δόξα* and *ἐπιστήμη*, the one 'opinion,' the other 'knowledge,' is not exactly that made by Isocrates. *δόξα* is here, not irresponsible opinion, but a working theory based on practical experience—judgement or insight in dealing with the uncertain contingencies of any human situation which presents itself. In this realm, he holds, there can be no exact science."¹⁷

δόξα is the outcome of *λόγος*. Isocrates' opinion of *λόγος* is expressed in two celebrated passages, too long to quote.¹⁸ In them Isocrates sets out the function of *λόγος*—to persuade, and to communicate ideas; to discover laws; to convict and extol—that is, to know good and evil; to educate; to debate and enquire. It is the mark of intelligence and judgement; it is the only true standard by which to judge a man's *ἀρετή*.

What is the conception of *logos* that underlies these eulogies? Isocrates conceives *logos* as speech—but more than speech. To speak one must have matter—facts, arguments, and reasons, appeal to feeling; *logos* is the power to discover these. It is also the power to express them in order. But it is still more; these qualities never founded cities, established laws and gave the beginnings of civilization. *Logos* is, at its deepest, the discourse of the mind with itself—the processes of thought. "The same arguments by which we persuade others in speech, we also use in our deliberations, and so, while we give the title of rhetoricians to those who can speak in public, we attribute prudent counsel to those who can most effectively debate their problems in the privacy of their own minds."¹⁹ Here, *logos* comes very close to logic; one can see how in the beginning primitive men "debating

¹⁶ They are discussed, often at length, in all the works cited in note 2 above—by Jaeger, Steidle, and Mikkola particularly.

¹⁷ G. Norlin, *Isocrates* (Loeb ed., 1929), p. 290, note.

¹⁸ *Cyprians*, 5-9, repeated word for word in *Antid.* 253-7; and *Paneg.* 47-9. Cf. Jaeger, *op. cit.*, pp. 89-90.

¹⁹ *Antid.* 256. Cf. Plato, *Theaetetus*, 189E: . . . λόγον δὲ αὐτὴ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἢ ψυχὴ διεξέρχεται περὶ ὧν ἂν σκοπῇ.

their problems in the privacy of their own minds" observed phenomena and drew conclusions and established laws; perceived where their advantage lay and persuaded others and founded cities; discovered moral codes and material goods, and taught their children the conclusions of their interior discourse.

In summary, then, Isocrates did not believe in the possibility of certain moral knowledge, of *ἐπιστήμη*, but only of *δόξα*. This is reached by *λόγος*. And one of the most important conclusions for *λόγος* to reach is the judgement of the *καιρός*—the opportune moment, the opportune circumstances, the opportune methods for advocating a course of action. Isocrates prides himself on the flexibility of mind that this implies, and takes issue with his predecessors and rivals: "To learn the elements from which we make and arrange all our speeches is not every difficult, if a man goes not to the teachers who make extravagant promises, but to those who know something about these things; but to choose each of these suitably, and blend them with each other and arrange them appropriately, to judge the right occasion, and to dapple the whole speech with attractive arguments, and deliver it with harmony and rhythm—this requires great study and is the work of a manly spirit, a spirit sound in judgement."²⁰

Now what is the relation of these psychological and epistemological ideas to Isocrates' teaching methods? Briefly summarized, the methods are: instruction in the fundamentals of rhetoric; the analysis of examples; abundant practice in composition; competition; and group criticism. The first three points are common to the other teachers of rhetoric,²¹ and are the teaching and practice which figure in the educational trinity. The last two are the direct outcome of the theories I have just been discussing.

The group-discussion of policies and details of style which I have described as a feature of Isocrates' school is a reflection in the field of education of Isocrates' view of interior *λόγος* as the power of thought or exterior *λόγος* as the means of social progress. Only a man who had little faith in absolute certainty, in *ἐπιστήμη*, and at the same time had respect for the power of human minds acting in concert, would adopt such a system of education. It is a system which accords very closely with democracy in politics.

²⁰ *Against the Sophists*, 16-17. Cf. *id.*, 12-13.

²¹ Marrou, *op. cit.*, pp. 53-4.

Is it wrong to suppose that this method of teaching, with its training not merely in forms but in freedom of expression, and in critical ability, and in facing criticism—this method far removed from the flashy and arrogant attitude of other teachers²²—was in large part responsible for the prestige Isocrates enjoyed as a teacher and the remarkable success he achieved in his pupils?

The other element in his teaching methods—the pitting of one pupil against another, as in the wrestling school—is another expression of these fundamental ideas. Isocrates clearly shows his esteem for the *καυρός*,²³ and just as clearly states that certain knowledge of it is impossible. Only abundant practice in competition will make the pupil “generally able to hit upon the best solution in (his) judgements.”²⁴ The importance of direct experience and the continual awareness that error is possible are pillars of his thinking equally in pedagogy and other fields.

The most recent large-scale study of Isocrates begins with a salutary exhortation²⁵ not to break him into fragments but to realize his wholeness and the interdependence of all aspects of his thought. Such an approach adds to Isocrates' stature as a thinker. It also gives us a new appreciation of him as a teacher. It is, I think, axiomatic in educational theory that the most effective education is given when day-to-day teaching methods are integrated to the utmost with a whole philosophy of life valid outside the classroom. In Isocrates' school, that integration is clear. The desire to train rhetors is in itself a reflection of Isocrates' reverence for the *logos*. In that training, the relative importance of talent, study, and practice; the methods

²² *Against the Sophists*, 1, 3, 9.

²³ Steidle, *op. cit.*, pp. 270 ff., makes a detailed examination of the importance of this element in Isocrates' philosophy.

²⁴ *Antid.* 271.

²⁵ Mikkola, *op. cit.*, p. 5. “Wenngleich die Gedankenwelt eines Menschen oft voll von Widersprüchen ist, hat er doch im Denken ein zwingendes Bedürfnis nach der Ganzheit, in der alle Teile sich nahtlos aneinander anschliessen, woher auch immer ihre eigentlichen Baumaterialien stammen mögen oder wieviel auch immer man sie anderswo verwendet haben mag. Darum handeln wir unrecht gegenüber dem betreffenden Menschen, wenn wir sein Denken in Stücke schlagen, indem wir untersuchen, wessen Gedanken er in jedem Augenblick als die seinigen vorträgt.”

of teaching rhetoric, by precept, example, practice, competition, and criticism—and of teaching speech-content, by reading, incorporation in speeches, criticism (like a modern tutorial class); disbelief in the possibility of certain knowledge; high esteem for discussion, judgement, and appropriateness; all these are mere reflections in the school-room of Isocrates' whole outlook on life. If space permitted, a clear connection could be shown—through the fundamental ideas of λόγος and δόξα—between these details of day-to-day teaching and Isocrates' ideal of the rhetor and his concept of ἀρετή; and these concepts would then lead on to his ideal of the state, and his concept of παιδεία, and of the meaning of man's life.

Isocrates' philosophy is praiseworthy if not profound;²⁶ and his few basic ideas permeate every aspect of his life, so that his educational methods are related to a political ideal and indeed an elevating *weltanschauung*. This gives his schooling that depth which, according to our nuances, distinguishes "education" from "training."

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²⁶ That its depth is underestimated is one theme of both Steidle and Mikkola.

HORACE, *CARMINA*, I, 2.

The second Ode of the first Book has commanded attention less successfully than the poems it most resembles, the third and the fourth of the Roman Odes. All alike address themselves to Octavian, the first explicitly and the other two tacitly: each in its way provides a mirror for magistrates. The Roman Odes have excited, if perhaps also evaded, considerable speculation as to their political meaning, but by dedicating *C.*, I, 2 to the ruler Horace has encouraged the assumption that he must be writing a paean. His tentative identification of Octavian and Mercury (41 ff.) has monopolized discussion, and one sometimes receives the impression that Horace concerned himself only to write a foot-note to the history of the ruler cult. Debates as to whether Horace thinks Octavian actually a god, metaphorically a god, or only very like a god, have moved from the confines of the text to the ampler context of comparative religion, sometimes with an almost apocalyptic suggestiveness.¹ Yet Horace's religion shows itself here to be an eminently practical one, and as a document in contemporary politics the Ode yields the clearest reading. Those who allow a diplomatic rather than a theological bias usually take the Ode as symptomatic of the poet's reconciliation to Octavian's rule. "The Ode is fitly placed in the forefront of the three Books, as containing once for all Horace's palinode and 'apologia.' He is professing and explaining his conversion to Caesarism."² Such a verdict bases itself primarily on the function—*Caesaris ultor*—which Horace prescribes for Mercury, incarnate in Octavian (44). For Sellar

¹ Zielinski ("Le Messianisme d'Horace," *L'Antiquité Classique*, VIII [1939], pp. 171-80) invokes the Arcadian Hermes and his son Logos, and incorporating the Gospel according to St. John emerges with a remarkably hospitable view of Octavian as "le Verbe, Verbe créateur, Verbe, identifié à la second personne de la Trinité, Verbe, identifié au Messie" (p. 179). Cf. K. Rupprecht, "Gott auf Erden," *Würz. Jahr. für Alt.*, I (1946), pp. 67-78.

² E. C. Wickham, *Odes of Horace* (Oxford, 1904), *ad loc.* Cf. the editions of C. L. Smith (Boston, 1903), C. H. Moore (New York, 1902), P. Shorey (Norwood, 1923). I used the text of Kiessling-Heinze, 8th ed. (Berlin, 1955).

the phrase was sufficient to convict Horace of suggesting that Octavian's "first duty was, as the avenger of Julius Caesar, to crush the remnants of the party for which Horace himself had fought."³ Yet Horace has come less to praise Caesar than to bury him, and his "declaration of allegiance"⁴ to Caesar's adopted son and heir presents at the same time a warning. Summaries naming the Ode a clear panegyric preserve only a half truth, and it is my purpose to emphasize the other half; to show that if the Ode displays the characteristics of a paean, it betrays those of Cautionary Verses.

What is the poem about? Primarily revenge, as the repetition of *ultor* insists (18, 44, 51). We hear of Jupiter's punishment of the Romans, and of the river god Tiber's; Mercury is hailed as avenger of Caesar, and urged to exact revenge, under Octavian's leadership, from the Medes. The concept of vengeance includes those of crime, punishment, and expiation. The first stanza suggests that a divine wrath pursues the Romans; we learn of their *vitium* (23, 47) and *scelus* (29), and of the need for expiation (29). The opening words, *iam satis*, announce an accompanying theme of excess, one reinforced by the persistent hiss of the *s*'s in the first two lines. The plea for a savior, *tandem venias* (30), confirms our sense of a too long continued punishment, as does the repetition of *nimum* (17, 37). Excessive revenge emerges as the subject of the first five stanzas, as images of natural chaos—snow, hail, lightning, and a flooding of the Tiber—declare a divine wrath against the Roman people. The tempest Horace describes has been so severe as to approach that survived only by Deucalion and Pyrrha, when the disruption approximated the ultimate fantasy of traditional *adunata*. Fishes clung to trees (9-10), and does (11-12) swam in the sea—one scholiast detected here an inappropriate levity: *leviter in re tam atroci et piscium et palumborum meminit, nisi quod hi excessus lyricis concessi sunt* (Porphyrio, *ad loc.*). It is surprising to find Mr. Wilkinson even less indulgent: "Horace has got onto a well known *locus* and let his fancy lead him astray."⁵

³ *Horace and the Elegiac Poets* (Oxford, 1924), p. 153.

⁴ Smith, *ad loc.*

⁵ *Horace and his Lyric Poetry* (Cambridge, 1946), p. 63. Peerlkamp (Amstel, 1862) and Meineke (Berlin, 1874) simply omit the stanza as unworthy: *totius carminis maiestate indignissimos* (Meineke *ad loc.*).

In evoking a somewhat mannered vision of Pyrrha's age Horace is exercised less by his fancy than by the effort to find a sufficiently grotesque illustration of the chaos his generation has witnessed. Fishes assume the actions of birds (*haesit ulmo*, 9) and land animals those of fish (*natarunt aequore dammae*, 11-12): earth, sea, and sky become inchoate. If the first three stanzas insist upon the violation of nature's processes, the next two announce a shattering of divine sanction as well:

vidimus flavum Tiberim retortis
litore Etrusco violenter undis
ire deiectum monumenta regis 15
templaque Vestae,

Iliae dum se nimium querenti
iactat ultorem, vagus et sinistra
labitur ripa Iove non probante u-
xorius amnis. 20

The link with myth now becomes aetiological rather than comparative, as an excessive desire for vengeance—for whether we take *nimium* with *querenti* or *ultorem* the sense remains clear⁶—defines itself as the cause of Rome's misfortunes. Jove's disapproval (19) of Tiber's excessive zeal seems to confirm Horace's hope that the Father has sufficiently punished his people (1-4). The sacrilegious character of the river god's revenge is dramatized by the buildings he attacks. Horace mentions only the Regia, built by Numa the Good and official residence of the Pontifex Maximus, and the shrine of Vesta, peaceful goddess of the hearth.

The poem's logic demands that we take the first twenty lines as something more than a report on actual weather conditions at Rome. Unless we allow the first five stanzas to stand as symbols of political chaos, the sixth has no meaning in terms of what precedes:

audiet civis acuisse ferrum,
quo graves Persae melius perirent,
audiet pugnas vitio parentum
rara iuventus. 21-4

If Horace compels us to a larger interpretation only at line

⁶ L. Mueller (St. Petersburg, 1900), Wickham, and Kiessling-Heinze understand the first; which seems preferable; Plessis-Lejay (Paris, 1909), Shorey, and Moore take the second.

twenty-one, he has already prepared us for the transition from meteorological to political terms. The animals (does and doves) and buildings bearing the force of the storm associate themselves with peace,⁷ while the violence of Tiber's attack—*retortis undis*,⁸ *violenter*, *deiectum*—suggests an analogy with battle. If the *horrida tempestas* gathering in the thirteenth Epode bore a political relevance,⁹ the storm clouds are now seen to have broken in full fury. To take the various aberrations of nature as symbols of civil war in general is preferable to Porphyrio's popular identification of them as the portents following the murder of Caesar:

Post occisum C. Caesarem, quem Cassius et Brutus alii que coniurati interfecerunt, multa portenta sunt visa; Tiberis enim ita crevit, ut prodigii loco haberetur. Haec autem omnia (omina?) vult videri in ultionem occisi principis facta et poenam eorum, qui bella civilia agere non desinebant (*ad* 1, ed. Hauthal).

The earliest estimate puts the Ode eight years after Julius Caesar's death, while it is probable that fifteen years had elapsed:¹⁰ would Horace's storm still convey so specific a reference to his contemporaries? The commentator's interpretation is narrower than the poet's, for Horace does not so restrict himself. His images of disorder are not markedly similar to the portents after Caesar's death recorded by other authors, and he has deliberately neglected the most remarkable—sweating and

⁷ Horace later connects the temple of Vesta explicitly with peace; from her the Romans entreat a savior to end civil wars (26-8).

⁸ The phrase has caused much confusion as to its meaning in terms of the Tiber's actual course; see any commentary *ad loc.* Horace perhaps wrote *retortis undis* because he wished primarily to suggest violent turmoil, rather than with the wealth of geographical detail in mind which his editors assume.

⁹ See C. Giarratano, *Il libro degli Epodi* (Pescia, 1930), pp. 89 ff.; J. Stroux, "Valerius Flaccus und Horaz," *Philol.*, XC (1935), pp. 325 ff.; A. Y. Campbell, *Horace* (London, 1924), p. 143; V. Pöschl, *Foundation Hardt*, II (Geneva, 1953), p. 100. Wilkinson (p. 128) suggests a reference to "the political storm which blew up in 33-2 B.C. and burst at Actium."

¹⁰ H. T. Plüss (*Horazstudien* [Leipzig, 1882], pp. 39 ff.) dates it in 36 B.C. Most modern editors agree that a date after Actium is practically certain, though they disagree as to the precise date between 29 and 27 B.C. See below, pp. 52 ff.

weeping statues, wolves in the streets, speaking cattle, volcanos and earthquakes.¹¹ Debates over the possible applicability of Horace's stanzas to the events of 44 B. C. obscure a central point: had he intended an immediately recognizable description he could easily have given one, for the material was not lacking.¹² His description is, rather, deliberately vague enough to include the unnatural events after Caesar's death without being so detailed as to restrict itself to these alone.

The fact that a flood of the Tiber apparently formed no part of the portents of 44 B. C. also militates against so specific an application. In asserting that there had been such a flood Porphyrio was guilty of a type of scholarly reasoning which is not without parallel. On the assumption that Horace was describing the portents of 44 B. C., it followed that the Tiber's flood must be among them. Porphyrio then asserted inference as fact.¹³ After thus canonizing the Tiber's flood, Porphyrio could explain Ilia's anger, which causes it, as the result of Caesar's murder. Later editors confirmed and embellished this explanation by invoking a genealogy in which Ilia is daughter of Aeneas. As a charter member of the *gens Iulia*, and thus ancestress of Julius Caesar, she then achieves a plausible motive for her complaint against the Romans. Yet Ilia was not popularly supposed to be ancestress of Caesar: the *Iulii* derived their descent, as their name, from Aeneas' son Iulus, who seems not to have figured in the legends concerning Ilia.¹⁴ Horace empha-

¹¹ Cf. Vergil, *G.*, I, 466 ff., Tibullus, II, 5, 71 ff., Ovid, *Met.*, XV, 782 ff., Dio, XLV, 17. See also M. E. Hirst, "The Portents in Horace's *Odes* I, 2, 1-30," *C. Q.*, XXXII (1938), pp. 7-9. Yet many editions continue to follow Porphyrio in treating the first five stanzas as a description of the portents after Caesar's death. See Moore, Shorey, Wickham, T. E. Page (London, 1895), Plessis-Lejay, Villeneuve (Paris, 1927).

¹² Particularly after the appearance of Vergil's first *Georgic*, which Horace almost certainly imitates. Ps.-Acro early commented upon the connection, while Franke (*Fasti Horatiani* [Berlin, 1839], p. 142) elaborated the details. See also Birt, *Horaz's Lieder* (Leipzig, 1925), II, pp. 54 ff.; Barwick, "Horaz Carm. I, 2 und Vergil," *Philol.*, XC (1935), pp. 257 ff.

¹³ "Porphyrios Notiz zu v. 1 . . . ist offenbar aus unserer Stelle geschöpft" (Kiessling-Heinze *ad* 13). Cf. Hirst, *op. cit.* Others have maintained that Horace was thinking of a flood of the Tiber which took place in 27 B. C.; see below, note 45.

¹⁴ Kiessling-Heinze *ad loc.*

sizes only her traditional role as mother of Romulus, for to describe her execution is to presuppose her crime in bearing twin sons.¹⁵ Others have tied Ilia directly to Caesar on the grounds that he was Pontifex Maximus; hence his murder would seem a sacrilegious insult, calling for revenge from the Goddess he served.¹⁶ Such an explanation must take Ovid (*F.*, III, 699-700) rather than Horace for its text:

ne dubita meminisse; meus fuit ille sacerdos:
sacrilegae telis me petiere manus.

Horace's Ilia makes no such claim, and the Regia represents more than one of Julius Caesar's official residences (see above, p. 39). Ilia's anger may well include such particulars, but should not be confined to them. Porphyrio's explanation is needlessly restrictive, and demands that we accept an historically dubious flood as its basis. In any case, the source of her complaint cannot be crucial, or it would be less equivocally presented. Effects rather than causes are at issue, and Horace means us to remember the excessive and unholy convulsions produced by an overly zealous relative. The lines are more significant as an image of a possible type of revenge than as the description of a specific punishment.¹⁷

If punishment rather than crime controls the initial argument, the one implies the other, and an awareness of sin is tacit, not absent. Although the crimes of the Romans include

¹⁵ Ilia was a vestal virgin, and as punishment for conceiving Romulus and Remus was cast into the Tiber. The river god then took her as his wife; thus *uxorius amnis* (20). Only as father of Romulus, by Ilia, could Mars be considered *auctor* (36), and the Romans his descendants, *nepotes* (35). Cf. *C.*, III, 3, 30-1; *Aen.*, I, 274; Livy, I, 4, 1.

¹⁶ Cf. Birt, *op. cit.*, p. 61; Rupprecht, *op. cit.*, p. 68; and Shorey, *ad loc.*

¹⁷ We should not forget that one motive for her anger might be her own murder. Revenge is administered by an overly fond relative, and one would assume that the crime had been committed against Ilia herself. If we allow the episode a symbolic significance there need be no difficulty in the seven hundred years which elapsed. Ennius (*Ann.*, I, 40, 42, ed. Vahl.²) seems to describe a flooding of the Tiber after Ilia's execution, and Horace may be adapting this flood rather than referring to a contemporary one. *Vidimus* (13) need not be taken literally. It seems parallel to *scimus* (*C.*, III, 4, 42) which includes both mythical past, in the Gigantomachia, and political present, in Actium, to which the Gigantomachia almost certainly refers.

Caesar's assassination—*Caesaris ultor* (44) guarantees as much—they are not limited to it, as Horace's generalized treatment of the storms and floods suggests. By comparing the deluge with that survived only by Pyrrha and Deucalion, Horace insinuates an almost archetypal context. Jupiter seems not so much to punish a specific crime as to level an indictment against the wickedness of whole generations.¹⁸ Nor are Caesar's assassins the sole object of Ilia's complaint.¹⁹ All the Romans are murderers of a sort, and Caesar's death epitomizes rather than exhausts their *scelus* (29), which like *vitium* (23) must refer to fratricide in general:

quem vocet divum populus ruentis	25
imperii rebus? prece qua fatigent	
virgines sanctae minus audientem	
carmina Vestam?	
cui dabit partis scelus expiandi	
Iuppiter?	30

Ever since the murder of Tiberius Gracchus in 133 B. C. the spectre of civil war had haunted Roman imaginations, and had emerged with a desperate clarity in the decade of the thirties: Actium might be seen simply as the culmination of a Hundred Years' War. Punishments were often as bad as the crimes: in 73 B. C. the rulers had revenged themselves upon six thousand followers of the revolutionary Spartacus by nailing them to crosses every fifty yards from Capua to Rome (Appian, *B. C.*, I, 14, 120). The capitulation of Perusia was followed by the execution of the unoffending Perusine Senate, though Octavian found it expedient to spare the object of his siege, Lucius Antonius—one story, whatever the truth, had it that Octavian sacrificed hundreds of leading citizens to the shade of Julius Caesar (Suetonius, *Aug.*, 15; Dio, XLVIII, 14). Proscriptions had become a commonplace. If not all Horace's contempo-

¹⁸ Cf. the flood of Noah, God's ultimate punishment for the sins of the whole race. Ovid (*Met.*, I, 211) specifies the cause of Jove's flood as the *infamia temporis*.

¹⁹ As Ps.-Acro takes it, apparently misunderstanding *partis* (29) as a genitive singular: *scelus partis*. Cf. Gallovotti, "Il Secondo Carme di Orazio," *La Parola del Passato*, IV (1949), pp. 217-29, p. 218, n. 1. Villeneuve in his edition (*ad loc.*) and L. Hermann, "Nostrum Scelus," *Rev. Belge*, XV² (1936), pp. 981-5, both take *scelus* (29) as referring only to the murder of Caesar.

raries might remember those of Marius and Sulla, few could forget those of Antony, Octavian, and Lepidus after Julius Caesar's death. Two thousand Equites and three hundred Senators fell, and Cicero's head was impaled on the rostrum from which he had spoken (Florus, II, 16, 5). Philippi in 42 B. C., the naval battle against Pompey in 36 B. C., and Actium in 31 B. C. conspired to make civil war the most compelling fact of recent history.²⁰ To Horace, who had, after all, fought under Brutus at Philippi, Caesar's murder was significant less as a moral sin than for its historical consequences, for the blood spilled on the Senate floor prefigured that which was to flow in the fields and seas of the whole Empire.²¹

Only by referring to some original sin could Vergil account for the persistence of Rome's wars:

satis iam pridem sanguine nostro
Laomedontae luimus periuria Troiae. *G.*, I, 501-2

Satis iam pridem: iam satis terris. In testifying to an identical weariness, Horace endorsed his contemporary's conviction of an ancestral curse, and the third Roman Ode was to echo the accusation of Laomedon.²² "In Adam's fall, we sinned all," has been a common formulation of Christian theology, but if both Augustans seemed to anticipate such a verdict in pagan terms they sometimes varied as to the primary responsibility, and Romulus might play the part of Old Adam as well as Laomedon:²³

²⁰ *Ep.*, VII; XVI; *C.*, I, 35, 33 ff.; II, 1; Vergil, *G.*, I, 489 ff. If a fear of civil war informs some Epodes and early Odes, the later Odes celebrate Augustus as above all the restorer of peace. For a sketch of the bloodshed of the whole century see R. S. Conway, *New Studies of a Great Inheritance* (London, 1921), pp. 49 ff., who catalogues twelve civil wars and five proscriptions.

²¹ *Ep.*, VII, 3; *C.*, II, 1, 29; Vergil, *G.*, I, 491-2; Ovid, *Met.*, XV, 824. For Vergil too Caesar's murder was less important as an individual crime than as a historical cause of further war: *ergo inter sese paribus concurrere telis* (*G.*, I, 489).

²² *C.*, III, 3, 21-4, 26-7. Since Troy was regarded as the ancestral home of the Romans, the divine anger evidenced by their civil wars might be explained by the fraud which Laomedon practised upon the gods in founding Troy (*Il.*, XXI, 441 ff.). Cicero (*Pro Marcello*, 18) also suggests the possibility of some original sin, though without specifying the crime.

²³ Cf. *Aen.*, I, 292, where the return of the Golden Age—i. e., Augustan

Quo, quo scelesti ruitis aut cur dexteris
 aptantur enses conditi?
 parumne campis atque Neptuno super
 fusum est Latini sanguinis,
 non ut superbas invidiae Carthaginis
 Romanus arcis ureret,
 intactus aut Britannus ut descenderet
 Sacra catenatus via,
 sed ut secundum vota Parthorum sua
 urbs haec periret dextera?

· · ·
 sic est: acerba fata Romanos agunt
 scelusque fraternae necis,
 ut inmerentis fluxit in terram Remi
 sacer nepotibus cruor. *Ep.*, VII, 1-10, 17-20

One critic has appealed to these lines to prove that *scelus* (*C.*, I, 2, 29) cannot refer to civil war.²⁴ The seventh Epode, he feels, defines the crime of the Romans as Romulus' murder of Remus, while civil war is their punishment. Yet the tragedy of Rome's history lies in the fact that punishment not only fits the crime but is the crime—for what is civil war but expanded fratricide?²⁵ War both punishes an original *scelus* and itself perpetuates it. In the same Epode (VII, 1) Horace may thus apply *scelesti* to those contemporaries bent on renewing the past: *quo quo scelesti ruitis?*²⁶ Words like *impius* or *nefastus* also

Rome—is signalled by the reconciliation of the two brothers. The third Roman Ode is written to honor Romulus, and thereby Augustus, who almost took his name; see Suet., *Aug.*, 7; Dio, LIII, 16, 7-8; Florus, II, 34, 66; K. Scott, "The Identification of Augustus with Romulus-Quirinus," *T.A.P.A.*, LVI (1925), pp. 82-105; J. Gagé, "Romulus-Augustus," *Mélanges d'Arc. et d'Hist.*, LXVII (1930), pp. 138-81. Hence Horace cannot very well remind the Romans of Romulus' crime which he dwelt upon in the seventh Epode, and invokes in its place the crime of Laomedon.

²⁴ Zielinski, *op. cit.*, pp. 171-2.

²⁵ Thus Horace may use *fratres* as a shorthand for civil war in general in *C.*, I, 35, 33-4. The context makes it clear that he is thinking not of Romulus and Remus, but of more recent history.

²⁶ Cf. *sceleris*, *C.*, I, 35, 33. *Nostrum scelus* (*C.*, I, 3, 39) probably refers to man's innate refusal ever to accept his place, and not to civil war. However, as would be appropriate in an Ode addressed to Vergil, it may be an echo of Vergil's own *sceleris vestigia nostri* (*Ecl.*, IV, 13), which is "almost certainly a localized reference to the civil wars," according to J. P. Elder, "Horace, *C.*, I, 3," *A.J.P.* LXXIII (1952), pp. 140-58, p. 157.

²⁸ The forceful present *ruentis* (25) emphasizes the immediacy of the danger; cf. *Ep.*, VII, 1; XVI, 2. Horace elsewhere uses a technique of dire prediction as an incitement, as in the sixteenth Epode as a whole, or the end of the sixth Roman Ode.

sive mutata iuvenem figura
ales in terris imitaris, almae
filius Maiæ patiens vocari
Caesaris ultor,

serus in caelum redeas diuque
laetus intersis populo Quirini,
neve te nostris vitiis iniquum
ocior aura

tollat: hic magnos potius triumphos,
hic ames dici pater atque princeps,
neu sinas Medos equitare inultos
te duce Caesar.

The coming savior's task is threefold: to save the empire from civil wars, to expiate the Romans' *scelus*, and, as we infer from line forty-four, to avenge the death of Caesar. Although Horace does not grant to the last the initial importance of the other two, later commentators have dwelt upon it as evidencing the poet's conversion to Caesarism. At the battle of Philippi Octavian vowed a temple *pro ultione paterna* (Suet., *Aug.*, 29; cf. Ovid, *Fasti*, V, 569), and the two thousand dead after the proscriptions of 43 B. C. testified to his seriousness. Ovid found it expedient to hymn the revenge Octavian exacted,²⁹ but Horace was never to repudiate his Republican friends, and Sellar's suggestion that he encourages Octavian to "crush the remnants of the party" is untenable.³⁰ The Ode recommends not vengeance but an abandonment of vengeance against the Romans: *iam satis*. The phrase *Caesaris ultor* (44) is by its context rendered almost ironic. Jove himself has disapproved Tiber's punishment of the Romans, whether for Caesar's murder or for a more general *scelus*. To exact vengeance would be to perpetuate the sin of civil war rather than expiate it, to renew the past and not redeem it.

The gods Horace invokes confirm such a conclusion, for the

²⁹ *Met.*, I, 200-5; *Fasti*, III, 707-10. Velleius Paterculus excused Octavian on the grounds that he had been compelled to the proscriptions by Antony and Lepidus (II, 66, 2), though Seutonius records that Octavian proved himself more severe in his vengeance than either of his fellow triumvirs (*Aug.*, 27, 1).

³⁰ This is not, of course, to suggest that Horace remains an unreconciled Republican—C., I, 2 itself sufficiently refutes such a view—but merely that he wishes no further punishments.

character of each belies the title *ultor*. It has been often remarked that each of the first three divinities could boast a connection with the Julian house or Roman race. Apollo was special patron of Augustus, and the emperor's calculated program to identify himself with this god has been amply documented.³¹ As mother of Aeneas, Venus was ancestress of the Julian line through her grandson Iulus, and the *Carmen Saeculare* salutes Augustus as *clarus Anchisae Venerisque sanguis* (50). Mars, as father of Romulus, was author of the Roman race itself. Multiplying the possible references of each of these figures is an intoxicating and frequently exercised right of scholarship, but for the purposes of his poem Horace tells us exactly what he wants us to remember. *Neque semper arcum tendit Apollo*, and the god appears not as the warrior of the fourth Roman Ode but as the *augur* of the *Carmen Saeculare*, presiding deity of Rome's revival. As a model for Venus, Horace may have in mind Lucretius' *Aeneadam genetrix*,³² perhaps remembering that for the older poet she was not only goddess of growth but the Romans' best hope for *placidam pacem* (*De Rer. Nat.*, I, 40). As *Erycina ridens*, in any case, she represents gentleness, and her companions *Iocus* and *Cupido* are calculated to confirm the benevolence implicit in the adjective. Mars is summoned not as a warrior but as *auctor* of the race. Though delighting in the battles of Roman foot soldiers, the Marsi, against the enemy, even he is now satiated by the too long continued civil wars.³³ The last deity Horace invokes is Mercury, whom he summons to earth in the bodily guise of Octavian. By suggesting such an identification Horace has provoked frequent arguments as to whether there was in fact a cult of Mercury-Augustus at Rome³⁴—a consideration having very little

³¹ See Fr. Altheim, *A History of Roman Religion* (English tr., London, 1938), pp. 365 ff.; J. B. Carter, *The Religion of Numa* (London, 1906), pp. 164 ff.; E. H. Haight, "An Inspired Message in Augustan Poets," *A. J. P.*, XXXIX (1918), pp. 341-66; W. Deonna, "Le Trésor des Fins d'Annecy," *Rev. Arch.*, 5e Série, XI (1920), pp. 112-206, pp. 161 ff.

³² Kiessling-Heinze, Shorey, Smith, Plessis-Lejay, etc. note the similarity.

³³ *Respicias* (36) implies a gracious glance. See Rupprecht, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

³⁴ See *C. I. L.*, X¹, 888; Roscher, *Lexicon*, II² (1894-7), s. v. *Mercurius*,

to do with our understanding of the Ode. Horace's views emerge from the poem itself rather than from contemporary cult practice, and perhaps the most important thing about Mercury is the fact that he is never named. *Almae filius Maia*: the periphrasis is significant. Horace may now introduce the adjective *almus* (which might sit oddly upon the god himself), thus suggesting the character Mercury, and, by extension, Octavian, is to display. *Alma* was the attribute of Lucretius' Venus (*De Rer. Nat.*, I, 2), as it was of Horace's Muses (*C.*, III, 4, 42). Like both of these Mercury suggests the twin conceptions of nourishment and peace.³⁵ As an intermediary between gods and men (thus the reminder of *ales*), Mercury, like the Muses, is the vehicle of *lene consilium* (*C.*, III, 4, 41), though as the embodiment rather than the donor of it. Nor was his character inappropriate to such a role. As patron of the peaceful arts of commerce and poetry his statue won admission to the temple of *Concordia*, next to that of the Goddess herself.³⁶ Horace's hymn to Mercury invokes him as god of the lyre and tamer of *feros cultus hominum* (*C.*, I, 10, 2): the union of poetry and civilization recalls that of the fourth Roman Ode.

If, after emphasizing the peaceful aspect of each god, Horace proposes "the son of gentle Maia" as *Caesaris ultor*, his implication is clear: there is to be no vengeance. Horace has displayed two types of revenge. Tiber, "boasting himself" the avenger of Ilia's excessive complaints, stands in pointed contrast to Mercury, "enduring to be called avenger of Caesar." Tiber's

p. 2818; H. Heinen, *Klio*, XI (1911), pp. 150 ff.; Deonna, *op. cit.*, pp. 187-8; J. Six, *Rev. Arch.*, IV (1916), pp. 257-64; Pasquali, *Orazio Lirico* (Firenze, 1920), pp. 182 ff.; Altheim, *op. cit.*, p. 365; K. Scott, *Hermes*, LXIII (1928), pp. 15-33; J. Elmore, *C.P.*, XXVI (1931), pp. 261 ff. Though coins, statues, and altar portraits have been cited, Horace's Ode remains the only sure literary evidence for the identification. Scott, like Kiessling-Heinze, concludes that Horace either indulges a private fantasy or else is influenced by Eastern beliefs; see note 48.

³⁵ In the first proem Lucretius appeals to Venus not only as life-giver to all nature, but as donor of peace to humans; 29 ff.; 40 ff. Horace's Muses both "recreate" Caesar and his tired cohorts, and give to him "gentle counsel" (*C.*, III, 4, 37 ff.).

³⁶ Altheim, *op. cit.*, p. 531, n. 49. Plüss, *op. cit.*, p. 35, cites Ovid's description of him as *pacis et armorum superis imisque deorum arbiter*. On Roman coins the Caduceus he carries is to be understood as a symbol of peace; see DeWaele, *The Magic Staff or Rod in Antiquity* (The Hague, 1927), p. 75.

vengeance is not an allegory: Ilia is not Julius Caesar nor is the river god Octavian. But without insisting upon the definitive austerity which an allegory implies, we may take lines 17-20 as an evocative symbol of one type of revenge for the murder of a relative.³⁷ Horace presents a kind of parable to caution Octavian, the self-proclaimed avenger of his father, against further punishments. Yet the last of Caesar's assassins had been already executed (Vell. Pater., II, 87), and fifteen years after Philippi the threat of renewed vengeance could hardly have oppressed the remaining Republicans. Ilia, as we saw, appears as ancestress of the race, while the Roman's *scelus* is war in general, Caesar's murder being a representative rather than isolated example. Horace's indictment is deliberately broad. It embraces not merely those who had fought against Caesar, but all who had been involved in the shedding of Roman blood. Pompeians and Antonines³⁸ as well as Republicans were still in evidence, and even those who had not borne arms were guilty with the rest. In the name of all alike Horace issues a covert plea for mercy, and praise of the avenging victor unites with a prayer for his sinful people.

The fourth Roman Ode, at once paean and elegy, betrays a similar intent. Probably written shortly after Actium, the account of Zeus' victory over the Giants decorates rather than disguises praise of Octavian's triumph over Antony. To the tired victor the *almae Musae* recommend *lene consilium*, mild counsel (41). In the first nine stanzas Horace had donned the elaborate robes of a traditional *vates*, asserting himself spokesman of the Muses, and thus suggesting that their *lene consilium* is the Ode itself, both praise of and prayer for wisdom in the ruler.³⁹ In *C.*, I, 2 Mercury, patron of poets,⁴⁰ reminds us of

³⁷ Ovid compared Jove's vengeance in Pyrrha's flood with that taken by Octavian, though he approves equally of both: *Met.*, I, 200 ff. Franke (*op. cit.*, p. 138), sees that Horace intends a parallel between Tiber and Octavian, but interprets the picture of Tiber as a compliment.

³⁸ We should remember that in 32 B. C. over three hundred Senators and both Consuls had sided with Antony, and tried (unsuccessfully) to vote a censure of Octavian.

³⁹ Wilkinson, *op. cit.*, pp. 69 ff., rightly insists that the last stanzas evoke sympathy for those defeated by Zeus, and that the whole poem expresses Horace's plea "for a real amnesty" (p. 71).

⁴⁰ Horace calls himself a *Mercurialis vir* (*C.*, II, 17, 29-30), and

the same union of poetry and political wisdom; the poem itself recommends the qualities which the *almae filius Maiæ* embodies. In delivering himself of a *peccavi* for his former Republicanism, the poet delivers a *caveat* to the ruler. A strategic rather than confessional bias dictates the Ode, and the fact of Horace's past errors is less urgent than the possibility of Octavian's future ones. The fourth Roman Ode, as its Pindaric echoes suggest,⁴¹ stands as a hymn to Peace, and *C.*, I, 2 readily adapts itself to the same form. To punish the Romans, warns Horace, would be to confirm Rome's *acerba fata*. Punishment would be a kind of further civil war, and itself a *scelus*. In dispatching his peace-loving son Jove declares his will: *iam satis*. The excesses, *nimum* (17), symbolized by Ilia and Tiber seem acknowledged even by Mars, *nimis longo satiate ludo* (37). For avenger to become expiator only one course is possible: Roman swords must turn against foreign enemies.⁴² The *Caesaris ultor* (44) must transmute the type of Tiber's revenge, *iactat ultorem* (18), into punishment of the Medes:

neu sinas Medos equitare inultos
te duce Caesar.

51-2

The last two lines thus seal the poem's logical progress, and lose the effect of an afterthought which a first reading might suggest. We have been often reminded that one man's Mede is another man's Persian, and hence Horace's concluding plea echoes a deceptively casual line (21-2):

audiet civis acuisse ferrum,
quo graves Persae melius perirent.

Since this stanza is cast into the future (*audiet*), the imperfect

asserts that Mercury rescued him from Philippi (*C.*, II, 7, 13 ff.). Cf. *C.*, I, 10, 6.

⁴¹ See especially the opening of Pythian VIII, which treats the rebellion and defeat of the Giants. The Ode is a prayer to *Ἥρα*, who knows "with perfect fitness the secret of gentleness." She holds the "masterkeys of councils and of wars" (cf. *vis* and *consilium* in *C.*, III, 4), a phrase Farnell's edition (London, 1932) *ad loc.*, explains as follows: "for the true object of a righteous war is to secure a lasting peace."

⁴² Horace does not, as Rupprecht, *op. cit.*, p. 70, suggests, summon Mercury "Kriege gegen die inneren und äusseren Feinde Roms zu führen."

perirent does not rule out hope of fulfilment. Persians may still perish by Roman swords, vengeance may yet be exacted from the Medes, if Horace's advice is heeded.⁴³ Elsewhere (*C.*, I, 35, 33-40), in lines which seem almost an epitome of *C.*, I, 2, he proposes the same alternative, while exhibiting an identical shame at the *scelus* of the past:

eheu cicatricum et sceleris pudet
fratrumque. quid nos dura refugimus
aetas, quid intactum nefasti
liquimus? unde manum iuventus
metu deorum continuit, quibus
pepercit aris? o utinam nova
incude diffingas retusum in
Massagetis Arabasque ferrum.⁴⁴

If, as the verbal texture declares, the Ode deals with the varieties of vengeance, we should perhaps reconsider the date of composition. Most editions suggest the end of 28 B. C., on the assumption that Horace is exercised by the prospect that Octavian might return to private life, and that chaos would come again. With whatever sincerity, Octavian did make such a proposal to the Senate on Jan. 13, 27 B. C., and possibly he had earlier given public indications of it.⁴⁵ Yet the concern with

⁴³ If, with Kiessling-Heinze, we accept Bentley's emendation of *Marsi* for *Mauri* (39), Mars becomes a kind of exemplum to Horace's sermon. He rejoices in the shout and bloody face of the Roman foot soldier only when turned in *hostem* (40).

⁴⁴ Cf. *C.*, I, 21, 13 ff. *Ep.*, VII, 7-8 hints at the same alternative.

⁴⁵ Though this seems unlikely in view of the stir his announcement created; see Dio, LIII, 11. Moore, Shorey, Barwick, and Kiessling-Heinze all agree upon a date shortly before Octavian's proposal. Galavotti (*op. cit.*) puts it even later, holding that the flood of the Tiber which Horace describes is that which took place in Jan. of 27 B. C. The flattering interpretation put upon the flood at that time (Dio, LIII, 20) makes it improbable that Horace refers to this flood. His treatment of it—*nimium, Iove non probante*—could seem only an impertinence if the flood were popularly supposed to be a tribute to the new ruler.

Princeps (50) need not refer to the official title of *Princeps Senatus* which Octavian received in 28 B. C., but is probably an informal term of respect; see H. F. Pelham, "*Princeps* or *Princeps Senatus*?" *J. Phil.*, VIII (1879), pp. 323-33. Certainly *Pater*, in the same line, cannot refer to the official title of *Pater Patriae* which Augustus received only in 2 B. C.

revenge in the poem's first half, and the sense of expectancy in the second, sit ill with such an interpretation and so late a date. Three and a half years after Actium, fear of punishment need agitate no one, while an effusive welcome, accompanied by guesses as to the savior's identity, might seem a somewhat coy anachronism. A date better according with the feeling of the Ode would be either just before or just after Octavian's return to Rome in July of 29 B. C. for the first time since Actium.⁴⁶ He had by then completed his triumphal⁴⁷ swing through the East, yet a question would remain as to what policy he might adopt upon his return, thus providing the two elements of joy and apprehension informing the poem. *Hic . . . hic* (49-50) might oppose Rome to the East: Horace entreats, or possibly applauds, the ruler's return to the capital to celebrate his victories. Such a geographical antithesis helps explain the presence of Mercury, for whom scholars have often felt constrained to apologize as a rather minor Olympian. A possible influence of the Egyptian Thoth-Hermes has been frequently remarked, and certainly the idea of a god incarnate suggests an Eastern provenance.⁴⁸ If Octavian were still in the East, Horace's summons to a God easily associated with Egyptian conceptions might strike his readers as peculiarly apposite. Nor would it, perhaps,

For a discussion of other dates which have been proposed see Elmore, *op. cit.*

⁴⁶ A date before Octavian's return to Rome is accepted by Plessis-Lejay, *op. cit.*, intro. to *C.*, I, 2; G. Schörner, *Sallust und Horaz über den Sittenverfall und die sittliche Erneuerung Roms* (Erlangen, 1934), p. 66; Elmore, *op. cit.*, pp. 398 ff.

⁴⁷ *Triumphos* (49) has been thought to refer to the triumphs of Octavian celebrated in August of 29 B. C., thus establishing a *terminus post quem*. But it is not necessary to assume that his victories had been already celebrated at Rome: the military facts would justify Horace in terming them *triumphos*. Cf. Vergil, *G.*, I, 503, written, and read to Octavian, before he had returned to the capital.

⁴⁸ The Egyptian herald in Aesch., *Suppliants*, 920, invokes Hermes as "greatest of patrons." Eastern influence has been emphasized by R. Reitzenstein, *Poimandres* (Leipzig, 1904), pp. 176 ff.; D. Norberg, *Eranos*, XLIV (1946), pp. 389 ff.; K. Scott, *op. cit.*, pp. 27 ff. Keissling-Heinze (*ad* 41) hold that unless an influence of "der ägyptisch-hellenistische Hermesglaube" is responsible, Horace himself invented the identification. Pasquali, *op. cit.*, p. 183, notes that in Egypt Mercury was not only a god but also a great king, a god incarnate, an idea alien to Roman religion; see Cicero, *De Imp. Cn. Pomp.*, 14, 41.

be extravagant to detect a hint that the time had come for a descent to earth after the virtual divinization that Octavian had received in Egypt.⁴⁹

The Ode might be seen as a welcome home much in the manner of Vergil's *Georgics*.⁵⁰ Its closeness to the conclusion of the first *Georgic* has been often emphasized, yet the differences are also instructive. With *iam satis* Horace acknowledges his debt.⁵¹ His Ode in a sense succeeds, complements, and qualifies the Vergilian cry.

Di patrii, Indigetes, et Romule Vestaque mater, quae Tuscum Tiberim et Romana Palatia servas, hunc saltem everso iuvenem succurrere saeclo	500
ne prohibete! satis iam pridem sanguine nostro Laomedontae luimus periuria Troiae; iam pridem nobis caeli te regia, Caesar, invidet atque hominum queritur curare triumphos, quippe ubi fas versum atque nefas; tot bella per orbem	505
tam multae scelerum facies, non ullus aratro dignus honos, squalent abductis arva colonis, et curvae rigidum falces conflantur in ensem. hinc movet Euphrates, illinc Germania bellum; vicinae ruptis inter se legibus urbes	510
arma ferunt; saevit toto Mars impius orbe; ut cum carceribus sese effudere quadrigae, addunt in spatio, et frustra retinacula tendens fertur equis auriga neque audit currus habenas.	

Vergil probably wrote these lines several years before the Horace Ode, for *saevit toto Mars impius orbe* would hardly be appropriate after Octavian's settlement of the East.⁵² For Vergil the mere presence of *hunc iuvenem* seems to guarantee an end to the

⁴⁹ Where he had a special cult as Zeus Eleutherios, and was popularly honored as divine; see L. R. Taylor, *Divinity of the Roman Emperor* (Middletown, 1931), pp. 142 ff. Even when most frankly eulogistic in the Odes, Horace places Octavian's apotheosis in the future: *C.*, III 3, 12; III, 5, 2.

⁵⁰ Which were read to Octavian on successive days at Atella, where he rested on his way to Rome after landing at Brundisium in the summer of 29 B. C.

⁵¹ Horace often uses the first few words as indication of his source, then goes on to develop the theme in his own way; see *C.*, I, 9; I, 12; I, 37.

⁵² These lines are usually dated before Actium; see the commentary of Papillon and Haigh *ad loc.*

wars following Caesar's death (489 ff.), and the parallel *satis iam pridem . . . iam pridem* (501-3) tacitly identifies the hoped for end of an ancestral curse with the arrival of Octavian. For Horace expiation depends less upon the presence than the character of the ruler—for it is with possible characters that the Ode's latter half deals, as Horace seeks a God suitable to endure being called *Caesaris ultor*. Vergil's background is one of undifferentiated chaos, while Horace sees foreign wars not as simply part of an *everso saeclo*, but as an alternative to civil wars. One poet thinks in terms of the ruler's presence, the other in terms of his policy: where the former demands only that a charioteer seize the reins, the latter suggests a course for him to follow. We should remember that while Horace was still recovering from the Republicans' defeat at Philippi, Vergil was allowing his rustics to greet Octavian as a God (*Ecl.*, I, 6), and the almost Baroque fancy of the proem to the *Georgics* testifies to an ever increasing enthusiasm. The dangers of a single ruler presented themselves with greater immediacy to Horace than to his contemporary, and apprehension perceptibly qualifies his praise. Mercy, he suggests, is the tax on power. By reminding Octavian that the hope of the future depends upon his wisdom in the present, the Ode becomes a summons to greatness no less than a celebration of it.⁵³

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⁵³ I regret that when this article was submitted I had not seen Eduard Fraenkel's treatment of *C.*, I, 2 in his *Horace* (Oxford, 1957), pp. 242 ff.

THEOPHRASTUS, *DE SENSIBUS* 66: DEMOCRITUS'
EXPLANATION OF SALINITY.

ἀλμυρὸν δὲ τὸν ἐκ μεγάλων καὶ οὐ περιφερῶν, ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἐνίων
μὲν σκαληνῶν, <ἐπὶ δὲ πλείστον οὐ σκαληνῶν>, διὸ οὐδὲ
πολυκαμπῶν (βούλεται δὲ σκαληνὰ λέγειν ἅπερ περιπάλαξιν
ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ συμπλοκήν). μεγάλων μὲν, ὅτι ἡ
ἀλμυρὸς ἐπιπολάζει· μικρὰ γὰρ ὄντα καὶ τυπτόμενα τοῖς
περιέχουσι μείγνυσθαι ἂν τῷ παντί· οὐ περιφερῶν δ' ὅτι τὸ
μὲν ἀλμυρὸν τραχὺ τὸ δὲ περιφερὲς λείον· οὐ σκαληνῶν δὲ
διὰ τὸ μὴ περιπαλάττεσθαι, διὸ ψαφάρων εἶναι.

Thphr., *Sens.*, 66 (= *Vorsokr.*⁶, II, p. 118, 17-23)

In this passage, as it stands in the manuscripts, there is a contradiction between ἐπ' ἐνίων μὲν σκαληνῶν in the first sentence and οὐ σκαληνῶν in the final sentence; in the first sentence the atoms of the saline savor are said to be scalene in some cases, but in the final sentence they are said not to be scalene.

Hermann Diels made two attempts to remove this contradiction. In *Doxographi Graeci* (p. 518, 9-15) he accepted Philippson's deletion of οὐ before σκαληνῶν in the final sentence, and he changed μὲν to καί in the first sentence. This solution merely leads to a new contradiction; in the final sentence the atoms are now said to be scalene because they do not interlock, but in the parenthesis of the first sentence scalene atoms are said to be those that do interlock.

In *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, from which the above text is taken, Diels sought to remove this new contradiction by restoring the deleted οὐ and by adding ἐπὶ δὲ πλείστον οὐ σκαληνῶν after ἐπ' ἐνίων μὲν σκαληνῶν in the first sentence. This solution, too, is objectionable. With no evidence whatever Diels has made a substantial addition to Democritus' theory by ascribing to him the notion that there are two kinds of atom in the saline savor, some scalene and others not. Theophrastus does say that Democritus held that each thing contains atoms of different kinds (*Sens.*, 67); but by this is meant, undoubtedly, that the different qualities of a thing are accounted for by the different component atoms and not that different atoms cause the same quality. In the final sentence οὐ σκαληνῶν provides for no exceptions and presumably must apply to all atoms of the saline savor.

Gustav Kafka (*Philologus*, LXXII [1913], pp. 76-9) for ἐπ' ἐνίων μὲν σκαληνῶν proposed ἐπιπέδων μὲν σκαληνῶν δ' οὐ, which he translated: "von ebener aber nicht von ungleichmässig." This emendation strains the normal use of μέν and δέ; there is not even a weak antithesis between ἐπιπέδων and σκαληνῶν . . . οὐ, and on Kafka's interpretation they are virtually synonymous. There are more serious objections to ἐπιπέδων. Kafka recognized that as a planimetric term ἐπίπεδος could not properly be applied to the solid atoms; he thought its use possible here because the context did not demand a mathematical exactness of expression. But to use ἐπίπεδος with the meaning ἐπιπέδοις περιεχόμενος would be more than what Kafka called a "risky brachylogy." In neither mathematical nor non-mathematical language does the word mean 'smooth-sided.' In mathematics ἐπίπεδος is 'plane' as opposed to στερεός, 'solid.' In non-mathematical descriptions of solids it does not mean that all the surfaces are smooth; it refers to one surface only, usually the upper, as if for the purpose of the description the solid had no depth. Moreover, granted that the individual surfaces of the atom are smooth, the atom as a whole is rough, and its roughness is stressed as one of its main characteristics. Some reference to its roughness is to be expected in the introductory sentence of the description rather than such exclusive emphasis on smoothness as results from Kafka's interpretation.

A further difficulty common to the second solution of Diels and that of Kafka is the relation of διὸ οὐδὲ πολυκαμπῶν to the preceding words. According to these solutions, the text states that the atoms are not—or for the most part are not—σκαληνός and are therefore not πολυκαμπής either. The meaning of these terms will be discussed later. It may be pointed out here that they cannot be related in the way that Diels and Kafka have supposed. οὐ σκαληνός does not imply οὐ πολυκαμπής. Theophrastus says that the pungent savor σκαληνὸν οὐκ ἔχει (*Sens.*, 67) and that its atom is κάμπυλος (*C. P.*, VI, 1, 6, where κάμπυλος corresponds to πολυκαμπής in *Sens.*, 65-7). An atom that is not σκαληνός may nevertheless be πολυκαμπής (or κάμπυλος).

Clues to the correct solution are, I believe, to be found in three passages that Diels and Kafka seem not to have used. These are:

- 1) ἀλμυρὸν δὲ τὸν γωνιοειδῆ καὶ εὐμεγεθῆ καὶ σκολιὸν καὶ ἰσοσκελῆ.
Thphr., *C. P.*, VI, 1, 6;

- 2) ἥκιστα τε ὑπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου (sc. τὸ ἀλμυρόν) ἀνάγεσθαι καὶ ἐπιπολάζειν. πανταχοῦ γὰρ πλατέα καὶ μεγάλα τοῖς ὑγροῖς ἐπιφέρεσθαι, ἀσύμπλεκτα δὲ καὶ ἄκολλα διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν σκαληνὲς ἀλλὰ γωνιοειδῆ τε εἶναι καὶ πολυκαμπῆ.

Thphr., *C. P.*, VI, 10, 3;

- 3) ἐπεὶ ποιοῦντι <γε> τοὺς χυλοὺς διὰ τὰ σχήματα καὶ τὸ ἀλμυρὸν ἐγ μέγνων καὶ γωνιοειδῶν . . .

P. Hib., 16, 40-43 (= *Vorsökr.*⁶, II, p. 108, 22-3).

The first of these passages is from a summary of Democritus' theory of taste. In the second the name of Democritus does not appear, but there can be no doubt that the doctrine is that of Democritus (see Schneider, *Theophrasti Opera*, IV, p. 472). In the papyrus containing the third passage all but two letters of Democritus' name have been preserved. This papyrus has been assigned to the *περὶ ὕδατος* of Theophrastus.

It will be observed that none of these passages supports the view that there are two kinds of saline particle. All three agree with *Sens.*, 66 that the atom is large; and, like *Sens.*, 66, 2) states that the atom remains on the surface because of its size. 2) agrees with the final sentence from *Sens.*, 66 (against the first sentence from *Sens.*, 66) that the atom is not scalene; and in 1) *ἰσοσκελῆ* is apparently used as a privative of *σκαληνόν*. 2) agrees with *Sens.*, 66 that the absence of scalene atoms causes the saline to be friable.

There are, however, two major disagreements. While *Sens.*, 66 has οὐδὲ πολυκαμπῶν, 2) states that the atom is πολυκαμπής; in 1) *σκολιόν* is apparently the corresponding term. Secondly, while all three passages say that the atom is γων(ι)οειδής, *Sens.*, 66 has nothing to correspond. It should be noted, too, that γωνιοειδῆ τε καὶ πολυκαμπῆ in 3) is found also in Theophrastus' account of the acid savor in *Sens.*, 65 and is paralleled by γωνιοειδῆ καὶ κάμπυλον in his accounts of the acid and pungent savors in *C. P.*, VI, 1, 6.

In short: 1) and 2), as well as the final sentence from *Sens.*, 66, suggest that οὐ σκαληνῶν should be read in the first sentence from *Sens.*, 66; 2) shows that οὐ σκαληνῶν is compatible with πολυκαμπῶν and that therefore the negative before πολυκαμπῶν in *Sens.*, 66 may be incorrect; 1), 2), and 3) suggest that γωνιοειδῶν may have dropped out of *Sens.*, 66; and the parallels to γωνιοειδῆ τε καὶ πολυκαμπῆ in 2) suggest that γωνιοειδής was

regularly applied to the same atom as πολυκαμπής was and that γωνιοειδών may have been linked with πολυκαμπών in *Sens.*, 66. That is, if *Sens.*, 66 is to agree with these other accounts it should say that the atom is not σκαληνός but is γωνιοειδής τε καὶ πολυκαμπής.

In investigating the manuscripts of the *De Sensibus* I have found that many errors appear to have been caused by the erroneous application to the text of interlinear corrections made in a lost ancestor of the exemplar from which our two earliest manuscripts (PF) were copied. Sometimes the correction has been copied into the text after the error (e. g., Παρμενίδου Παρμενίδης, *Sens.*, 2, where Παρμενίδης is the intended correction). Often the correction has been scrambled into the text in such a way as to compound the error and make it difficult to detect. It seems probable that in the present case ἀλλ' ἐκ γωνιοειδών τε was omitted and later added above the line and that it is concealed in ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἐνίων μὲν . . . διὸ οὐδὲ of our manuscripts. After the correction the early manuscript would read:

ἀλμυρὸν δὲ τὸν ἐκ μεγάλων καὶ οὐ
ἀλλ' ἐκ γωνιοειδών τε
περιφερῶν οὐδὲ σκαληνῶν καὶ πολυκαμπῶν.

The correction was intended to be added after σκαληνῶν. The scribe of the next copy could make out only a few letters of the correction; and he thought that there were two corrections, the first intended to replace οὐδὲ before σκαληνῶν, the second intended to replace καὶ before πολυκαμπῶν. From ἀλλ' ἐκ γωνιοειδών he derived ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἐνίων μὲν, and from δῶν τε he derived διὸ οὐδὲ, which he substituted for οὐδὲ and καὶ respectively. Thus he wrote: ἀλμυρὸν δὲ τὸν ἐκ μεγάλων καὶ οὐ περιφερῶν, ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἐνίων μὲν σκαληνῶν διὸ οὐδὲ πολυκαμπῶν. He should have written: ἀλμυρὸν δὲ τὸν ἐκ μεγάλων καὶ οὐ περιφερῶν οὐδὲ σκαληνῶν ἀλλ' ἐκ γωνιοειδῶν τε καὶ πολυκαμπῶν.

This reconstruction brings *Sens.*, 66 into agreement with the three other accounts of the theory, and it eliminates the contradiction between the first and last sentences.

To interpret the reconstructed sentence and the other passages that have been discussed above it is necessary to consider some of the terms used to describe the atoms. These terms are not only important for Democritus' explanation of the saviors; they

throw some light on the atomic theory as a whole. The description of the savors in *Sens.* provides the fullest extant evidence for their meaning and relation to one another. They have been misunderstood because of the corrupt διὸ οὐδὲ πολυκαμπῶν in *Sens.*, 66.

Theophrastus says that, according to Democritus, atoms that interlock are scalene. If, then, the atoms of the saline savor are not scalene—or for the most part are not scalene (Diels)—and are therefore not πολυκαμπής either, it would appear that πολυκαμπής, like σκαληνός, referred to a characteristic of the atoms that caused them to interlock. Further, the atoms of the bitter savor have καμπαί which cause viscosity (*Sens.*, 65); presumably it is because of the lack of such καμπαί that the saline savor is friable. On the basis of the manuscript reading in *Sens.*, 65, therefore, πολυκαμπής has been taken to mean 'provided with many hooks' (Stratton, similarly Kafka). But the word cannot have this meaning; for, as has been noted, in *C. P.*, VI, 10, 3 Theophrastus says that the particles of the saline are πολυκαμπής but do not interlock and adhere. Evidently, then, πολυκαμπής does not refer to the καμπαί that cause viscosity in the bitter savor. The interpretation of LSJ, 'with many curves,' is no more satisfactory. If, as seems to be intended, the curves are thought of as determining the general shape of the atom (e. g., as in the crooked branch of a plant or a winding path), such curves, if they have any effect, must cause the atoms to interlock as the supposed hooks would. Nor is it any better if the curves are thought of not as causing interlocking but as giving the atoms rounded surfaces. In Theophrastus' accounts of the savors πολυκαμπής and κάμπυλος are always closely associated with γων(ι)οειδής. These combinations of adjectives cannot mean either that some atoms of a savor are rounded and others are angular or that the same atom is both rounded and angular. True, Lucretius says that sea water is composed of smooth round atoms and rough atoms; but he means that the round atoms cause the fluidity of the water and the rough atoms the salinity.¹ The account of Theophrastus is not parallel; he is concerned only with salinity, not with the saline solution. The only atom that combines roundness with angularity is that of the pungent savor. All other atoms of the savors are either περιφερής (or

¹ See note 5, below.

στρογγύλος) or γων(ι)οειδής (or πολυγώνιος). The atom of the pungent savor, possibly an icosahedron, is περιφερής, γων(ι)οειδής, and κάμπυλος (*Sens.*, 67; *C.P.*, VI, 1, 6). But κάμπυλος does not refer to its roundness; atoms that are πολυκαμπής (or κάμπυλος) are also γων(ι)οειδής, and those of the astringent (*C.P.*, VI, 1, 6), the acid (*ibid.*), and the saline (*Sens.*, 66) are specifically said not to be περιφερής. Theophrastus says in *Sens.*, 66 that the saline is not composed of atoms that are περιφερής because such atoms are λείος, while the saline is τραχύς. This distinction is borne out by all his descriptions of the atoms in *Sens.*, 65-7 and *C.P.*, VI, 1, 6. Atoms that are περιφερής are, with the exception of that of the pungent, λείος; but atoms that are πολυκαμπής (or κάμπυλος) and γων(ι)οειδής, including that of the pungent, are τραχύς (or ὀξύς), and no mention is made of any other characteristic that would be due to their shape. It becomes clear, then, that unless πολυκαμπής and κάμπυλος are superfluous and tell nothing of the atom's shape—a possibility that need hardly be considered—they refer to the same feature of the atom's shape as γων(ι)οειδής does. In combination with it they mean that an atom has (many) bends and angles that cause the atom to have several sharply defined surfaces and, therefore, to be rough. That is, these combinations of adjectives are opposed to περιφερής, which means that the atom is more or less spheroid and has a single smooth surface.²

Misinterpretation of πολυκαμπής as referring to hooks or curves that cause the atoms to interlock has necessitated misinterpretation of σκαληνός. If atoms that are not σκαληνός are for this reason not πολυκαμπής either, and if the καμπαί are hooks or curves that cause interlocking, σκαληνός cannot have its usual geometrical meaning; for it does not follow that because the sides of the atoms are unequal the atoms do not have many hooks

² The other term used by Theophrastus to indicate the angularity of atoms is πολυγώνιος. The astringent savor is said to be composed ἐκ μεγάλων καὶ πολυγωνίων καὶ περιφερὲς ἥκιστ' ἐχόντων (*Sens.*, 66; cf. *C.P.*, VI, 1, 6). By this is probably meant that the atoms are irregular jagged masses with sharp angles. γωνιοειδής and πολυκαμπής (or κάμπυλος), if not merely synonymous, may have been used together to indicate less extreme angularity than πολυγώνιος; that is, πολυκαμπής (or κάμπυλος) may have been added to γωνιοειδής to qualify it, to indicate that the angles are less numerous and sharp than in an atom that is πολυγώνιος.

or curves. Stratton has, therefore, taken *σκαληνός* to refer to the crooked shape of the atom, Kafka to an irregularity of the atom's surfaces; and LSJ noncommittally gives 'uneven, unequal, rough' for its use in *Sens.*, 66. These interpretations are correct only in so far as they recognize that some sort of irregularity is meant; they mistake the nature of the irregularity. In *Sens.* Theophrastus uses *σκαληνός* only in connection with the atoms of the saline and pungent savors (66, 67) and with the rough (*τραχύς*) atoms of the black, which are contrasted with the smooth round (*λεῖος*, *περιφερής*) atoms of the friable white (73-4). Elsewhere in references to the atomic shapes of Democritus and Epicurus *σκαληνός* is used along with *ὀξυγώνιος* and *πολυκαμπής* in contrast to *λεῖος* and *περιφερής*.³ Clearly, it refers to some quality of atoms that have angles and bends as opposed to those that are round. Since atoms that have angles and bends are rough, it is to be expected that *σκαληνός* should occur in association with *τραχύς* and in opposition to *λεῖος*. It does not, however, mean 'rough' (LSJ), nor is it applicable to all atoms that have angles and bends; for the atoms of the saline and pungent have angles and bends and are rough, but they are not *σκαληνός* (*Sens.*, 66-7; *C. P.*, VI, 1, 6, VI, 10, 3). It means, as it does in geometry, 'with unequal sides.' That Theophrastus so understood the word is certain; in his description of the saline savor in *C. P.*, VI, 1, 6 *ἰσοσκελής* is the equivalent of *μηδὲν ἔχειν σκαληνές* in *C. P.*, VI, 10, 3 and *οὐ σκαληνῶν* in *Sens.*, 66. This meaning is confirmed by Hesychius, who defines *ἀσκαληνές* (Diels' correction of MS *ἀσκαληρές*) as *ἰσόπλευρον παρὰ Δημοκρίτῳ*. Thus scalene atoms are atoms with angles and bends whose sides are unequal. The inequality of the sides causes the atoms to interlock, as irregular polygonal stones do in a wall; and it is analogous to the bends on the surface of the smooth round atoms of the bitter savor.

In *C. P.*, VI, 1, 6 Theophrastus says that the atom of the saline savor is *σκολιὸς καὶ ἰσοσκελής*. On *σκαληνός* LSJ adds the note: "prob. akin to *σκολιός*." If this note is correct for the use, and not merely the origin, of the two words, Theophrastus has assigned incompatible attributes to the atom; the same atom is both scalene and isosceles. But it has been seen that

³ Thphr., *C. P.*, VI, 7, 2; Epicurus, *Ep.*, II, 109; Plut., *Mor.*, 697 A-B, *Mor.*, 1088 A (where the Epicureans are refuted in their own language).

σκολιός in *C. P.*, VI, 1, 6 is the equivalent of πολυκαμπής in *C. P.*, VI, 10, 3 (and *Sens.*, 66 as restored). This equivalence is supported by the fact that in *C. P.*, VI, 1, 6 σκολιώτης is used with reference to the καμπαί of the atoms of the bitter savor mentioned in *Sens.*, 66. Confusion of σκολιός and σκαληνός as atomic terms is likely to result not only from the misinterpretation of σκαληνός as 'crooked' or 'uneven' in *Sens.*, 66 but also from Hesychius' definition: σκαληνόν· σκολιόν καὶ πολυγώνιον· τοῦ γὰρ τριγώνου εἶδη τρία ἰσόπλευρον ἰσοσκελές σκαληνόν. (The same definition, with minor differences, is given in the scholium to Plato, *Euthphr.*, 12 D.) Since σκολιός, like σκαληνός, indicates an irregularity, if any of the three types of triangle is σκολιός, it is probably the scalene. But the explanatory clause in the definition does not say that σκαληνός and σκολιός are interchangeable terms for a type of triangle; and it says nothing of the other adjective, πολυγώνιος, which refers to the number of angles in a figure, not the relative length of the sides, and which is in any case not applicable to a triangle. The definition, in fact, seems to be compounded of two distinct elements—or, rather, two different definitions—which have no connection with each other: the explanatory clause gives an example of the planimetric use of the word to be defined; but the phrase σκολιόν καὶ πολυγώνιον gives two equivalents to the word, one of which at least is not a planimetric equivalent. The first definition (σκαληνόν· σκολιόν καὶ πολυγώνιον) was probably, like the definition of ἀσκαληνές, derived from an atomic text, which was misunderstood by the author of the definition. As has been noted, Theophrastus uses σκολιός as the equivalent of πολυκαμπής; and several times he uses πολυγώνιος, instead of γωνιοειδής, in descriptions of the angular atoms (*C. P.*, VI, 1, 6; *Sens.*, 66). As applied to the atoms σκολιόν καὶ πολυγώνιον may, then, be equivalent to πολυκαμπές τε καὶ γωνιοειδές. The author of the definition σκαληνόν· σκολιόν καὶ πολυγώνιον probably found the three terms regularly used of the same atom and thought that the first was interchangeable with the other two. He did not notice that, although atoms that are σκαληνός are σκολιός καὶ πολυγώνιος, the converse is not necessarily true, since atoms may be angular without being scalene.

The significance of these terms as they are used in Democritus' theory of savors may now be stated in summary. At the begin-

ning of his account of Democritus in *Sens.* (60) Theophrastus says that Democritus was not consistent but distinguished some objects of sense by size, some by shape, and some by order and position. Beginning his accounts of the savors he says that Democritus based his explanation on shape (*Sens.*, 64; *C. P.*, VI, 1, 6). His detailed discussion of the savors does not bear out either statement. All atoms of the savors are distinguished by both size and shape. Size determines the extent and speed of penetration: the small atoms of the acid penetrate quickly everywhere, the large atoms of the sweet, slowly (*Sens.*, 65); the large atoms of the astringent stop up the pores (*Sens.*, 66), and those of the saline remain on the surface (*Sens.*, 66). There are two main shapes: round and angular. The round are *περιφερής* (*Sens.*, 65-7) or *στρογγύλος* (*C. P.*, VI, 1, 6). The angular are *γωνιοειδής τε καὶ πολυκαμπής* (*Sens.*, 65, and 66 as reconstructed; *C. P.*, VI, 10, 3), *γωνιοειδής καὶ κάμπυλος* (*C. P.*, VI, 1, 6), *γωνιοειδής καὶ σκολιός* (*ibid.*), or *πολυγώνιος* (*Sens.*, 66; *C. P.*, VI, 1, 6). Apparently there are differences within each shape: atoms of the astringent are *πολυγώνιος* and least *περιφερής* (*Sens.*, 66); and those of the pungent are *περιφερής καὶ γωνιοειδής* (*Sens.*, 67; and *κάμπυλος* *C. P.*, VI, 1, 6). The physiological effect of the atoms depends primarily on their shape: the smooth round atoms of the sweet are soothing (*Sens.*, 65); the rough angular atoms of the acid and pungent heat the body (*Sens.*, 65, 67). The atoms are further distinguished as to whether or not they cohere: the smooth round atoms of the bitter have bends (*καμπαί* *Sens.*, 65; *σκολιότης* *C. P.*, VI, 1, 6) that cause viscosity; similarly, if angular atoms are scalene they interlock, but if they are not they cause the savor to be friable. The individual atoms of the savors are thus distinguished in three ways: by size, by shape, and by capacity to cohere.

Returning to the description of the saline savor in *Sens.*, 66 as reconstructed, we may see how these three distinctions are applied to its atoms. The saline savor is set out in contrast to the bitter savor that is described immediately before it. The bitter savor is composed of atoms that are small, smooth, and round but have bends that cause it to be viscous. The atoms of the saline savor have the opposite characteristics. "That savor is saline which is composed of atoms that are large and not round nor scalene but are angular and have many bends. (By 'scalene'

he means atoms that interlock and intertwine with one another.) The atoms are large because salt remains⁴ on the surface; for, if they were small and were battered against the surrounding particles, they would mingle with the whole. They are not round, because the saline is rough, while the round is smooth. They are not scalene, because they do not interlock; and that is why the saline is friable."⁵

⁴ ἐπιπολάζει, which Stratton translates "comes to the surface of bodies." Democritus probably deduced the large size of the saline atom from observing that when saline water is filtered the salt is left behind on the surface. Cf. Lucretius, II, 471-7.

⁵ Compare the account of salinity given by Lucretius, II, 464-77. He says that because brine is fluid it is composed of smooth round particles (*e levibus atque rutundis*, 466). With these are mixed rough painful bodies which must not be hooked and held together (*retineri hamata*, 468. Note also *non e perplexis sed acutis esse elementis*, 463, which, despite corruption in the preceding verse, clearly refers to non-cohesive rough atoms; cf. οὐδὲ σκαληνῶν ἀλλ' ἐκ γωνιοειδῶν τε καὶ πολυκαμπῶν, as reconstructed in *Sens.*, 66). There must be round atoms, as well as rough, to explain the fluidity of brine (469-70). The presence of the rough atoms is proved by the fact that when sea water is filtered through earth the sweet water leaves behind the *tætri primordia viri* (471-7). (Bailey's translation of this passage misses part of the meaning. He translates *scilicet esse globosa tamen, cum squalida constant* (469) as "you must know that they are nevertheless spherical, though rugged." Here, as the context shows, the same atoms are not both spherical and rugged; there must be spherical atoms *although* there are also rugged atoms.)

Two differences between the accounts of Theophrastus and Lucretius may be noted. First, Lucretius calls sea water bitter (465). But his description of the rough atoms that cause the taste corresponds to Theophrastus' description of the atoms of the saline and not of the bitter.

Second, Lucretius does not call the atoms scalene. Corresponding to Theophrastus' οὐ σκαληνῶν δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ περιπαλάττεσθαι he has *neq tamen haec retineri hamata necessumst* (II, 468). Lucretius apparently uses *hamatus* to refer to the *καμπαι* of the round atoms and to translate both *πολυκαμπῆς* (or *κάμπυλος*) and *σκαληνός*. Thus he says that olive oil may be composed *magis hamatis inter se perque plicatis* (II, 394). Since olive oil is a fluid, it must be composed of round atoms (II, 451-2, 466), and *hamatus* must refer not to the general shape of the atoms but to projections from their surfaces (cf. II, 426-9), like the *καμπαι* which, according to Theophrastus, make the bitter savor viscous. Elsewhere he uses *hamatus* of rough atoms that interlock as opposed to smooth round atoms. In his account of the composition of stones the word

refers primarily, if not solely, to the interlocking of the atoms (II, 444-50; cf. 451-5). But in his accounts of the objects of taste, other than that of the salinity of sea water, although atoms that are *hamatus* interlock, it is their roughness and not their interlocking that explains their effects and distinguishes them from the smooth round atoms (II, 402-7; IV, 655-62). In passages of the latter two kinds *hamatus* is used as if it combined the meanings of *πολυκαμπής* and *σκαληνός*; that is, as if all atoms that had bends (and so were rough) interlocked. (Cf. Hesychius' definition of *σκαληνός*.) The result is that he gives contradictory explanations of bitterness:

at contra quae amara atque aspera cumque videntur,
haec magis hamatis inter se nexa teneri . . . (II, 404-5);

. . . nec tamen haec retineri hamata necessumst (II, 468).

In the first account *hamatus* stands for *πολυκαμπής*, and, as the context shows, it refers to the roughness of the atoms; in the second it stands for *σκαληνός*. In the first, things that are bitter and harsh are explained by their composition from atoms that are *hamatus*, which therefore "tear a way into our senses and at their entering break through the body" (II, 406-7); in the second, the atoms, although rough, are not *hamatus* and therefore do not interlock.

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ASPECTS OF NON-TECHNICAL VOCABULARY IN APICIUS.

It is a rather curious phenomenon of Apician scholarship that the exotic subject matter of this 4th-century Roman cookbook has perhaps deterred non-culinary investigations. Duller late Latin works have lent themselves to little but linguistic studies, but Apicius has inspired reams of popular and semi-popular writing which has in reality added little to its many difficult textual problems. This paper will attempt only to illuminate certain aspects of the long-overlooked non-technical vocabulary in Apicius, especially those elements which are common to most authors and which are as significant for the whole study of late Latin as for the understanding of this particular text.

The only existing lexicon to Apicius is the author's *Glossarial Index to De Re Coquinaria of Apicius*,¹ which was prepared from the most recent and scholarly edition, Giarratano and Vollmer,² and with the help of which one can find any word or form occurring in the chief MSS, E and V from the 9th century, and in the sole MS of the related Excerpts of Vinidarius, A from the 8th century. The references in this paper are made to page and line in that edition, and an asterisk indicates an occurrence in the Excerpts. The glossarial index, however, is not, and never was intended to be, a definitive glossary of all Apician terms. Its purpose was to make all forms readily available to scholars, and its very format precluded discussion of debatable problems. Moreover, it made no attempt to add to existing knowledge of meanings. The exact force of *liquamen*, *sphondylus*, *innula*, and many other technical terms, some unique in this author, is a fascinating aspect of Apician vocabulary study, demanding as much knowledge of antique botany and gastronomy as of philology for the glossing of so much as a single doubtful word; for the definitive establishment of the text, however, the less colorful

¹ M. E. Milham, *A Glossarial Index to De Re Coquinaria of Apicius* (Madison, 1952).

² C. Giarratano and Fr. Vollmer, *Apicii librorum X qui dicuntur De Re Coquinaria quae extant* (Leipzig, 1922).

adjectives, adverbs, and conjunctions are equally important and raise equally difficult problems of textual criticism.

Although a great deal of study has been given in this century to the principles of late Latin and to the texts from which we adduce our evidence, the Latinity of Apicius has barely been touched and only as a part of other studies. The classical scholars of Sweden have made outstanding contributions to this field, from the time of Ahlquist's study of the *Mulomedicina Chironis* at the beginning of the century to the contemporary work of Erik Wistrand, and, of this group, Svennung has dealt most with Apician forms in his penetrating study of Palladius,³ an author closely related in subject matter to Apicius. But the majority of vocabulary studies have been contributed by the dean of the Swedish group, Einar Löfstedt, who for more than a half-century has synthesized the work of his predecessors and compeers, at the same time expanding the field enormously by his own contributions. Löfstedt only occasionally draws upon Apician evidence but has established by exhaustive word-counts and grammatical analyses of many authors the major differences between the syntax and vocabulary of classical and post-classical Latin. This paper proposes for the first time to examine the cookbook of Apicius in light of the principles established by Löfstedt, specifically those dealing with non-technical vocabulary.

One of the most easily recognized characteristics of late Latin lies in its special types of verbal composition. A very common phenomenon is recombination, wherein a compound verb preserves the vocalism of the simplex although a reduced vowel is expected in classical Latin.⁴ Thus *aspargere* occurs 57 times in *De Re Coquinaria* and 6 times in the Excerpts as opposed to 54 occurrences of the classical *aspergere*. In addition, *adspargere*, similarly attested in the *Mulomedicina Chironis*, occurs once (*81, 4), *superspargere* once (*81, 22), and *circumspargere* and *dispargere* each once in the main text (68, 24 and 27, 6 respectively). Likewise *pertangere* is attested once (66, 22), and *concapere* once (31, 8) in a reading attested by both E and V but held suspect by editors. Another phenomenon common

³ J. Svennung, *Untersuchungen zu Palladius und zur lateinischen Fach- und Volkssprache* (Uppsala, 1935).

⁴ E. Löfstedt, *Philologischer Kommentar zur Peregrinatio Aetheriae* (Uppsala, 1936), p. 259.

to late Latin is the adding of a second compounding prefix to an already compounded verb.⁵ Apicius attests *superinfundere* (66, 3), *superinmittere* (12, 23), and *reexinanire* (7 occurrences), the last also representing the type of recomposition in which *re-* rather than *red-* is used before vowels by analogy with the antec consonantal form.

Frequently in late Latin the compound verb appears where we would expect the simplex, thus revealing that the prefix has lost its force or specialized meaning. Löfstedt's many illustrations of this principle⁶ are corroborated in Apicius, where *capere* is used only twice, but *accipere* appears 34 times, only 4 of these with classical meaning. In its other 30 occurrences in the main text it has the meaning of the simplex, usually occurring as a formula, *accipies*, directly comparable to our own recipe formula: "Take one egg. . . ." Similar forms appear in the gerundive of *accoquere* (66, 20EV) and the two occurrences of the past participle of *accurare*. Another prefix which often loses all force in late Latin is *per-*, exemplified by the common Apician verb *perfundere* (66 occurrences in the main text and 11 in the Excerpts).⁷

Apicius also reveals interesting late Latin vocabulary choices among synonyms. *Coepi* seems generally to replace *incipere* in late Latin; thus it is noteworthy that *coepi* appears twice in *De Re Coquinaria* and 3 times in the Excerpts, always in the form *coeperit*, while *incipere* is not represented at all.⁸ *Interficere*, another rare verb in late Latin, is also missing, while the more popular *occidere* occurs twice (43, 30 and *81, 19).⁹ Similarly *reperire*, a learned word according to Löfstedt, has been replaced by the more vulgar *invenire* (4 occurrences),¹⁰ and *edere*, the classical verb of eating which was replaced by *manducare* in France, Italy, and Rumania, does not occur in Apicius although *manducare* is attested 5 times.¹¹

Although the number of significant non-technical adjectives in Apicius is limited, expressions of size and amount are worthy

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 92.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 304.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 124.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 286.

⁹ Löfstedt, *Syntactica*, II (Lund, 1933), p. 343.

¹⁰ Löfstedt, *Phil. Kom. Per.*, pp. 232-3.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 300.

of note. Since the classical adjectives for "large" and "small" had a strong tendency to disappear in late Latin,¹² it is not surprising that both *magnus* and *parvus* are missing in the text of Apicius, although the comparatives *maior* and *minor* occur in a number of forms. The only substitutes for *magnus* occurring in this text are *amplus*, which occurs only once (12, 19) and *abundans*, which occurs 3 times, while the commoner substitutes for *magnus* (*grandis*, *enormis*, *infinitus*, and *ingens*) are also missing. On the other hand, *minutus* occurs 30 times in the main text and once in the Excerpts, *modicus* 28 and 6, the related substantive *modicum* 53 and 1, and the adverb *modice* 65 and 2. *Pauci* occurs just twice, *paulatim* 5 times in the main text, and *paululum* once in the Excerpts (*82, 4). Apicius also reveals the late Latin substitution of *integer* for *totus*, since *integer* appears 14 times to *totus*' once (8, 28) and *universus*' twice (26, 19, and 59, 13).¹³ Incidentally *totus* in its only appearance has its classical meaning, not the late Latin force of *omnis*,¹⁴ which occurs 42 times in *De Re Coquinaria* and 8 in the Excerpts.

In any late Latin author the demonstrative pronouns are of considerable importance, especially since *is* tends to be replaced by other words.¹⁵ Apicius, however, seems to maintain more classical usages than Löfstedt has found in comparable 4th or 5th century texts. Forms of *is* occur in 57 legitimate citations in the main text, an additional dozen being either editorial emendations or meaningless and therefore presumed erroneous. Forms of *hic* are also quite common (42 and 13), but *ille* occurs only 7 times, 5 times as a substitute for *is* and 2 as an adjective (59, 16 and 26, 25). Another common late Latin substitution for *is* is *ipse*, thus found in 15, 9; 15, 21; and 29, 23. An interesting substitute for *hic* in the meaning "the following" is found in the 5 singular uses of *talis* in Apicius,¹⁶ but perhaps most significant of all is the total absence of *iste* in this text although it is a common pronoun in late Latin and highly significant for Romance developments.¹⁷

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 71-3.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 251.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 69.

¹⁵ Löfstedt, *Syn.*, II, p. 47.

¹⁶ Löfstedt, *Coniectanea* (Uppsala, 1950), pp. 129-30.

¹⁷ Löfstedt, *Phil. Kom. Per.*, p. 123.

According to Löfstedt *idem* was sometimes substituted for *item* in vulgar Latin;¹⁸ in Apicius there is one clear example of this phenomenon, *mustum recens idem praestat* (8, 12) and 3 other probable examples (8, 7; 43, 23; 45, 21) in which the main verb is *facere* and *idem* may be construed either as n. sg. acc. or as an adverb equivalent to *item*, the latter seeming the better interpretation. Conversely, *ipse* is used for *idem*, a development significant for late Latin,¹⁹ in 2 clear examples, *aquam pluvialem ad tertias decoques . . . et ipsam aquam pro hydromelli aegris dabis* (9, 14) and *friges oenogaro. postea simul cum ipso oenogaro inferes* (*78, 23). Thus *idem* shows late Latin usages in Apicius, but whether *idemque*, as found in Gregory of Tours, Aethicus Ister, and others, is here attested is by no means certain.²⁰ In these authors a meaningless particle *-que* has been added to *idem*, but the only possible Apician example has an unfortunate ambiguity of syntax which renders it impossible of proof, especially since the copulative *-que* is attested elsewhere in Apicius: <mittis> *folii et croci dragmas singulas dactylorum ossibus torridis quinque isdemque dactylis vino mollitis* (6, 6), the problem here being whether the last four words comprise an ablative absolute or an ablative of accompaniment parallel to *ossibus torridis*. A similar problem arises with the enclitic *-que* in 8, 30: *lasere . . . mittis et nucleos pineos ut puta viginti cumque utendum fuerit lasere, nucleos conteres*, where the difficulty of understanding the material makes it impossible to decide whether one is dealing with a copulative *-que* or with a non-classical indefinite relative *cumque*, merely suffixal in such classical forms as *quandocumque*. In many cases, the technicality and frequent obscurity of Apicius' subject matter only increases the ambiguity of a most casual syntax, and editorial punctuation can hardly be used as a reliable guide.

The other 3 occurrences of enclitic *-que* in Apicius serve to introduce his distribution and uses of conjunctive and disjunctive particles; however, all occurrences of *-que*, characteristically a rare form in late Latin, are restricted to Book I (Epimeles).

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 295.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

²⁰ Löfstedt, *Vermischte Studien zur lateinischen Sprachkunde und Syntax* (Lund, 1936), pp. 39-40.

Although 7, 2-4 twice attests a seemingly conjunctive form in a doubtful passage of MS readings, *conditi Camerini praeceptis utique apsinthio cessante; in cuius vicem absenti Pontici terendique uncias . . .*, only 12, 3 can exhibit an indisputable conjunctive *-que*. *Ac* and *atque* are also as rare in Apicius as in such other authors as Vitruvius, Comodian, and the *Mulomedicina*, *ac* occurring 7 times in *De Re Coquinaria* and *atque* twice in the Excerpts.²¹ This paper will make no attempt to analyze or categorize the some 1050 occurrences of *et*, which remains the standard copulative particle in Apicius and the Excerpts.

The disjunctive particles in Apicius usually have their classical meanings rather than the conjunctive sense common in late Latin.²² *Vel* is most frequently attested (94 times in the main text and twice in the Excerpts), *aut* occurs 19 times and twice, *sive* 32 and 5, and *seu* only once (22, 10). In only three of these passages does conjunctive meaning seem preferable. In Book VI (Aeropetes), two passages have offered editorial problems as they appear in MSS E and V. 42, 13 has *gruem vel anatem lavas* (E, *levas* V) *vel ornas*, the second *vel* being emended by Giarratano to *et*. It would seem that this second *vel* is best interpreted as conjunctive, although Giarratano's emendation is unjustifiable in light of the demonstrated ambivalence of *vel* in other texts. Another example of the same ambivalence occurs in 43, 22, where E and V attest *et* but the derived group of MSS called ζ attests *vel*. Another recipe which seems to use *aut* as a conjunctive raises the same difficulty; 72, 16 advises, for *SALSUM SINE SALSO*, *iecur coques teres et mittes piper aut liquamen aut salem. addes oleum*. It hardly seems that any one of seasoning, broth, or salt would alone be able to make liver resemble salt fish. The difficulty of making such decisions lies in our incomplete knowledge of Roman gastronomy, in the fact that we do not know what would and would not please the Roman taste. These disjunctive particles also occur in a number of correlatives, the only ones worthy of note being the mixed correlatives *vel . . . aut . . . aut* (11, 23) and *aut . . . vel* (*80, 15). The comparative infrequency of *aut* in this text is also of interest, for it is the disjunctive particle which survived in the Romance languages.²³

²¹ Löfstedt, *Phil. Kom. Per.*, pp. 85-7.

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 197-8.

²³ Löfstedt, *Syn.*, II, p. 224.

A close relationship exists in Apicius, as in other late Latin authors, between those conjunctions and adverbs which tend to shift in both meanings and usage. Several significant forms which maintain their classical meanings in Apicius are the previously mentioned *atque*, elsewhere replacing *etiam*; *autem* (5 occurrences), elsewhere replacing *enim*; ²⁴ *exinde* (*pulpa . . . fricatur et exinde isicia plassantur* 12, 18), elsewhere replacing *usque*; ²⁵ *quemadmodum* (32, 25), sometimes temporal; *quando*, regularly temporal as in the 3 occurrences of *quando volueris* in Apicius but elsewhere sometimes modal; and *ubi* (19 occurrences), temporal, but elsewhere sometimes modal, sometimes causal.²⁶ In addition, *denuo* (7 occurrences), *enim* (*cum nervis sequetur . . . cum nervis enim manducare non potes* 43, 1), and *iterum* (6 occurrences) are here used regularly rather than in their late Latin adversative sense.

Certain other Apician adverbs and conjunctions, however, show late Latin usages. For instance *sed*, used 10 times in Apicius, does not always have adversative force. In one of the recipes attributed to Varro there is an example of the *come sed grandis* construction found in the *Peregrinatio*, *betacios sed nigros* (17, 8).²⁷ *Sed et* is also found twice in Apicius, but neither in true apodosis as it is sometimes used in late Latin,²⁸ nor as a substitute for *et*,²⁹ but in 8, 12 it seems best translated as if it were *sed etiam*. The rare late Latin adversative *sane*³⁰ also seems to be once attested: *cum ad bibendum voles uti, addito melle rosatum conficies. sane custodito ut rosam a rore siccam et optimam mittas* (7, 15). *iam* and *mox* are of particular interest because each is used as a conjunction in Apicius.³¹ Löfstedt long ago pointed out the MS readings *iam bulliit* (60, 13) and *iam bullivit* (*79, 4) along with another example of conjunctive *iam* from the *Mulomedicina*, but the same phenomenon is attested with *mox* in *patinam, mox constrinxerit, inferes* (*78, 18). The only other occurrence of *mox* in Apicius shows

²⁴ Löfstedt, *Phil. Kom. Per.*, p. 139.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 230.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 128-9.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 179-80.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 203.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 338.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 323.

³¹ Löfstedt, *Vermischte Stud.*, pp. 48-9.

it with the force of *modo*³² in *erunt tales quovis tempore quasi mox de arbore demptae* (11, 3).

Among other non-classical uses of adverbs in Apicius, the pleonastic use of *ita* before *ut* appears 25 times, a phenomenon so common that the two words had almost become felt as one, as in *sicut*.³³ Only once is *ita* used before *ne*, however: in *craticula igni lento exsiccabis, ita ne urantur* (50, 16). *Sic*, often having the force of *tum* in late Latin,³⁴ thus appears in many of its 76 occurrences in *De Re Coquinaria* and 17 in the Excerpts, a typical example being *ante tamen teres piper rutam liquamen et sic superinmittis iecur* (12, 23). Finally, *tam* sometimes replaced *et* in late Latin,³⁵ and it is with this meaning that it makes its only appearance in Apicius, *agitabis surculo lauri viridis tam diu coques* (64, 13).

It should also be pointed out that *tamen* occurs much less frequently than in the *Peregrinatio* (4 times),³⁶ each time with the force of *autem* and with an adverb meaning "before" to indicate that the given information should have been inserted sooner in the recipe, as in *assas iecur porcinum et eum enervas. ante tamen teres piper rutam liquamen* (12, 22). This last example also illustrates the late Latin preference for *ante* (8 occurrences in Apicius and 1 in the Excerpts), while *antea* occurs only once (26, 18).³⁷ *Post* is also sometimes used as an adverb in late Latin in place of *postquam*,³⁸ as in *post a charta praeccludes* (63, 18), and *praeter* for *praeterea*³⁹ as in . . . *praeter quod subtracto igni in se redit* (6, 1).

The final group of adverbs are *saepe*,⁴⁰ *satis*,⁴¹ and *valde*,⁴² none of which are used as conjunctions but all of which are significant for late Latin vocabulary. Löfstedt presents a number of word-counts to prove that *saepe* was almost entirely replaced in late Latin, since it does not appear in the *Peregrinatio* and only three times each in Pomponius Mela, Firmicius Maternus, and Cassius Felix. Similarly it does not appear at all in the main text of Apicius, occurring only twice in the

³² Löfstedt, *Phil. Kom. Per.*, p. 241.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 60.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 231.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 338.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 27-8.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 74-5.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 334.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 280.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 277.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 73-4.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 36.

Excerpts (*81, 31 and *82, 16) and then in the comparative *saepius*. It is replaced in the main text by *frequenter* twice, *subinde* twice, and *aliquotiens* once. *Satis*, on the other hand, is attested 17 times in the main text, once in the Excerpts, 8 times in its classical adverbial sense, several times as a substantive, and once in the late Latin meaning "too" or "too much" in *holera electa non satis matura in vas pictim repone* (10, 5). Last of all, *valde*, which was especially popular in the *Historia Francorum* and Gregory of Tours, occurs 3 times in Apicius (31, 14; 47, 14 and 72, 26).

This then presents a broad survey of non-technical vocabulary in Apicius exclusive of prepositions, which are so complex and extensive as to demand separate analysis. It is obvious that this late 4th-century text has many late Latin forms and usages but is by no means so far removed from classical Latin as are the *Peregrinatio*, *Mulomedicina*, or certain other documents of the same period. Yet its late Latinity cannot be overlooked as has heretofore been its editorial fate. Even so recent and careful an edition as Giarratano and Vollmer's and so excellent a study as Brandt's⁴³ have indulged in emendations and restorations unjustifiable in light of the facts of late Latin syntax; no definitive edition can be produced in the future without full cognizance of these facts. It is true that scholars would like to know a great deal more about the meanings of Apician technical vocabulary, its adjectives and nouns and even verbs; but without a solid understanding of the non-technical pronouns, adverbs, and conjunctions which bring syntactic order out of a welter of technical terminology, the sometimes plebeian, sometimes fantastic, fare of the Roman cookbook must remain shrouded in doubt and mystery.

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⁴³ E. Brandt, *Untersuchungen zum römischen Kochbuche* (Leipzig, 1927).

REVIEWS.

BERNARD M. W. KNOX. *Oedipus at Thebes*. New Haven, Yale University Press; London, Oxford University Press, 1957. Pp. viii + 280.

The title of this excellent study might almost have been "*Oedipus at Athens*," for the author has based his interpretation of *Oedipus Rex* on a careful and penetrating examination of the intellectual history of Athens in the late fifth century. Oedipus himself, always an Everyman, is here revealed as an Everyman of specifically Athenian temper, delineated in terms of the πόλις τύραννος, and embodying to a large degree the vital but self-destructive genius of Periclean and post-Periclean Athens. This view of Oedipus, which is perhaps the book's principal theme, is powerfully supported by citations from Thucydides and other historians, as well as from the sophists, orators, and medical writers. Knox's knowledge of the period is admirable in general; but his analysis of the language and imagery of the play in the light of that knowledge (chiefly in Chapter 3) is a piece of real philological virtuosity, and we must feel grateful to the author for so enlarging upon his earlier study which appeared in *Tragic Themes in Western Literature* (ed. C. Brooks, New Haven, 1955). Sophocles' lines are analyzed in their wide range of cultural association as a rich poetic web representing the intellectual and spiritual concerns of Athens with dazzling fullness and brilliance. One emerges with the feeling that there was little of moment in the world around him which Sophocles did not reflect somehow in *Oedipus Rex*.

To find fault with such a book may seem ungrateful, but, as Gibbon once wrote, "Omnipotence itself cannot escape the murmurs of its discordant votaries." The votaries of Sophocles are not likely to agree about everything, and about the ultimate metaphysical implications of *Oedipus Rex* one may easily differ. Knox is by no means doctrinaire, but one has the impression that sometimes he is a little too much on the side of the gods. The very fact that the oracles are, in the final event, shown to be correct leads the author occasionally, though not always, toward the view that the play justifies the ways of God to man. This reviewer, at least, will never be convinced that "The play . . . is a reassertion of the religious view of a divinely ordered universe" (p. 47), or that Oedipus "has learned well . . . the existence of divine prescience and of an order beyond human understanding" (p. 50). Prescience, perhaps; but order does not follow necessarily from prescience, and Knox himself has stated clearly and correctly that "Sophocles has chosen to present the terrible actions of Oedipus not as determined but only as predicted, and he has made no reference to the relation between the predicted destiny and the divine will." And yet in his treatment of the Oedipus-Jocasta scene in general, the author keeps implying that the principals are morally wrong, and even impious, to doubt the oracles, and that they are somehow revolting against the divine

"order" in their necessary search for the truth. Surely the following, for instance, is an overstatement of the case about *εἰκὴ κράτιστον ζῆν*: "Jocasta makes her famous declaration which rejects fear, providence—divine and human alike—and any idea of universal order. Her declaration amounts almost to a rejection of the law of cause and effect, and it certainly undermines the basis of human calculation." To deny that there is any clear foreknowledge in human life is only to summarize what the play's events dramatize. The oracles had been explicit, of course, and their correctness comes out in the end; but Sophocles has exercised his subtlest dramatic skills to make them seem, even to the dimmest intelligence, unfulfillable. So far as "human calculation" is concerned, that of Oedipus and Jocasta is unexceptionable, and it is only because they use the full range of their intelligence that they ever find out the truth.

So too, things seem to get a little out of hand in the discussion of Jocasta's lines, 711 ff., where Knox (pp. 171 ff.) tries to prove that the queen, because she lacks naïveté, also lacks all trace of religious feeling. It seems unfair, when Jocasta has carefully avoided denying Apollo's foreknowledge, and even explicitly affirmed it, to torture her words into their opposite. Such an interpretation is perhaps necessary in order to motivate the ode at 863 ff. in the way that Knox sees it. But it is also part of the misconception that *Oedipus Rex* asserts a religious view of the world, and that anything which seemingly questions that religious view falls under the poet's disapproval. So too, one might draw very opposite conclusions from the staggering list of verbal equations between the gods and Oedipus, equations which Knox feels expose the "divine stature implicit in Oedipus' attitude . . . as false." These parallels, like the Homeric *δαίμονι ἴσος* and *θεοῖς ἐπιείκελος*, constitute no small part of what gives Oedipus the appearance of divine stature in the play. Finally, it is one-sided, to say the least, to declare that in the catastrophe Oedipus is found to be "not the measurer, but the thing measured" (p. 157), or that "there is a standard beyond man by which Oedipus is measured," and thus make Sophocles foreshadow and concur in the Platonic doctrine that God, not man, is the measure of all things (p. 184). Oedipus and Apollo have, in a very real way, measured each other, as the carefully balanced statement of *Oedipus Rex* 1329-31 makes clear. Sophocles was far closer to the age of Protagoras than to that of Plato; and in his initial analysis of Oedipus as hero, and in the very last sentences of his book, Knox has stated in a far more satisfactory way, indeed a wonderful way, what seems to me to have been Sophocles' intuitive metaphysical design. But there seems to be an undercurrent of modern religious feeling which intrudes occasionally upon the book's otherwise clear historical perspective.

It is this undercurrent, I believe, which accounts for the author's treatment of the controversial central stasimon (*Oedipus Rex* 863 ff.). Knox has assailed my own interpretation of the ode so painstakingly (p. 209, n. 98), even to applying the term "ingenious" (classical scholarship's most courteous cuss-word), that the temptation to reply is irresistible. Besides, for all Knox's ingenuity (there!), I still think that I am right in believing that the ode does

not add up to a unified conviction, positive or negative, on the part of the chorus about the value of oracles or of religion, but rather reflects the wavering views of the late fifth century, the lingering hope that divine order may prevail in the universe, and the growing fear that it may not. In the section devoted to the poem (pp. 99 ff.), Knox has ably canvassed the difficulties of its relevance to the play. His own explanation is an extension of his finely supported argument that Oedipus derives the salient features of his character from the national character of Athens herself, the *πόλις τύραννος*, brilliantly energetic, decisive, autocratic, yet subject to the weaknesses involved in such overwhelming endowments. That Oedipus and Athens do, on one level, closely resemble each other I should not wish to deny. But to identify them in the ode to the extent of saying that "the words of the chorus are a warning and a prophecy of Athenian defeat" (p. 104) is to fall into "a most abrupt *anankê*." Such a solution differs little from the view, which Knox dismisses, that Athens, not Oedipus, is the object of the choral strictures on *ἔβρις*, as the author seems to realize when he says that Sophocles here attributes "to Oedipus faults which are not to be found in the hero of the play but in the actions of the city of which he is the dramatic symbol." In that case, the irrelevancies to the play still stand. But the ode cannot be so specific and schematized; neither can I agree that Knox's paraphrase of it (p. 211) is justified, or that the chorus is exhibiting "the faith which moves mountains" (p. 210) when they beg Zeus to fulfill an oracle which is apparently incapable of fulfillment. The faith which moves mountains was not, I suspect, a characteristic of post-Periclean Athens, and not at any time a pronounced Hellenic trait.

All are agreed, or should be, that the oracles here under discussion are those given to Laius, not to Oedipus. I wonder now, however, if I was correct when I stated formerly that the chorus prays for their fulfillment. The chorus says that they are not being fulfilled (906 ff.), that if they are not fulfilled, then they (the choristers) will neglect the oracular centers of Greece, and they suggest that Zeus, if that is his right name, take account of the situation (903-5, where the subject of *λάθαι* is unexpressed, and even the previous *τάδε*, which one understands as subject, may refer specifically to the oracles, or to the general moral scheme outlined in the three preceding stanzas). That might be interpreted as prayer; if so, it is of an old, formulaic kind, and it is certainly ambiguous. The first three stanzas are, indeed, prayer, punctuated by statements of moral and religious belief: the choristers pray first for purity in word and deed (863 ff.), then for the continuance of righteous effort which benefits the city (879 f.); finally they pray that evil fate may overtake the high-handed and irreligious man (883 ff.). Their statements about the heavenly origin of law (865 ff.), the necessary fall of tyranny and *ἔβρις* (874 ff.), the punishment for unrighteousness (883 ff.) strongly imply that they see the world as a morally comprehensible structure, and they add: "For if such (*sc.* evil) deeds are held in honor, why should I dance?" Here, of course, *χορεύειν* cannot mean simply "perform tragedy," as has been so often suggested. The art of tragic formulation occurs precisely as the result of the failure of such pat schemes as the chorus has just expressed; "dance" here

indicates any dance, or celebration in general, in honor of the gods, and the application to tragedy does not go beyond the fact that the theatre was sacred to Dionysus. The whole section, however, does imply that in the eyes of the chorus, religious observance and moral rectitude are symptoms, perhaps even conditions, of civilization itself (cf. 879 ff., and *Antigone* 370); if these fail, everything fails.

It is not really surprising that, at this point, Sophocles subtly turns the tables; his odes seldom embalm an idea or conviction, but rather reflect the tensions and contradictions of the action. In the famous first stasimon of the *Antigone*, for instance, after all the high praises of human accomplishment, peculiar ambiguities begin to arise: the line ἀπορος ἐπ' οὐδὲν ἔρχεται τὸ μέλλον is doubtless rightly translated "There is nothing in his future which he approaches without resource," but there is something in the word order and the surprising use of the article which suggests the interpretation "Without resource he passes to the future nothing (i. e., death)"; cf. Fg. 871, line 8 Pearson, and *Electra* 999 f. Is φνγὰς the accusative of φνγή, and ξυμπέφρασται middle, or the nominative of φνγάς, and the verb passive? Certainly 365 f. is a deliberate anticlimax: "With the devising of his skill—wisdom beyond hope—sometimes he creeps toward evil, sometimes toward good"; one might have looked for a less chance-ridden conclusion. (Cf. J. C. Opstelten, *Sophocles and Greek Pessimism*, pp. 144 ff.) The realm of unreason is never forgotten in Sophocles. And so too, here, in the *Oedipus*, only more clearly: after three stanzas of piety and prayer, the chorus says explicitly, "If oracles and their religious implications are not fulfilled, then I will neglect the holy places; let Zeus and his everlasting rule take heed of it; the oracles are indeed unfulfilled, Apollo is not clearly honored, and religion is on the wane." If this is the faith that moves mountains, it is no wonder that the mountains are in their usual places.

That the oracles are in fact fulfilled has nothing to do with what the chorus says at this point; the choristers are in the dilemma of trying wishfully to defend an apparent contradiction, and (I still say) they are confused. Sophocles, however, was not, and one might look a little further into his words. In the first strophe there is implied the old antinomy between νόμος and φύσις; the laws (νόμοι), offspring of Olympus and heavenly aether, stand forth treading high, embodying a great and ageless god. No mortal nature (φύσις) gave them birth. The root of φύσις is then taken up in φντεύει (873): ὕβρις breeds the tyrant, the opposite of law. Is it not clear that law is not the product of human nature, but rather of the gods? Is it not further implied that human nature is dangerously full of ὕβρις, overstuffs itself on evil gains, and falls by its own ambitious vaultings, while the protection from that fate is to hold the god as one's champion (881)? Such, surely, is the familiar ethic, which the Greeks, from Hesiod down, had hoped was true, and indeed the contrast between ὕβρις and τὸ καλῶς ἔχον πόλει πάλαισμα (879 f.) is a little like Hesiod's two forms of ἔρις. Without the divine laws, we are animals which overstuff, and therefore destroy ourselves. (Cf. the medical language used to describe this phenomenon in both *Oedipus Rex* 874 f. and *Ajax* 758 ff.) And yet, neither the ode, nor the play itself in the last analysis, illustrates this hopeful pie-

ture: Oedipus, exercising his mind to save the city (τὸ καλῶς ἔχον πόλει πάλαισμα), in perfect purity of motive, is neither hybristic nor a gluttoned animal, but he is ruined; as for the gods, their oracles are fulfilled, but they scarcely prove to be either good for the city (civilization) or morally instructive. If anyone can derive any feeling of divine order from the text of *Oedipus Rex*, he will be hard put to it to say what it consists of, unless it is "order" for the gods to say "I told you so." The chorus' pious hope is dashed in a most exemplary manner, and a most ironical one, for the very token by which, as they imply, they will believe in divine order (namely, the fulfillment of oracles) is the precise means by which the just man, from whom they had benefited and in whom they had supreme faith, is brought to a nightmare of undeserved horror, as a striking example of the fact that the gods do fulfill oracles (i.e., have prescience), but do not reward moral excellence. So also, throughout the ode, the chorus is not really sure that the moral will hold. They assert that no forgetfulness (λάθα, 870) will put the laws to sleep, but they pray Zeus not to let these matters escape him (λάθοι, 904). The whole last stanza shows, if it shows anything at all, that they are afraid that Delphi has misfired, that there is no divine order, that religion is passing away, and with it, by implication, all civilization.

Between such fears and the "passionate tumult of a clinging hope" the chorus is distraught, as well it might be just at the turning point of the action of the drama. Immediately after this ode, all the major roles are reversed, and the truth comes clear. The ode is indeed, as Knox says, "magnificently functional," and its function is to hold the metaphysical issue in suspense, in preparation for its clarification through action. It reflects, I maintain, not strong religious faith, but the impact of tragic experience upon the simpler moral generalities of Greek culture, and expresses with sorrowful compassion the confusion of those who are neither great thinkers nor great actors, but whose lives are shaken, and driven between hope and despair, by the dread unfoldings of human life.

But to digress so long over differences is only to emphasize the importance of Knox's work, which is really required reading. The book is tastefully, even eloquently, written, and the effect of its historical thoroughness should be to lay to rest forever such theories as the Freudian or the "detective-story" interpretations, and the other sordid vulgarisms of Sophoclean critique. It will be, fortunately, easily accessible to the reader who knows no Greek, and therefore of interest to all literary people. It is a pity that transliteration of Greek has been used in the text: some Greek words transliterate elegantly, but the general effect of transliterated sentences has the unhallowed look of jabberwocky. Also, the real Greek in the notes might have been more carefully proof-read. But these matters have little weight. *Oedipus at Thebes* is a magnificent contribution in a difficult field. Perhaps one may legitimately hope that Professor Knox may yet write a sequel about *Oedipus at Colonus*, to be called, in all seriousness, *Oedipus at Athens*, and exhibiting with equal insight and abundance of evidence the old Oedipus, now no longer the embodiment of Athens the πόλις τύραννος, but of Athens the Ἑλλάδος παιδεία.

FRANCO SARTORI. *Le eterie nella vita politica Ateniese del VI e V secolo A. C.* Rome, "L'Erma" di Bretschneider, 1957. Pp. 169. (*Università degli Studi di Padova, Pubblicazioni dell'Istituto di Storia Antica*, III.)

Mabel Lang, in her fine study of "The Revolution of the 400" (*A. J. P.*, LXIX [1948], pp. 272-89) summarized (pp. 278-9) the "softening-up activities of the oligarchic clubs in the . . . order in which Thucydides presents them (first, a calculated kind of violence; second, a deceptively mild program; and third, the use of the first two as levers of persuasion and intimidation)." This account agrees so well with Plato's statement in the *Republic* (II, 365 D) that Plato may well have had the situation of 411 B. C. in mind, as Sartori himself now suggests (*Historia*, VII [1958], pp. 164-8); see also *Theaetetus*, 173 D, and, not independent of these passages, *Isocrates*, III, 54.

Students of Athenian politics have always been interested in the composition, the organization, and the activities of these clubs. George M. Calhoun's monograph on *Athenian Clubs in Politics and Litigation* (*Bull. of the Univ. of Texas*, No. 262, issued Jan. 8, 1913) has been able to satisfy this interest, and his book is used and quoted whenever these clubs are mentioned. Calhoun admits quite frankly (p. 4) that his "investigation is but incidentally concerned with the origin or the history of the clubs," and his section on "Origin and Development" (pp. 10-17) and on "Political Tendencies" (pp. 17-24) are rather sketchy. He concludes (p. 24) that "the clubs were not restricted to any one party, (but) the majority of them seem to have been oligarchic." He is led to this conclusion (p. 18) by "the existence of hetaeries which supported popular leaders of the fifth century, Themistocles, Pericles, Alcibiades." Actually, our knowledge of the "clubmembership" of Themistocles is based on a passage in Plutarch's *Aristides* (II, 4) which goes back to Aeschines the Socratic, probably *via* Theopompus; in this passage the justice of Aristides is contrasted to the partiality of Themistocles. It is doubtful, moreover, whether in that early period there was as yet any alternative to the aristocratic organizations of the Athenian nobles. The case of Pericles is different (see also below, note 5), for we know even from Plutarch (*Pericles*, 7; 9, 2-3) that Pericles was an aristocrat until the 'sixties when Aristides had died and Cimon was away on military campaigns.¹ Alcibiades was, of

¹ This is confirmed by a passage of the Scholia on *Aristides* (III, p. 446, lines 17-26, ed. Dindorf) which does not seem to have been considered so far, although it appears to go back to Theopompus: *καὶ τούτων μὲν (sc. τῶν δημοτικῶν) πρόστατο Κίμων, πολλὰ διανέμων καὶ συγχωρῶν ὀπωρίσασθαι τοῖς βουλομένοις, καὶ ἱμάτια διανέμων τοῖς πένησι* (see *F. Gr. Hist.*, 115 F 89, and J. E. Sandys' comments on Aristotle's *Const. of Athens* 27, 3). *τῶν δὲ ὀλιγαρχικῶν πρόστατο Περικλῆς· κατηγορηθεὶς δὲ ὁ Κίμων ὑπὸ Περικλέους <ἐπὶ> Ἑλληνικῇ (ΕΠΙΛΑΝΙΚΗ codd.) τῇ ἀδελφῇ καὶ ἐπὶ Σκύρῳ τῇ νήσῳ, ὥς ὑπ' αὐτοῦ προδιδομένου ἐξεβλήθη. δεδιώξ δὲ ὁ Περικλῆς μὴ ζητηθῇ ὑπὸ τῶν δημοτικῶν, πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἐχώρησεν· οἱ δὲ ὀλίγοι γαμβρόν ὄντα Θουκυδίδην τὸν Μελησίου τοῦ Κίμωνος ἀπεσπᾶσαντο, σκυλακώδη ὄντα καὶ ὀλιγαρχικόν.* The expulsion of Cimon evidently refers to his ostracism which has always been connected with Pericles (as accuser;

course, never a democrat, although he may have been popular. It is, therefore, clear that the clubs as such, whenever they were active in the political field, should be considered as antidemocratic, whether or not certain of their members courted popular favor to achieve and to maintain their political positions.

Since Calhoun's excellent book did not deal with the "historical development" of the clubs, there was a need for a study of "The *hetaireiai* in the political life of Athens during the sixth and fifth centuries B. C." This need has now been fulfilled by Sartori's book under review; its subject is of sufficient importance to justify the preceding introduction and the following lengthy discussion. Both Sartori and Attilio Degrassi (in the brief preface) claim that new discoveries and recent research have made Calhoun's book obsolete; it is surprising, however, how little new evidence on the Athenian clubs has been brought to light either by excavations or by the re-examination of old material. Nor has Sartori made use of all of the new information which has become available. I am thinking of ostracism: the few references (collected in the Index), all conventional, are based either on Calhoun (pp. 136-40, a very good account) or on Carcopino's second edition of *L'ostracisme Athénien* (1935) which is little more than a reprint of his splendid book of 1909. Actually, a great many ostraca have been found in recent years, and a great deal of work has been done on ostracism; see O. W. Reinmuth, *R.-E.*, s. v. *Ostrakismos*, and the list of articles in footnote 1 of my forthcoming article "Theophrastos on Ostracism" in *Classica et Medievalia*, XIX (1958). If Sartori really believed (p. 45) that the clubs were active in the ostracisms not only of Hyperbolus but also of Hipparchus, Aristides, Themistocles (see Ehrenberg, *People*, p. 340, note 4), Cimon, and Thucydides the son of Melesias, he should not have been satisfied with a passing reference to Calhoun's treatment, and with the addition of a few references in a footnote (p. 80, note 6) on the date of the ostracism of Hyperbolus (to which should be added *Phoenix*, IX [1955], pp. 122-6).

The first chapter (pp. 17-33) is devoted to an examination of the terms *hetaireiai* and *synomosiiai*, and to an attempt to show that these terms are not only not similar but actually contradictory (p. 17).² Actually, the two terms were used indiscriminately in references to the political activities of the oligarchic clubs between 424 B. C. and 403 B. C., by Aristophanes, Andocides, Thucydides, Plato, and Aris-

see Plutarch, *Pericles*, 9, 4) and Elpinice (as cause; see Andocides, IV, 33; Plutarch, *Cimon*, 15, 3; Scholia on Aristides, III, p. 515, line 15, quoting Didymus), but it is difficult to understand the reference to Skyros and to Cimon's betrayal of Pericles. R. Sealey, *Hermes*, LXXXIV (1956), pp. 234-47, discussed Pericles' entry into politics without considering his earlier aristocratic associations.

² The evidence offered is three Hellenistic inscriptions (*Syll.*³, 360, 526, 527) condemning *synomosiiai*, one of which (527) testifies also to the existence of *hetaireiai* as official divisions of the people of Dreros, just as they are known from the Gortynian Laws (*I. C.*, III, 72, X, line 38; see M. Guarducci's commentary on p. 168). This merely shows that *synomosiia* can mean "conspiracy"; actually, it can also mean "confederation" as Sartori recognizes (p. 33). See now J. and L. Robert, *R. E. G.*, LXXI (1958), p. 195, no. 75.

tote; the former term (*synomosia*) had often a derogatory meaning, while the latter (*hetaireia* and *hetairikon*) was the more formal designation. On the whole, the matter of terminology has already been well treated by Calhoun (pp. 4-9). Nor does Sartori's second chapter, devoted to the character of the Attic *hetaireiai* (pp. 37-49), go beyond what Calhoun has already stated in his book.

In the third chapter (pp. 53-7: the Attic *hetaireiai* until the time of Cleisthenes), Sartori passes from the conspiracy of Cylon (whose associates are called an *hetaireia* by Herodotus, V, 71, *synomotai* by Plutarch, *Solon*, 12, 1) directly to the Alcmeonid attack upon Leipsydriion (called *prodosetairon* by Aristotle, *Const.*, 19, 3) and to the conflict between Isagoras and Cleisthenes in which, according to Herodotus, V, 66 (and Aristotle, 20, 1), the *hetaireiai* were actively involved. Sartori mentions (p. 55), without approval and without reexamination, Beloch's old theory that the political divisions of the first half of the sixth century B. C. reappeared in the struggle for power after the expulsion of Hippias. Whatever may be the truth of this theory, a study of the *staseis* of old Athens should certainly have been included in an account such as Sartori's.

The meaning of *stasis* in the sense of "a group of people taking a certain political position" (we commonly use the related term "opposition") cannot be attested before the fifth century (see note 4), although it is probable that it originated in the political struggles of the late Solonian age.³ *Staseis* are first mentioned as existing immediately after Solon's reforms (Aristotle, 11, 2), and they are identified, anachronistically, as *demos* and *gnorimoi*; actually, these groups are said (2, 1) to have been at odds with each other even before Solon (see also 5, 1-2). We next hear of the *staseis* from Herodotus (I, 59-62, whom Aristotle follows, 13, 4-15) who reports that Peisistratus raised a third *stasis* in opposition to the two led by Lycurgus and Megacles. It is generally assumed that these three *staseis* comprised large segments of the population, as did presumably the two *staseis* of the earlier Solonian period, and that it is to these *staseis* that the Solonian law against "neutralism" refers (Plutarch, *Solon*, 20, 1); Solon himself would then have obeyed his own law (see Aristotle, 14, 2, and the parallel passages assembled in Sandys' edition). It is far more likely, however, that the three *staseis* were comparatively small groups led by ambitious aristocrats, and that

³ See Kock, *Com. Att. Frag.*, I, p. 584, no. 859 (= J. M. Edmonds, *Frag. Att. Com.*, I, pp. 778-9, no. 859): *στάσις· οὐχ ἡ φιλονεικία, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ οἱ στασιάζοντες*; for the formation of the word, see G. R. Vowles, *C.P.*, XXIII (1928), p. 42; E. Schwyzer, *Gr. Gramm.*, I, pp. 504-6. L.-S.'s *Lexicon*, s. v., III, 1, lists, I think incorrectly, Theognis, I, lines 51-2, a passage to which Herodotus' (poetic?) source in III, 82, alludes. This political view must be associated with Solon, fr. 3 (Diehl), lines 18-22, a passage to which, in turn, Herodotus refers in VIII, 3 (A. W. Verrall, *C.R.*, XVII [1903], pp. 98-9); see also the related *gnome* in I, 87. In all these passages, and in many others (see L.-S.'s *Lexicon*, s. v., III, 2), *stasis* is used in the sense of "the action taken by the group called *stasis*, faction (which also has a double meaning), sedition, discord"; for Aristotle's analysis of this term, see M. Wheeler, *A.J.P.*, LXXII (1951), pp. 143-61, who calls Herodotus, I, 59, 3, the *locus classicus* but fails to notice that Herodotus uses the word here in a different meaning.

they were not at all different from the later *hetaireiai* of the time of Cleisthenes or of Alcibiades; see also Plutarch, *Solon*, 29, 2. This interpretation is confirmed by Herodotus who speaks (V, 69-72) of the *hetairoi* of Isagoras and of Cleisthenes as *antistasiotai*, *systasiotai*, *stasiotai*, and by Plutarch who consistently (following here one source, probably Theopompus) refers (*Aristides*, 7, 3; *Nicias*, 11, 4; *Alcibiades*, 13, 4) to the *hetaireiai* of Nicias and Alcibiades as *staseis*; only in one significant passage (based on Theophrastus) does he mention the *hetaireia* of Phaiax.⁴ It is clear, therefore, that the *staseis* of the first half of the sixth century should have been included in an historical account of the Attic *hetaireiai*; in fact, the political struggles of the age of Cleisthenes read like a repetition of those in the time of Peisistratus.

The sixty years from the battle of Marathon to the beginning of the Peloponnesian War (a better break would have been the death of Pericles) are treated by Sartori on five pages (pp. 61-6). This is the period during which the law of ostracism was enacted and employed; only one ostracism (the freak one of Hyperbolus) took place after the death of Pericles. This is the period during which Athenian democracy developed against the opposition of the aristocratic elements united in the *hetaireiai*. This is the period during which Athenian politics was directed by the generals who were chosen and elected under circumstances which made possible the activity of the *hetaireiai* either on behalf of certain candidates or against them. Of all this, one reads next to nothing in Sartori's account; but this is not the place to present the story which he failed to tell.⁵

After the death of Pericles, as after the expulsion of Hippias, a new political situation arose; only this time it was Cleon, not Cleisthenes, who was the leader of the *demos*. Accordingly, the aristocratic groups were pushed still further into the background, gaining in strength only through Nicias' successes (especially his "peace") and through Alcibiades' bold adventures. The ostracism of Hyperbolus, as masterly a stroke as that of Themistocles more than

⁴ This is, of course, not the place to examine all the significant occurrences of *stasis* (and related terms) in Herodotus, Thucydides (e.g., IV, 71), Isocrates (e.g., IV, 79), Plato, Antiphon (Harpocration, *s.v. stasiotes*), Aristotle (e.g., *Oec.*, II, 1348a35-b4), and in other authors; attention may be called, however, to a few occurrences in Aeschylus because these have been combined and given a separate meaning in L.-S., *Lexicon*, *s.v.*, II; see now G. Italie, *Index Aeschyleus*, *s.vv. stasis* and *stasiarchos*. Actually, they are the earliest testimonies to the use of *stasis* as "group of people who stand in opposition." There can be no doubt that to Aeschylus and to his audience the word *stasis* had a political meaning, and that its use evoked recollections of the political struggles of Athens during the sixth and early fifth centuries.

⁵ The reader may merely be warned that the quotation of the description of Pericles' activity by Plutarch (following Critolaus), *Pericles*, 7, 5: τὰλλα δὲ φίλους καὶ ἑταίρους καθιέις ἐπράττειν (pp. 65-6) is incorrect. Calhoun (p. 18, n. 5) defends the MS reading φίλους καὶ ῥήτορας ἑταίρους, claiming that ἑταίρους is used here as an adjective; Lindskog-Ziegler (following Holzapfel) transpose ἑταίρους ῥήτορας; while B. Perrin (following Xylander) prints ῥήτορας ἐτέρους, an easy emendation which I consider to be correct.

fifty years earlier, was quickly followed by the bloody purge of the *Hermokopidai* and of the Mystery-Mockers. After the panic of the Sicilian disaster and again after the defeat at Aigospotamoi, the way stood open for an oligarchic revolution, and it was taken by men who formed no longer a loyal opposition but rather a subversive conspiracy. The overthrow of the Thirty marks the end of the political activities of the aristocratic clubs; they were and remained to be discredited.

The first part of this period (431-421 B. C.) is well treated by Sartori (pp. 69-76);⁶ the main evidence is the "Old Oligarch" and the *Knights* and *Wasps* of Aristophanes. Sartori points out that the oligarchic clubs became more and more associated in the mind of the *demos* with conspiracies to establish a tyranny. Whether this was merely the result of propaganda or whether there was some factual evidence for this suspicion, we cannot tell; the "Old Oligarch" certainly discourages all hope that the hated democracy may be overthrown.

The next lustrum (421-415 B. C.) stands in the shadow of Alcibiades who, like Pericles before him, was able to attain great popular support, especially since the democratic "machine" was in the hands of Hyperbolus upon whom contemporaries and later generations have heaped abuse, perhaps not unjustly. Sartori passes quickly over the years following the peace of Nicias and even over

⁶ He calls attention to a passage in Plutarch's *Praecepta gerendae reipublicae* (806F-807A) which, in his opinion, suggests that Cleon may have been associated with a "non aristocratic" (p. 72) *hetaireia* before entering politics. It so happens that a fragment of Theopompus' account of Cleon (*F. Gr. Hist.*, 115 F 92) is repeated without the author's name in Plutarch's *Praecepta* (799D), and I suggest that the story of Cleon's entry into politics also goes back to Theopompus; compare the similar account of Pericles' entry into politics (treated above, note 1) which can be attributed also to Theopompus. The newly identified passage should be associated with *F. Gr. Hist.*, 115 F 93 which speaks of Cleon's first political activities. It is, therefore, significant that before that time (i. e. 428/7 B. C.), Cleon is said by Plutarch to have attacked Pericles (*Pericles*, 33, 6-7; 35, 4). If the reference to Cleon's friends implies, therefore, his membership in an *hetaireia*, this does not mean that it was a "democratic club"; in fact, the passage in question indicates that Cleon abandoned his "friends" to take as *hetairoi* the worst elements of the people, following, it would seem (at least in the account of Theopompus), the example of Cleisthenes and of Pericles. In any case, the passage in Plutarch (*Praecepta*, 806F-807A) must not be used as evidence for the existence of a "democratic" *hetaireia* attached to Cleon; see now M. L. Paladini, *Historia*, VII (1958), pp. 54-6.

There is evidence, however, that Cleon did surround himself with a "gang" of supporters, which may have fulfilled a function similar to that of an *hetaireia*. In Aristophanes' *Knights*, the Sausageseller addresses Demos, saying (lines 850-7) that his adversary (Cleon) has a device by which he can avoid being punished by Demos, namely his gang (*stiphos*) of brush, honey, and cheese sellers, i. e. a private army. The use of this "squad" is indicated in the following lines (855-7): they will prevent their master from being ostracized, thus fulfilling the same function as the *hetaireiai* according to Andocides, IV, 4; see my comments in *A. J. A.*, LX (1956), p. 279.

the ostracism of Hyperbolus in which as many as three *hetaireiai* seem to have been involved, and he devotes this chapter (pp. 79-98) to a detailed but somewhat awkwardly presented account of the accusations made against Alcibiades and his friends, both before and especially after the departure of the Sicilian Expedition. He comes to the convincing conclusion that the mocking imitation of the mysteries (without any particular political aim) was done at many times, in many places, and by many groups of people, and that many friends of Alcibiades were involved in these actions and in the Mutilation of the Herms (which Sartori considers of political significance). The close association of the literary and the epigraphical evidence (following Pritchett's brilliant example) is certainly welcome and provides a better understanding of the composition of the *hetaireiai*. We need, however, a closer re-examination of the relation between the ostracism of Hyperbolus and the "purge" of the aristocrats on the charge of "impiety" not of "subversion" (Sartori never mentions this fact; see *A. J. A.*, LV [1951], pp. 229 f.). We also need a more thorough examination of all the individuals connected with the *hetaireiai*; Sartori merely makes some significant remarks on this point. Finally, one must distinguish between the cause and the effect of the Mutilation of the Herms; it seems, from Sartori's own excellent account, that the two were distinct, and that our only testimony for the cause, the story told by Andocides, is in many ways untrustworthy.

With the period from 415 to 412 B. C. (pp. 101-12) we enter the homestretch of the history of the Athenian oligarchs. Sartori examines Aristophanes' *Birds*, Eupolis' *Demoi* (see now J. M. Edmonds, *Frag. Att. Com.*, I, pp. 978-94), and Euripides' *Helen*, in order to extract from these plays some information on the working of the *hetaireiai*; the harvest is unfortunately small and unsatisfactory.⁷ The rest of this chapter is devoted to the activities of Peisander who does not seem to have had any contact with the *hetaireiai* until his return to Athens (see below).

The next chapter deals with the revolution of the Four Hundred and the part in it played by the *hetaireiai* (pp. 115-26). Sartori's careful account is based primarily on Thucydides, without ignoring, however, the various other traditions and pieces of evidence. At the

⁷ Sartori claims, perhaps rightly, that the name of Peisthetairos referred to the trust among the members of an *hetaireia*, without noticing that the passage from the text of the introduction to the *Birds* (which he quotes on p. 102) does not read *ὡς εἰ πεποιθὸς ἕτερος τῷ ἑταίρῳ*, but *ὡς εἰ πεποιθὸς ἕτερος τῷ ἑτέρῳ καὶ ἐλπίζοι ἔσεσθαι ἐν βελτίῳ*; see W. G. Rutherford, *Scholia Aristophanea*, I, p. 423 (whose unnecessary emendations have been accepted by J. van Leeuwen, on line 644 of his edition of the *Aves*); J. W. White, *The Scholia on the Aves of Aristophanes*, p. 8. It may be noticed, moreover, that we have a tombstone from before the middle of the fourth century B. C. (*I. G.*, II², 5347) recording the death of Πιστοκλῆς Πισθεταίρου Ἀθμονεύς; the Pisthetairos here mentioned was probably alive when the *Birds* were performed, and one may argue that Aristophanes had his name in mind; see, however, B. B. Rogers' introduction (pp. viii-x) to his edition of the *Birds* (1906), and White's comments (on line 1 of the Scholia) who gives the name confidently as Peithetairos. The name Πεισθ[εταίρος] has been restored in another inscription (*I. G.*, II², 12440/1).

outset, he mentions C. Diano's startling thesis (*Dioniso*, XV, 1952) that Sophocles' *King Oedipus* belongs to the beginning of 411 B. C., and he lists (p. 104, and in the Index) the poet as one of the *probouloi* of 413-411 B. C.; see now H. Schaefer, *R.-E.*, XLV, cols. 1225-8. Next, he treats in some detail Aristophanes' *Lysistrata* (Lysimache, according to D. M. Lewis, *B. S. A.*, L [1955], pp. 1-7), without, however, making it clear that Lysistrata and her women form a *synomosia* (182, 237, 914, 1007), seize the Acropolis (176, 241-2), like Cleomenes (274), wish to make peace with Sparta but not with Persia (1133-4), are accused of tyranny (618, 630), think little of *psephismata* (697, 703-4), in other words act like an oligarchic *hetaireia*. Sartori was therefore mistaken when he interpreted the reference to Peisander (489-90) as indicating his leadership of the oligarchs; see also Sartori's comments in his earlier book, *La crisi del 411 A. C.* (1951), p. 12, n. 7. On the contrary, Peisander was at that time still considered a popular leader. Thucydides' account (VIII, 54, 4) of Peisander as "approaching" (*epelthon*) the clubs shows clearly that he did not belong to them; see A. G. Woodhead's fine study of Peisander in *A. J. P.*, LXXV (1954), pp. 137-8. It is hard to escape the impression that Aristophanes gives in this play a not unsympathetic account of the political position occupied by the oligarchic clubs on the eve of the revolution.

For the period from the overthrow of the Four Hundred to the Restoration of Democracy (pp. 129-43), Sartori uses, in addition to the well-known evidence of Lysias, Xenophon, and Aristotle, also Euripides' *Phoenissae*, Sophocles' *Oedipus at Colonus*, and Aristophanes' *Frogs*. Unfortunately, these plays add nothing to our knowledge of the *hetaireiai*, although they testify to the political unrest in Athens. For the period after 403 B. C. (pp. 147-52), Sartori only repeats what Calhoun has presented more fully, namely that the *hetaireiai* of which we read (mainly in the orators) concerned themselves with court matters, i. e. they returned to the activities originally attributed to them by Thucydides (VIII, 54, 4). Sartori's attempts to discover political significance in some of these references are unsuccessful;⁸ he promises (p. 148, n. 6), however, to devote a separate study to Plato and the *hetaireiai*, and in it (*Historia*, VII [1958], pp. 157-71) he gives an admirable account of the three meanings in which Plato used the word *hetaireia*: friendship, philosophical association (of the circle of Socrates), political association (disapproved by Plato).

Sartori's conclusions (pp. 153-5) repeat some of the weak points of his arguments: the essential difference between *hetaireia* and *synomosia*; the existence of democratic *hetaireiai*; Theramenes' membership in an *hetaireia*. On the other hand, Sartori emphasizes correctly the aristocratic (as distinct from oligarchic) character of the *hetaireiai*, and he suggests persuasively that the use of *hetaireiai* for political ends may be attributed to Thucydides the son of Mele-

⁸ His discussion of Andocides, IV, fails to consider the recent work done on this speech, both by myself (*T. A. P. A.*, LXXIX [1948], pp. 191-210; *Hesperia*, XXIII [1954], p. 68, nn. 2 and 3; *Phoenix*, IX [1955], p. 123, n. 3) and by A. R. Burn (*C. Q.*, IV [1954], pp. 138-42).

sias. If so, this would be a revival of the factional conflicts of the late Solonian and of the Cleisthenian periods, with that difference that the earlier *staseis* were between *hetaireiai*, the one at the end of the fifth century B. C. between the oligarchie *hetaireiai* and the democracy. And this was exactly Peisander's aim (Thucydides, VIII, 54, 4) when he approached the *hetaireiai*, παρακλευσάμενος ὅπως ξυστραφέντες καὶ κοινῇ βουλευσάμενοι καταλύσουσι τὸν δῆμον.

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AUGUSTO SERAFINI. Studio sulla satira di Giovenale. Florence, Felice Le Monnier, 1957. Pp. xi + 441.

Juvenal has awakened considerable interest in the past ten years. In addition to the critical edition of Knoche (Munich, 1949), of fundamental importance to any future textual study of the poet, the scholarly world has received the second edition of Marmorale's *Giovenale* (Bari, 1950) and Highet's *Juvenal the Satirist* (Oxford, 1954). Now, Serafini joins this group with his extensive study on aspects of Juvenal's satire, a work which aims to correct the exaggerations of Marmorale and to probe deeper into problems lightly touched by Highet.

In his introduction, Serafini scans Juvenalian scholarship over the past. While paying due tribute to the elucidation of particular Satires and to such special studies as those of De Decker and Mrs. Ryberg,¹ while recognizing the progressive improvement in the text, Serafini argues that central problems still remain unsolved. He therefore rejects the method adopted by Highet and De Labriolle, namely, discussion of individual Satires, and takes up directly those issues which, he considers, provide the key to understanding Juvenal: "il problema scottante della verità storica e quelli non meno gravi del moralismo e della poesia. Sono le questioni di maggior interesse per chi studia Giovenale" (p. ix). Of secondary importance are chapters on rhetoric and style, on Juvenal's attitude towards the Greek world, and his connection with his satiric predecessors. Serafini ends his study with a discussion of Satire 10, which, though designed as a conclusion, fails to meet expectations.

Clearly, Serafini has read deeply in Juvenal, in the scholarship about the satirist, and in the authors and histories that shed light on the satirist's age; it is equally evident that his refusal to accept the Crocean depreciation of Juvenal, so pronounced in Marmorale and other Italians, marks an advance in the understanding of the satirist. On the other hand, it hardly seems necessary to argue so strenuously, and in many cases so unsuccessfully, through half the volume, matters which students of English satire have long since

¹ J. De Decker, *Juvenalis declamans* (Ghent, 1913); I. G. Scott-Ryberg, *The Grand Style in the Satires of Juvenal* (Northampton, Mass., 1927). Serafini consistently refers to the latter as J. G. Scott.

solved;² I doubt that we are still tremendously bothered about Juvenal's historical validity, his moral position, and his absolute rank as a poet. Perhaps some of us are, but not to that extent. Serafini might better have devoted more attention to Juvenal's language, rhetoric, and style, for the reader solves the general questions, if at all, when he correctly appreciates the particular factors of the satirist's technique.³

Serafini devotes 96 pages to the problem which Boissier labeled as primary in 1870 and Serafini still thinks most important: "vedere cioè se il quadro storico che risulta dalle satire giovaniliane è complessivamente veritiero oppure no" (p. 2). The argument against Juvenal's validity runs as follows: Satire acts as the conscience of society, mirrors its age, and provides our most reliable information on the life and thought of a people; Juvenal exaggerates, distorts scenes, and concentrates only on the negative; therefore, he is not honest, and consequently he is no moralist and an inferior poet. I shall criticize this syllogism subsequently, but first it is instructive to see how Serafini solves the problem. He attacks only the minor premise, with great discretion. Anyone who reads Juvenal senses the exaggeration, and Serafini would not deny it. Instead, he grants that the satirist distorts and attributes the distortion to Juvenal's passionate nature and the over-emphasis favored by his age. He accepts 1, 45 as a fact of Juvenal's personality: "scrive con l'animo sconvolto dall'ira" (p. 7). Furthermore, the satirist sees only the vicious aspects of his time, in contrast, for example, to Pliny. Granting all this, Serafini rightly observes that satire's *lex operis* requires fixed attention upon vice rather than virtue. He accordingly begins from these well-defined grounds: within the circumscribed world of evil which Juvenal takes as his subject, can he be conceded historical validity? After careful discussion of the course of Roman decline, as reflected in writers from the time of Plautus, of the vices central to individual satires, of the satirist's portraits of Roman emperors, Serafini reaches his conclusion: "la satira di G... è la testimonianza clamorosa della crisi di tutte le forze dell'impero (p. 96).

All this stirs reservations. Juvenal does erupt with fury over Roman degeneracy and imply that a critical point has been reached (cf. 1, 147 ff.), but he is no historian. As a satirist of his type, he dramatizes a special world of fact that possesses certain affinities with reality, but exists primarily for the interpretation which he will place upon it. Juvenal's reader, at least when the satirist succeeds, does not examine the historicity of facts, but follows with fascination the drama of voiced reactions to carefully selected details. In emphasizing drama, I question the validity of Serafini's concession, that Juvenal writes with a mind distorted by anger. Rather, Juvenal

² I cite as an excellent example M. Mack, "The Muse of Satire," *Yale Review*, XLI (1951-52), pp. 80-92.

³ Thus, De Decker fails to understand the function of Juvenal's rhetoric and arrives at the conclusion that Juvenal is dishonest and a declaimer, not a poet. Serafini exhibits some hesitation on this point, often insisting that a forceful moral argument or a vigorous description has nothing to do with rhetoric; and his biographical explanation of much that is part of the rhetoric leaves this reader in doubt as to his grasp of Juvenal's technique.

assumes a fictive character (often called *persona*) in his Satires. All of which brings us back to the major premise of the syllogism above, for it now emerges clearly that satire does *not* mirror its time with historical accuracy; only with the self-consistency that one would require of drama. In a period of at least equal crisis (40-30 B. C.) Horace wrote Satires which impress us as the direct opposite of Juvenal's, not because he discussed different faults or himself was devoid of choler and passion, but because he chose to present a drama of the writer smilingly exposing the foibles of humanity, with no reference to Rome. In approaching Juvenal, therefore, the historian must content himself with such facts as are not affected by the drama: descriptions of dress, of social customs, of monuments, etc.

As Serafini notes, the problems of the satirist's historical and moral value are interrelated, and in Chapter II he deals with "moralismo." In particular, he combats the views of Marmorale, who refused to give the title of moralist to a satirist who lacked adequate education and a dispassionate mental attitude, possessed insufficient experience of life, and therefore wrote like a man suffering from bile. Since Serafini accepts these as criteria relevant to Juvenal, he must assume that satire should be a dispassionate moral critique based on profound philosophical insights. Under the circumstances, he can only point out that Juvenal never urges his reader to evil or dispraises virtue, sometimes rises above the rhetorical sources from which he seems to draw so much of his doctrine, expresses sincere reactions against vice; in short, that Juvenal is actuated by "sentimentalismo etico" (p. 158). Serafini therefore finds it necessary to consider the satirist's sexuality, to explain his misogyny, in part, as the result of disappointed love (p. 108).

Again, it seems to me, Serafini should have challenged the assumptions of the critics rather than attempt to re-interpret the Satires biographically. It is true, as he states, that Juvenal is *vir bonus* at the same time that he is *orator* (p. 156), but again in a dramatic sense. The satirist's *persona* lives in a consistent fictive world, where vice (highly emphasized) provokes indignation (equally stressed), and we think of the speaker as a true Roman dedicated to the lost, and therefore all the more strikingly affective, values of the past. Satire of Juvenal's type must *not* be dispassionate. The satirist can even afford to contradict himself in his outrage; for instance, in 2,51 he can extol women (by contrast with male perversion), but in 6,242 he expressly denies women the very trait for which he had praised them. In Satire 6, he paints an utterly negative picture of Roman women, thus remaining more true to his fictive emotions than to the moral facts.

The third major chapter of this study attempts to determine whether or not Juvenal is a poet. As I consider the question itself largely futile and Serafini's treatment extremely weak, I shall limit myself to brief comments, in order to place emphasis on the valuable aspects of this book. Serafini measures the satirist first by the standard provided in 7,53-7 (but for *vatem egregium*), then by the esthetic dogmas of Croce and Gentile. Although he finds purple passages in profusion which demonstrate "abbandono poetico," "espressione lirica," serenity, and other presumably ideal qualities, he concludes with De Decker that Juvenal is either poet or declaimer, sometimes poet, but all too often a creature of rhetoric.

I found the two chapters on Juvenal's rhetorical and tragic satire useful. Serafini freely admits the rhetorical quality of Juvenal, and, although he fails to stress the essential function of rhetoric in the Satires, does resist the tendency of such people as De Decker to leap automatically to the assumption that rhetoric necessitates anti-poetic techniques. Juvenal abandons, he demonstrates, the *Musa pedestris* of Horace and adopts tragic manners and diction. Of special value in this discussion are sections on the satirist's language and style (pp. 263 ff.). Study of diminutives, adjectival formation, and other linguistic characteristics of *sermo cotidianus* proves unquestionably that Juvenal does not subscribe to Horace's satiric principles. Similarly, Serafini agrees with Ryberg that Juvenal employs the Grand Style as opposed to the *genus dicendi tenue*. These important innovations effected by Juvenal oblige Serafini then to consider the satirist's relation to the tradition behind him. In describing our satirist as "il nuovo Lucilio" he over-emphasizes the importance of Lucilius and ignores that of Persius. I myself would question whether the invective of Lucilius and Juvenal bears much resemblance and wish that Serafini had been acquainted with the antithesis established by Piwonka between the two satirists, both in satiric concept and style.⁴

To account for Juvenal's social orientation, Serafini fixes on the satirist's personality: "Anzitutto c'è un motivo personale" (p. 335). Consequently, he insists that the attitude expressed about the poor is unsullied by rhetoric. Juvenal himself is poor and sees the rich as the principal cause of Roman corruption. It seems safer, in my opinion, to assign the defense of the poor and the provincials and Juvenal's apparent poverty to the *persona* rather than to the writer. Otherwise, the varying attitude towards the poor and the diversity of mood between Satires 3 and 11 raise doubts. Umbricius, because he abides by the old principles, earns admiration; Trebius, because he submits to the insults of Virro, is properly treated as a buffoon. With the usual reservation, that too much of what is written is identified with Juvenal's deepest feelings, I find the chapter on the Greek world valuable. Serafini sketches the development of prejudice against the Greeks from the time of the Elder Cato and suggests that, in important respects, Juvenal has adopted the same Republican, conservative program as Cato. From the manipulation of Hellenisms in the Satires, Serafini rightly deduces that Juvenal does not appropriate Greek words as part of his own language, but uses them with distaste to demonstrate how Greek ways have insinuated themselves into Rome among the vices which the satirist most loathes.

In conclusion, Serafini has much to say that it is useful. As I have noted, the concentration on historical and moral validity and on Juvenal's absolute rank as poet strikes this reader as excessive and, since the book costs 4000 lire, might better have been reduced. Serafini has embellished his study with a wealth of relevant quotations from sources contemporary to Juvenal. In general, he has produced a handsome volume, with relatively few misprints,⁵ one

⁴ M. P. Piwonka, *Lucilius und Kallimachos* (Frankfurt, 1949), pp. 104 ff.

⁵ I list the misprints which I have noted: p. 10, n. 19: Trayan for

which could help the reader acquire a sympathetic attitude towards Juvenal.

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CLARENCE W. MENDELL. *Tacitus: The Man and his Work*. New Haven, Yale University Press; London, Oxford University Press, 1957. Pp. viii + 397. \$6.00.

This volume represents "an effort to gather together the chief results of [four and a half centuries of] Tacitean studies," and "some attempt at a revaluation of the man and his methods, not to estimate his greatness, but to try better to understand it"; it considers Tacitus as historian, lawyer, man of letters, and "man of strong individual personality." "People (some at least) will continue to read, study, and use the great Roman historian. It is for them that this book is compiled, to make their approach to Tacitus not merely easier but more immediately rewarding."

Part I, three-fifths of the whole, discusses the man, the writer, and the historian in eleven chapters ranging over biography, religious, philosophical, and political thought, style, composition, characterizations, sources, and credibility. Part II, in eight chapters, discusses the history of Tacitus' works from publication to discovery in the 14th century, describes in detail each of the extant MSS, considers their affiliations, and narrates the history of the printed text.

Thus the novice student of Tacitus may find here some discussion, either more or less, of almost any topic or question relevant to his studies. Yet this reviewer reluctantly and unhappily confesses to finding the book greatly disappointing.

The biography in chapter one is hardly satisfying. Tacitus' consulship has long been dated with confidence in 97, not "probably in 98." And Syme now (*Greece and Rome*, 2nd ser., IV [1957], p. 166) very plausibly suggests that "it might well have embraced the momentous month of October." "The year 100" as date for the prosecution of Marius Priscus is not very precise for a case which was commenced in 98 and concluded in 100, before the month of January ran out. There is extended discussion of the date of the *Dialogus*, and Mendell decides in favor of the early dating—"The decisive evidence to me is the whole tone and spirit of the essay. It

Trajan (cf. twice on p. 415); p. 33: rough breathing on *olkoumévης*; p. 63, n. 181: *Baltimora* for *Baltimore*; p. 90, n. 249: *sunt* omitted after *nostrum*; pp. 98, 100, and 129: Knocke for Knoche; p. 98, n. 3: *Handschriftliche* for *Handschriftliche*; p. 165: *sentimens* for *sentiments*; p. 179, n. 29: *Seyan* for *Sejan*; p. 208, n. 69: *Reth. ad Her.* for *Rhet.* (cf. p. 426); p. 340: *Les vieux client* for *Le vieux client*; p. 374, n. 91: for some reason the italics cease in the middle of the quotation; p. 383, n. 2: *I suppose* for *I suppose*; p. 409: the title of Weston's book has *Juvenal* for *Juvenal*; p. 414: umlaut needed on Beloch's *Bevolkerung*.

is written in a buoyant spirit in unmistakable contrast with the grim point of view that pervades the *Agricola* and the longer historical works." Yet if Güngerich's demonstration of Tacitus' use of Quintilian (*C. P.*, XLVI [1951], pp. 159-64) is not to compel the later date, it must be refuted; it cannot simply be ignored; or so it seems to this reviewer, who himself finds very perplexing some of the consequences of this late dating. No date at all is indicated for Tacitus' proconsulship of Asia; 112/13 seems fairly certain.

We have here, as also, to be sure, in the literary histories generally, 116 as the date of publication of the *Annals*. Now this is of course date for book II and, assumably, for so much as was published together with that book, *Annals* I-III or whatever it may have been. It is not necessary to accept in all its details the whole thesis of, e. g., Bretschneider, *Quo ordine ediderit Tacitus singulas Annalium partes* (Strassburg, 1905); it is yet difficult to suppose that the whole work was published at a single date. If Tacitus was, in A. D. 106/7, collecting material for his account of the year 79 (Pliny, *Ep.*, VII, 33, and Mommsen's dating), he was then less than half-way through the composition of the *Histories*. His writing was interrupted some years later by his proconsulate. Then the opening books of the *Annals* appeared in 116/17. Is it not reasonable, now, to suppose that the balance of his great work would hardly have been completed before, say, 125 or even somewhat later, and so, of course, that Tacitus' life was thus far prolonged?

Mendell concludes his account of Tacitus' career: "the evidence seems to indicate that his active life at the bar reached its peak in about 81 and that it led him to the quaestorship and the senate, *only to be thwarted to a large extent by the attitude of the emperor.*" (Italics added.) Thwarted, one cannot forbear to ask, of what? Not of the quindecimvirate, one of the major priesthoods. Not of the praetorship in 88. Not of a provincial governorship—"he was absent from Rome from 89 to 93, when he may have been governor of a Caesarian province (assignment to a senatorial province would have been for a shorter term) or, less probably, a *legatus legionis*" (p. 11). Not, one may add with probability, of a consulship. Syme has lately written: "It is generally (and conveniently) assumed that he owed the consulate to Nerva and to Nerva's friends. He might, however, have been on Domitian's list, designated already in 96.... (many of Domitian's designations being kept for concord, along with the candidates of the new government)" (*op. cit.*, pp. 164, 166). Whatever else the attitude of Tacitus, like that of his good friend Pliny, may have been toward Domitian, it was assuredly the basest ingratitude; to his favor they both owed their careers.

"Character Delineation" treats that topic very briefly in the *Dialogus* and the *Agricola*; then one reads: "It should be in a study of *Annals* 11-16 that we ought most easily to find out the method, if there is one, by which Tacitus presents his characters and makes them live." And to this is devoted the rest of a lengthy chapter. Thus, curiously, there is no consideration of the portrait of Tiberius, which most would certainly regard as Tacitus' masterpiece.

"Tacitus as historian of military affairs" handles B. W. Henderson as roughly as Henderson did Tacitus.

The chapter on "Credibility of Tacitus' history" occupies just

over three pages! Here Mendell remarks, "Scholars like Sievers, Freytag, and Stahr have done much to correct the total picture of Tiberius, and Marsh has had the last word in this area." Marsh's *The Reign of Tiberius* was published in 1931; there have been worthwhile words on Tiberius since then. The new student of Tacitus will need certainly to read, e. g., Charlesworth's wonderful chapter in *C. A. H.*, X (1934), and D. M. Pippidi, *Autour de Tibère* (Bucharest, 1944), to mention only two of the most obvious; but Mendell's bibliography will not suggest to him either of these.

The author emphasizes and reiterates, in judgment of Tacitus the historian, that his statements of fact are unimpeachable. "Tacitus' standard of integrity in the *use of facts* is above question" (italics added). So phrased, precisely, this is surely open to serious question. But Mendell continues: "His legal training and experience taught him how to present his facts effectively for his own purpose but not how to manufacture evidence or falsify the facts. Selection and arrangement were to him legitimate tools but not creation or distortion. This of course at once raises the question of whether Tacitus was primarily a lawyer or an historian" (pp. 100 f.). Follows a discussion whose conclusion is that he placed himself clearly in the convention and the tradition of historiography, except for the addition of a notably dramatic technique in the composition. This reviewer feels no confidence that the lawyer died when the historian was born.

We read again: "the significance of the story [of Calpurnius Salvianus in A. D. 25, *Ann.*, IV, 36] is such that, *without imputing deliberate and extensive dishonesty to the first lawyer of Rome*, one cannot deny that Tacitus is right in speaking of the great prevalence of prosecution at the time" (italics added; p. 136). Uninhibited to impute dishonesty and misrepresentation occasionally to the first lawyer of Rome in the mid-first century B. C., are we to be thus inhibited regarding the first lawyer of Rome a century and a half later? Again: "But the general verdict of time has largely removed the suspicion of deliberate falsehood. Tacitus' standing in the Rome of his day, his reputation for high integrity, makes such a charge almost absurd, and infinite effort has failed to produce evidence of false statements beyond those occasional mistakes which no mere human can hope to escape. This is not, however, to say that the total result of Tacitus' presentation can be accepted with confidence as the final and just interpretation of first-century Roman history. . . . If his presentation gives a biased impression . . . , as it undoubtedly does, it is not by falsification of the facts nor because of a failure to apply the best standards of scholarship known to his day. . . . He interprets the facts in the light of his own convictions and by means of his own artistic methods. He interprets them also under the influence of his own personal interests. . . . The modern historian must reinterpret the facts as he finds them in Tacitus in the light of accumulated understanding of these convictions and methods and interests but with confidence in the integrity of this brilliant partisan" (pp. 220-2).

The novice student of Tacitus will need much more qualification than appears here of the unquestionableness of the historian's statement of facts. He will be gravely in need of Mrs. Ryberg's "Tac-

tus' Art of Innuendo" (*T. A. P. A.*, LXXIII [1942], pp. 383-404) and its concluding dictum: "As an historian Tacitus would not suppress or misstate the facts, but as an artist he could present them in such a way as to make the reader draw the inferences which the historian refrained from drawing." But Mendell's bibliography will not lead him to that important article. It will, however, refer him to B. Walker, *The Annals of Tacitus* (Manchester, 1952), where he will not omit to read (p. 158): "There [in *Annals* I-VI], the elaborate narrative style is used to obscure facts, not to heighten them; and it is precisely where facts contradict the non-factual material that Tacitus' style becomes most sensational. The dramatic tension is sharpest, the rhetorical and poetic colouring most brilliant, the evocation of allusive associations most strong, where they have least relation to the events they are thought to describe."

In the area covered by Part II the reviewer has next to no competence whatever. He does note the omission from Sulpicius Severus' use of Tacitus (p. 228) of II, 30, 3 and 6, which are usually considered to be drawn from the *Histories*. By a curious slip Jordanes is dated "perhaps a hundred years or less after Cassiodorus" (p. 232); he appears as "Jordanes" there and on p. 234, but as "Jornandes" on pp. 215, 345, and 361; and both forms stand in the index, with a single page reference for each.

The proof-reading has been very ill done and the volume is much marred by almost innumerable typographical errors. Most of those in English text are mere irritation, though "Burrus" on p. 148 should be "Thrasea"; but some of the Latin quotations are badly garbled, e. g., "ex quis magnarum saepe rerum oriuntur" (p. 192) lacks "motus" following "rerum," and, extreme case, "qui sit Bebricum vicum a Cremona" (p. 233) should read "qui ait Bebricum vicum esse a Cremona."

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JOHN MAXWELL EDMONDS. *The Fragments of Attic Comedy*, after Meineke, Bergk, and Kock. Augmented, Newly Edited with their Contexts, Annotated and Completely Translated into English Verse. Volume I. Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1957. Pp. 1028. 98 Guilders.

For over a hundred years the standard collection of Greek comic fragments has been the work of Meineke, Bergk, and Jacobi. Later attempts to supplement this collection and bring it up to date have always been incomplete and relatively unsatisfactory. Kock's well-known work *Comicorum Atticorum Fragmenta* (1880—), although more recent than Meineke, lacks much of the necessary data (testimonia, ancient comments, and contexts, etc.), which are sadly needed to interpret these puzzling fragments. Kaibel's excellent attempt to bring the work up to date did not progress beyond the first volume (the fragments of Doric Comedy, which appeared

in 1899); a more recent attempt to handle this same material has been made by A. Olivieri (*Frammenti della commedia greca e del mimo nella Sicilia e nella Magna Graecia*, I, 1947). But the basic material for the study of ancient Greek comedy, which is, in the main, the Attic fragments, has remained unedited since 1880, although the past eighty years have seen many additions both to the material itself and to our knowledge of it. Scholars, therefore, can have only gratitude and praise for Professor Edmonds, who in the later years of a long and busy life has devoted his considerable talents and energies to bringing Kock up to date. Edmonds acknowledges his debt to Demianczuk's *Supplementum Comicum*, to various articles in Pauly-Wissowa, and to the many reports of papyrus fragments. All this leads us to hope for a definitive edition of the Attic Comic Fragments. Whether we have been given this or not still remains to be seen.

The first point that must strike a reviewer, or any reader, of this work is the immense amount of learning and labor that must have gone into the process of editing. To quote just a few relevant figures: 57 names of separate poets of the Old Comedy are listed and treated in the volume; one of the indices lists 300 or more known titles of plays. In addition, we have nearly 100 anonymous fragments and numerous citations of named authors but from unnamed plays. The period treated ranges from 487/6, the presumed date of Chionides' first comic victory, to ca. 360-5, the last plays of Theopompus. The volume includes about 3,500 separate fragments (including citations of single words): the largest number comes, naturally enough, from Aristophanes (969), with Eupolis (460) and Cratinus (457) in close competition for second place. Any reviewer may well quail before the task of evaluating all this. But prompted by the example of the still more arduous labors of the editor, let us make an attempt, although it must be remembered that no final evaluation of the work can be given at present: this is the sort of book which must be used by interested scholars for a least ten years before we will know whether Edmonds has done his work well or not.

Readers will not expect (nor would any editor in his right mind print) a full and detailed review of such a work. It must be enough to indicate briefly what Edmonds has done. The name of each author (excepting Aristophanes) is accompanied by the relevant ancient testimonia on his life and works, including inscriptional evidence; all testimonies are also translated into English, making for easier reference. With the fragments are given an English translation, and critical and brief explanatory notes. In many cases the explanatory notes include a brief conjectural restoration of the plot of the lost play. Many suggestions are made for the attribution of fragments of unknown plays to known titles. Wherever Edmonds' numbering differs from Kock's, Kock's numbering is given in parentheses. However, the work lacks what seems an essential aid: a comprehensive conspectus of numbering in Meineke, Kock, and Edmonds. This omission is surprising, considering the imposing number of other useful lists and indices, which include: (1) dated and conjecturally datable plays of Old Comedy (and of the Middle, to 362 B. C.); (2) poets of the Old Comedy in alphabetical order, with page numbering in Meineke, Kock, and Edmonds; (3) Greek

and (4) English titles of the lost plays of Old Comedy; and finally (5) a General Index, mainly of proper names. This summary will show what is offered in the work, and should impress prospective readers with the tremendous amount of labor which has gone into the volume.

Still, without wishing to detract from Edmond's substantial achievement, this reviewer has a few criticisms to make. In the first place, although the date given on the title page is 1957, the Preface is dated July 1946. This seems to indicate that there was an 11-year interval between the time when Edmonds finished his work on the manuscript and final publication of the work; and so, apparently, none of the considerable work done on Comedy since the war (by Webster, Dover, Kranz, *et al.*) has been used in the work. (A search of the notes reveals nothing later than this date.) While sympathizing with the great difficulties in printing a volume of this magnitude (in fact, it is remarkable that the work got printed at all), this reviewer cannot help feeling some disappointment that a new work should be so "dated" as soon as it appears. We can only hope that Edmonds will be given an opportunity for last-minute additions and revisions in future volumes, especially in the area of Middle Comedy, where a great deal of valuable work has recently been done.

Another disappointing feature is found in the translations of the fragments into English. At first glance, the idea of presenting English versions of all fragments seemed one of the most laudable aspects of the work. Who of us, in tracking down allusions and looking for usable material in the comic fragments, has not groaned over the amount of lexicon-thumbing necessary before we could even decide what was useful for our particular purposes? Indeed, the novice in this field is almost bound to conclude that half the comic vocabulary consists of *hapax legomena* for rare and implausible fish. We all would welcome a scholar who proposed to tell us the plain meaning of these obscure passages, so that we could pick and choose items of use with less searching in the dictionary. Alas! Edmonds' translations will disappoint such expectations: instead of the plain, literal meaning in readable prose, we find a somewhat labored attempt at English blank verse, which distorts the meaning of Greek. Aristophanes, fr. 220 is a case in point: Edmonds' version:

Think what our predecessors made
the objects of expense
Instead of building ships of war
and walls for their defence!

seems to give the exact opposite of the literal meaning: "(We?) ought to spend this on triremes and the walls, on which our predecessors spent the revenues." The poetry would be excusable, even with distortions, if these comic passages were great pieces of imaginative poetry, like (say) Aeschylus or Pindar, and only a poetic version could reproduce some of the elevation of the original. But such is not the case: nine out of ten, at least, of the fragments would not suffer a bit by translation into unvarnished, literal English prose versions. And one may be pardoned a slight doubt as to the value of these pieces as English poetry: take, for example, one of the finest bits of Eupolis (fr. 94K=98E), which describes the

effects of Pericles' oratory on his hearers; since the passage is familiar to most scholars, I quote Edmonds' English version alone:

- (A) That was the greatest speaker in the world.
Whenever he rose to speak, like a crack sprinter
He had the others beat by three good yards.
- (B) You call him swift, but swiftness wasn't all.
His lips enthroned a kind of suaveness—
He cast a spell on us; and when he stung,
Like no one else, he left his sting behind.

Particularly weak are lines 5 and 7: a plain, prose version would have been more effective: e. g., "Persuasion sat upon his lips," and "Alone of all the orators, he left his sting in (the minds of) his hearers."

Also questionable are some of Edmonds frequent emendations; we often find a new reading, with no explanation, when the traditional text is sound enough. Thus, in line 4 of the fragment of pseudo-Susarion, a perfectly understandable text is changed from: οὐκ ἔστιν οἰκίαν οἰκίαν ἀνευ κακοῦ to: οὐκ ἔστιν οἰκίαν οἰκίαν ἀνευ, κακόν, without any comment.

The explanatory notes are rather brief and often cryptic. Since the work does not contain a list of sigla or abbreviations, it is annoying to find many of Edmonds' predecessors quoted with just an initial or an abbreviation. Without any such aids, it is going to be hard for beginners to discover that B means Bergk in Meineke's *F. C. G.* Although it is shameless to ask for more, when we have received so much, it does appear that the work sadly needs a bibliography of scholars whose works are cited in the notes.

In a special Appendix, Edmonds gives a sample of a full reconstruction of a lost comedy, in "The Plot of the *Demes* of Eupolis," which he originally read as a paper to the Oxford Classical Association in 1934. This imaginative and detailed reconstruction seems out of place in a work such as this, which should be devoted to providing all the data for other scholars to use. Further, the restoration of the plot does not seem (at least, to this reviewer) either satisfactory or the least bit funny; it is too complicated to follow, even in a close reading; the Agon, or debate, does not come until almost the last episode in the drama (and even there it seems forcibly dragged in), so that no real conflict emerges earlier in the play. One doubts if the critical Athenian audience would have sat through this version. On the whole, the book would have been improved by the omission of this appendix.

There are a number of misprints, mostly in the English, as is natural in a work printed in Holland; it is to be hoped that these can be corrected if there are reprintings, since obviously this work is going to be in use for many years to come.

Despite these criticisms and misgivings, your reviewer must stress in closing the great contribution to scholarly progress which this edition represents. No comparable work is now available for intensive study of Old Greek Comedy, and we look forward eagerly to the anticipated future volumes.

CHARLES T. MURPHY.

RICHMOND LATTIMORE. *The Poetry of Greek Tragedy*. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1958. Pp. 157.

The present volume, which comprises six lectures delivered on the Percy Turnbull Memorial Lectureship at Johns Hopkins, comes like a fresh sea-breeze over the parched landscape of classical scholarship. For all throughout his discussions of nine Greek plays, Lattimore wears his academic mantle lightly, treating us to samples of his finest poetic translations while he puts forward some delightfully new interpretations from a somewhat novel point of view. Lattimore protests, however, that he is not endeavoring to establish any theory of his own. Indeed, he is definitely opposed to the critic who, by the necessity of his trade, is "inclined to be a monist, who tries to find the one key to all the meanings in a complex of art or literature. . . . There is no one exclusive approach to Athenian tragedy, or even to any one tragic poet, but many, and, always within the definite structure of theatrical form, the inner form is alive and various" (pp. 147-8). This, however, in some circles amounts almost to a declaration of war; it recalls the scholar-critic dichotomy set up by H. D. F. Kitto. But with this enlightened approach I find myself in complete agreement—even though it may be condemned in the higher courts as heretical—because this is the only area in which substantial progress, on the meaning of Greek tragedy at least, can now be made. Lattimore's professed aim is to explore some of the neglected poetic dimensions of Greek tragedy, and "to suggest ways of enlarging, and further vitalizing, our appreciation of what we are given" (p. 9). For the time has indeed come for us to make a sharp distinction between the ancient *document* and the *poem*; and the difference suggests two entirely different techniques in our approach to ancient literature. The two techniques, however, the historico-philological and the poetical, should be complementary and not antagonistic—and this is adequately demonstrated by Lattimore's study. It is only that each type of analysis may come up with a different answer, a different evaluation of what we have traditionally been given. In any case, as Lattimore seems to suggest, the area of poetic analysis is one which deserves our immediate concern; it is one in which traditional scholarship has not bequeathed a secure testament.

His suggestion is "that we look for the special contribution of the poetry" in the case of each of the tragic poets. In what does their poetry consist? It is a difficult question. But for Aeschylus, he suggests, it will consist in "enlargement," a kind of grand-scale poetic projection of a fundamentally meagre plot and limited characterization. For Sophocles Lattimore suggests "anomaly," a difficult term taken over from Plutarch, to describe that peculiar tension that exists between Sophocles' dramatic and poetic imagination. And, finally, for Euripides, it is "in relief or idealization," predominantly in the non-dramatic sections, insofar as he finds Euripides' poetry chiefly in those lyric passages which act as a thematic counterpoint to the drama.

Not all scholars will, of course, agree with Lattimore's point of view, but everyone should admire his courage and critically examine what he has to say. His analyses of the nine plays (four of

Aeschylus, two of Sophocles and three of Euripides) are everywhere subtly perceptive. In contrast with his originality in the area of poetic criticism, the author reflects a remarkable conservatism in his discussion of the origins of Greek tragedy (pp. 1-6), the ending of the *Seven* (p. 40), the authenticity of the *Prometheus* (p. 45), and the sincerity of Euripides' religious beliefs (pp. 128 ff.). More weight should perhaps have been given to the evidence of Sophocles' own characterization of his style as preserved in Plutarch (p. 60), as well as to the modern attempts to date the plays stylometrically (as, for example, by Earp). There is a curious passage where Lattimore says that the chorus of Ajax's shipmates enter "singing their desperate concern in lines so blithely versed, that they must almost be forced to skip as they sing" (pp. 60-1). But whether a musical line could be accompanied by skipping or "hippity-hops" would not, of course, depend upon the underlying iambic rhythm, but rather on the *tempo* of the music, and the relative time allowed in a particular song to the longs and shorts. Analysis of our extant fragments of Greek music suggests that quite different moods (a lament, a gay tune, a hymn) might be tied to the same rhythmic or metrical patterns. But until more is known about the exact relationship between Greek music and metric, we should be cautious of speaking of metrical lapses of taste.

But these are, indeed, minor matters, and of the sort that should arouse friendly discussion. Lattimore's book is one which all students of Greek tragedy will value highly; and his fine, poetic insights should be a healthy stimulus to help us reappraise some of our traditional points of view. For criticism is, to a large extent, a dialogue. As the author disarmingly writes: "We shall not come to one fixed, final conclusion. As Euripides put it, or as I think he did:

I have no quarrel with wisdom.

I am happy to track it down. Yet there is something else, something big, something manifest, that directs life toward good" (p. 148).

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S. M. ADAMS. *Sophocles the Playwright*. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1957. Pp. viii + 182. (*The Phoenix, Journal of the Classical Association of Canada, Supplementary Volume III.*)

There seems to be a presumption among scholars that Sophocles should be demonstrated as a figure serene, austere but benevolent, and above all pious. Since he is thought to have "made men as they ought to be," his heroes and heroines should be stately, generous, noble; in fact, they seem to be tough and bitter, sometimes bloody, almost always opinionated, obstinate, and, if so vile a term may be used, ornery. Since Sophocles was a religious, positively ecclesi-

astical man, "defender of the faith" (Adams, p. 135), his gods should be wise, just, and if stern yet ultimately beneficent, or at least good; actually they appear heartless and sometimes mean and vindictive. There comes then a feeling that the appearances which lead me (at least) to such adjectives *must* be somehow forced back into the reality which is Sophocles. He leaves an opening for this by declining to state an explicit theological position as Aeschylus and Euripides sometimes do. This, perhaps, is why there have been so many books about Sophocles, and why, though they so often begin as studies of "Sophocles the dramatist," they end by being more concerned with "Sophocles the moralist."

Professor Adams' new study of Sophocles seems to be directed toward this approach and controlled by the presuppositions which go with it. Instances of presuppositions and consequences follow. "The gods are good and just." They cannot then be and are not deceitful. Therefore, when in *Ajax* Athene calls herself the σύμμαχος of the hero, she must mean it; she is guaranteeing his heroization at the end, which she effects through her agent, Odysseus (pp. 24-6). The trouble is, for me, that nothing is said about heroization at the end of the play, and nothing is said about Athene either. Adams is reminded of the end of Aeschylus' *Eumenides*; I am not; for in the latter play, Athene is there and made to speak for herself. If a downright falsehood is not acceptable, for what the gods say elsewhere in Sophocles is true, then let us say that σύμμαχος is technically correct; Athene "cooperates with his fighting" (the flocks and herdsmen); she offered to help him before, and he tried to refuse, but since no man can reject the gifts of the gods, she has helped him anyway willy nilly, and not as he could have wished.

"Sophoclean people are better than real people are." So Oedipus, preparing for sanctification, must be good, and right; therefore, Polyneices, who was sent away unforgiven and blasted by a curse as Oedipus' last administrative act on earth, must be a hypocrite, his speech full of duplicity (pp. 173-5). Each student must read such passages for himself; I find no evidence of hypocrisy, and I think Sophocles was perfectly capable of making a character talk like a hypocrite if he wanted that plainly understood (as with Creon in this play). Taken at face value, the lines are moving and dramatic; is moral excuse for Oedipus, after all, the poet's main concern? In this regard, Adams falls into the habit of treating the dramatic character as if he were a real person whose historical career Sophocles would then be defending. Strange combinations sometimes emerge, as, on *Oed. Col.* 1211-49: "We, the audience, know, with Sophocles, what the elders, within the play, have not grasped: in the old age of this man before us, beyond the full powers of manhood in its prime, reside purpose and function, strength and dignity" (p. 173). But I know nothing of the sort which the chorus does not know, and in such a line-up I am simply bewildered.

"Sophocles was a flawless artist who never made a mistake." Therefore, since *The Trachiniae* contains mistakes, Sophocles probably did not write it (pp. 124-6). Adams actually says: (Introd., p. v): "Every line, if not every word, has its significance." Well; but *factual* significance? To make much of, for instance, such marginal matters as the ultimate fate of the armor of Achilles

(*Phil.* 359-84, see Adams p. 137) seems superfluous, unless we are to go thoroughly into the variants of the tradition.

In a long and patient study of the seven tragedies, Adams has, despite the above strictures, shown much penetration in detail. My objection is that he seems to be working from, not toward, conclusions. Granted the wish to establish sympathy for his heroes and respect (scarcely love!) for his gods, might Sophocles not have been working for other effects as well? This kind of careful study, made with less preconception, might find new answers.

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Papers Presented to Hugh Macilwain Last. *The Journal of Roman Studies*, XLVII (1957), Part I. Pp. 154; frontispiece; 1 pl.

Hugh Last died on October 25, 1957, several weeks before the appearance of this volume, which was to have been presented to him on his sixty-third birthday. Fortunately, he had seen the page proof, and had taken pleasure in this lasting testimonial offered to him by his friends and students. Most of the papers are in the field of Roman History, ranging, as Professor Last's work did, from the kingship to the late empire, but there are also articles on juristic, literary, and archaeological subjects, all within the scope of Professor Last's wide interests. With British colleagues, students, and friends, American, Belgian, and Italian scholars are among the contributors.

Plinio Fraccaro, in refuting Pareti's view that the *annales maximi* included ancient records restored immediately after the sack of Rome by the Gauls, stresses constructively the reliable elements in the traditions of kingship. On Niebuhr's ballad theory Fraccaro is somewhat more skeptical than Arnaldo Momigliano, who has contributed a fascinating history of the theory from the Dutch scholar Perizonius (1651-1715) to De Sanctis and Pareti. The *carmina* in Momigliano's view existed, but their influence has been exaggerated, and the effort to separate poetry and annalistic tradition "is bound to be speculative and frivolous." Sir Frank Adcock, in his analysis of the chief magistrates of Rome from 444 to 284, provides strong support for his conclusion that their choice was determined by "the instinctive political sagacity" of the leaders of the senate. Gianfranco Tibiletti shows that even without the evidence for the consular date 129 B. C., the *Acta de agro Pergameno* would have to be assigned to a time "before the law by which C. Gracchus subjected the Greek or Hellenized cities in Asia to taxation." J. P. D. V. Balsdon, in discussing three Ciceronian problems of the years 58-56, makes an attractive suggestion for the meaning of *frequens senatus* in Cicero's account (*Ad Fam.*, I, 9, 8) of the senatorial meeting on May 15, 56 B. C.

There are two papers on Mark Antony, P. M. Fraser's interpretation, with a new reading, of an inscription on a basalt statue base in the Cairo Museum, and John Crook's discussion of Antony's will. The view that the will was a forgery, Crook argues, is strengthened

by the fact that children of Cleopatra, a *peregrina* without *ius conubii*, could not have shared in inheritance under Roman law. But can we be sure that Cleopatra or perhaps her father, Ptolemy Auletes, had not been granted Roman citizenship? M. I. Henderson, in a learned and allusive article entitled "Potestas Regia," concludes (if I understand the argument correctly) that the republic that Augustus thought he was restoring was based on "ideas imbibed by the impressionable Octavian" in his brief experience with constitutional forms in 44 B. C. Stefan Weinstock, writing on "The Image and Chair of Germanicus," has a convincing emendation of line 3 in the *Tabula Hebana* (*facundi* for *fecundi*), and makes the very probable suggestion that the chairs of Mark Antony and Germanicus in the theater were connected with the flamine; the suggestion that Caesar's golden chair was carried into the theater only when Caesar was absent seems less likely.

On the army in politics from 68 to 70 A. D., G. E. F. Chilver, considering Vespasian's treatment of the army and the new evidence for the recruitment of the legions, concludes that the measures adopted were "appropriate to the victor of a faction fight, not to one who had been pushed by a rebellious soldiery" into securing advantages for them. F. A. Lepper explains the idea of the *quinquennium Neronis* as an invention perhaps of the Antonine period that was fathered upon Trajan. A. N. Sherwin-White supports Mommsen's date, 93, for the younger Pliny's praetorship against Otto's date, 95, and stresses the importance of the date in fixing the duration of the Domitianic terror. Ronald Syme discusses the career of Tacitus' friend, L. Fabius Justus, and suggests that the *Dialogus*, dedicated to Justus, should be dated soon after Justus had been designated suffect consul for 102. Mason Hammond analyzes the place of origin of senators from 68 to 235, and concludes that the increase of senators from the provinces was the result not of "deliberate imperial policy," but of "deep-seated social and economic trends."

On the late empire A. H. M. Jones has a detailed discussion of "Capitatio and Iugatio," which he interprets as a system of assessment that, where applied, was based on the sum of animals and persons registered on the land. A. J. Festugière holds that the six lonely years that Julian spent in his youth at Macellum in Capadocia led to the abandonment of Christianity. A. D. Noek, writing on "Julian and Deification," cites a surprising amount of evidence against the view which he has often stated and apparently still holds, that men lacked faith in the divine emperor as a god who could answer prayer.

There are three papers on literary subjects. C. M. Bowra traces the traditions of Greek poetry in Melinno's *Hymn to Rome*, discounting Roman influences even when Rome is described as a daughter of Ares. C. H. Roberts finds on the verso of *Pap. Mich.*, VII, 457, not, as H. A. Sanders had suggested, a legal document, but a fragment of a fable of Aesop. Eduard Fraenkel, writing of the style of Cicero's letters to Trebatius, has some delightful comments on the "grand style" in *Ad Atticum*, I, 16.

Legal studies are represented by David Daube's exhaustive treatment of *finium demonstratio*. The program of field Archaeology

lately undertaken by the British School in Rome, an investigation of Etruscan and Roman roads, is the subject of a preliminary report by John Ward Perkins. His comments on the old roads of the Veientane region are illuminating for the relation between the Etruscan and Roman systems of roads.

The bibliography of Professor Last's writings was prepared by Miss M. V. Taylor, long Editor and now also the President of the Society for the Promotion of Roman Studies. It is particularly fitting that the Society should honor a scholar who, in his writing in the *Journal* and in his counsel, has contributed so much to Roman studies. One cannot help regretting that Professor Last's arduous and devoted service as teacher and administrator prevented him from writing a History of Rome, for the magnificent chapters in Volumes VII, IX, and X of the *Cambridge Ancient History* prove that he was a great historian.

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E. KOESTERMANN. P. Cornelii Taciti Libri Qui Supersunt. Tom. II, Fasc. 1: *Historiae*. Ed. VIII. Leipzig, B. G. Teubner, 1958. Pp. 260.

E. KOESTERMANN. P. Cornelii Taciti Libri Qui Supersunt. Tom. II, Fasc. 2: *Germania, Agricola, Dialogus de Oratoribus*. Ed. VIII. Leipzig, B. G. Teubner, 1957. Pp. xxxix + 128.

This eighth edition of the Teubner Histories is very little more than a reprint of the seventh. There is no new discussion of the manuscripts or of the text tradition; the index is entirely unchanged; the pagination of the text is identical. This last fact is to this extent misleading: Koestermann has added four words in pointed brackets to the text. These are p. 4, *eversa*; p. 80, *strepitu*; p. 176, *iterum*; p. 218, *inventu*. None of them are essential or, to me, convincing. Marginal notes are added to mark the loss of the Medicean folia at the junction of Books I and II. Beyond these innovations the changes in the present edition are all minor ones in the textual notes. They consist of about seventy-five short omissions almost all of them minor emendations which have been made and rejected over the past years and about thirty-five additions which are either short suggested emendations not used in the text or references in support or in refutation of older emendations. No reference is made to the manuscript used by Ryck and once owned by Rudolph Agricola and turned up at Leiden since Koestermann's seventh edition (cf. *A. J. P.*, LXXXII [1951], pp. 337 ff.; LXXV [1954], pp. 250 ff.). Over twenty of its readings are, however, still given as emendations by Agricola and others as emendations by Rhenanus and Puteolanus. On p. 182 the old note on IV, 46 is repeated: *verum ordinem praeceunte Put. restituit Agricola*. It was the Leiden MS, cited without full appreciation by Agricola, which restored the true order and the Leiden MS antedated Puteolanus. One need not believe as

I do that this MS represents a line of tradition independent of the Medicean to do justice to its readings. In numerous places the present text might have profited by a consideration of Leidensis. Two examples out of many: III, 13, *militibus principem auferre principi militem*; V, 8, *alienigenis templum interius clausum*.

Part 2, the Minor Works, has a twenty-page preface which discusses the manuscript tradition. Koestermann rejects Robinson's unique valuation of Vind. 711 and defends (successfully, it seems to me) the more generally accepted theory of three families all descended from the so-called Hersfeld manuscript. The origin of this manuscript he still holds to be Hersfeld rather than Fulda in spite of Pralle's research into the annals of Fulda which he cites in his bibliography. The preface concludes with a warning that the editor's duty is to determine what Tacitus wrote and that this determination should be based on a knowledge of Tacitus' style and on the "innere Kritik" rather than on a scrupulous examination of the manuscripts. Fortunately the present editor applies this principle with admirable discretion. A welcome innovation is the inclusion of a bibliography embracing editions, books, and articles on the MSS and their tradition and books and articles of commentary. There is also the usual index of names. All of this matter supplementary to the text is adequate, clear, and concise. Koestermann's mastery of the material is thorough. There is one disturbing factor. No mention outside the bibliography which cites Bloch's article on the subject is made of the knowledge of the *Agricola* at Monte Casino in the twelfth century. Whatever one's conclusion about the significance of this knowledge, it is surely an important piece of evidence in relation to the source and value of the Jesi manuscript.

The text of the Minor Works, like that of the Histories, is conservative, as is most desirable in a Teubner edition which will be widely used as the basic text for citation. In *Germania* 2, it seems unnecessary after Norden's discussion of the interpretation and Robinson's to add the sign of textual corruption. In c. 10, the confirmed conservative would like to have seen the controversial *sed* restored and in cc. 15 and 16 the same critic would prefer not to accept the purely conjectural and unnecessary *magnifica* for *magna* and *hiemis* for *hiemi*. The change from *ceteris* to *ceterum* in c. 25, while widely adopted, still seems unnecessary. On the other hand, Koestermann rightly sticks to the MSS in c. 31 in spite of Robinson's brave but futile argument for a lacuna. The bracketing of *iugumque* in c. 43 may seem a little arbitrary in view of the fact that Tacitus shows in *Agricola* 10 his feeling for the distinction brought out in the following line of the present passage.

In the *Agricola* too there is little to be questioned even by a meticulous conservative. *Aulii* has at last disappeared from the textual notes on the title and the brackets from *legionis* in c. 9. The transposition of *ut* in c. 14 still seems to me mistaken, the result of editorial inertia since the time of Rhenanus. The transposition of *crebrae eruptiones* in c. 22 is, as Furneaux says, "a violent remedy" but the general approval of this change is based on logical grounds. I should not myself feel justified in bracketing *in melius* in c. 24 but it has the appearance of a gloss and Koestermann has probably chosen the best solution. The same can hardly be said for the obelisk

in c. 28. *Uno remigante* has been satisfactorily interpreted; the really baffling part of the sentence follows and the editor has selected the least violent of the traditional emendations. At the end of c. 46, the MSS cannot be followed. Either we must omit *veterum* (with Decembrio) or change *obruet* to *obruit*. It is a matter of personal judgment and the text of Koestermann now that he has changed to *obruit* is logical. To me the meaning of the sentence and the force of the peroration demand the deletion of *veterum* as a mistaken gloss and the retention of the future tense.

In the *Dialogus* it is hard to see why in c. 5 the editor still abandons the *non contigit* of an earlier edition and gives up the text as hopelessly corrupt. The ease with which a scribe could slip from the first *non* to the second explains the omission of the verb which of course may or may not have been *contigit*. The end of c. 37 might well be indicated as corrupt. If it is to be doctored, Koestermann's doctoring can hardly be bettered.

As can be seen from these selected instances, there is nothing revolutionary in this edition. It is the work of a mature and sound scholar which can be used with confidence.

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ALFRED ERNOUT. *Philologica*, II. Paris, Librairie C. Klincksieck, 1957. Pp. 256.

The first volume of *Philologica*, which appeared in 1946, was a selection of articles which Alfred Ernout had previously published in a number of journals over the preceding quarter-century, with a single article which had not been printed before, but had been delivered as an inaugural lecture.

The second volume is similar in general character; the selection was made by Ernout himself from among the articles published by him during the preceding ten years, but contains one article not previously published. The article, entitled *Metus-timor*, is actually devoted in large part to nouns of the morphological type of *timor*, whose general frequency and whose suitability for use at the end of a hexameter were partly responsible for the gradual increase of *timor* at the expense of *metus*. The article is provided with a statistical table showing the relative frequency of *metus*, *metuo*, *timor*, *timeo* from Plautus to the Vulgate, and with adequate evidence to show that in meaning itself the two nouns did not differ essentially.

The second article, *Les noms des parties du corps en latin*, deals with the distribution of anatomical terms among the three genders, with *os*, *ōris*, *os*, *ossis*, and other archaisms of the Latin vocabulary shared in some instances only with Indo-Iranian and Celtic; with the importance of the *r/n*-stems in the Indo-European vocabulary of anatomy; and with the replacement of old words by Greek borrowings or stems with diminutive suffixes.—The third article, *Le vocabulaire poétique*, is in part a criticism of several items in Axelson's *Unpoetische Wörter*, the great general value of which, however, Ernout fully recognizes. He is here concerned especially with the

reconsideration of several words which Axelson and others have sought to assign to the more vulgar stratum of the Latin vocabulary.—The fourth article, *Venus, venia, cupido*, treats several aspects of the history of words of the family of *venus*, including the semantic evolution of *venenum* (< **venes-no-m*) from 'love-philtre' to 'poison' and the development of *venerari* through the etymological figure *venerari venerem*. It also points out the contrast between *Venus*, where the abstract sense preceded the concrete sense, and *Ἀφροδίτη*, where the development was the reverse.—The article *Vis-vires-vis* is a detailed treatment of the usage of the defective singular *vis* and its heteroclitite plural *vires* and the distinction in meaning whereby *vires* is specialized in the sense 'physical strength,' which provides the means of exercising force (*vis*) without itself constituting force. The second *vis* in the title of the article refers to those rare plural forms occurring in Lucretius, II, 585, III, 265, Sallust *apud* Prisc., *Gramm. Lat.*, II, 249 Keil, and Messala *apud* Macr., I, 9, 14. These are shown to be used deliberately for the purpose of pluralizing the sense of *vis* as 'properties, virtues' for which *vires* could not serve. With these passages as support Ernout proposes to restore the corrupt passage Lucr., VI, 370, to read: . . . *quare pugnare necessest / dissimilis <vis> inter se turbareque mixtas*.—The short article *Colaphus-percolopare* treats the Latin derivatives of Gk. *κόλαφος*, which, despite their avoidance by classical authors, persisted through the late Empire into the Romance languages. The form *percolopabant* in Petronius, viewed in connection with the south Italian scene of the action of the *Satyricon*, is explained as having received its second *o* through anaptyxis of the kind seen in Oscan *Urufis, aragetud*.

Even the briefest summary of all of the twenty-four articles cannot be attempted here, but through the majority of them, apart from the first half dozen, a certain unifying principle can be seen. Students familiar with the first volume of *Philologica* and with the *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue latine* know that Ernout has a particular interest and has shown a particular ingenuity in tracing the processes by which two etymologically unrelated words eventually become contaminated. The causes may be partly loss of phonetic distinctions, partly extension of meanings, partly a tendency to replace nouns of rare types by others containing more productive suffixes. Thus the history of *condicio* and *conditio* was affected by the late Latin confusion between *-ci-* and *-ti-* before vowels, but also by the gradual extension of the meaning of *condicio* toward 'position, situation,' which brought it into the semantic sphere of *condo*, and by the tendency to favor nouns in *-tio* at the expense of the relatively small and unproductive class in which *-io(n)* was added directly to the verbal root.—The derivatives of the phonetically similar *cor* and *chorda* became blended through the notion of unanimity in *concor*s and of musical harmony in *chorda*, while the replacement of *concordare* by *accordare* was assisted by the equivalence of *adsentio* with *consentio*.—*Dictāturiō*: this form, which is cited by Priscian (*Inst. Gramm.*, 8, 74, = *Gramm. Lat.*, II, 429, 10 Keil) in the phrase *a dictatu dictaturio* is not to be emended to *dicturio* as suggested by Wölfflin, but Priscian's explanation of it is to be rejected and it is to be taken instead as a denominative

to *dictator*. Here the whole question of the origin of desiderative verbs in *-turio* and their possible relation to nouns in *-tor* and *-tura* comes to mind, but in this article, which is a single page in length, Ernout does not enter into it.—*Dilātiō-dilātō-prōlātō*: the derivatives of *lātus*, participle of *fero*, and of *lātus* 'broad,' although the two forms were etymologically unrelated, became confused, especially in certain compounds with *dis-* and *pro-*, the similarity in form being assisted by similarity in the meanings 'delay, postponement,' and 'extension, prolongation.'—*Farfarus et Marmar*: just as the river-name *Fabaris* in Verg., *Aen.*, VII, 715, *qui Tiberim Fabarimque bibunt* is a later form of the dialectal *Farfarus* preserved in Ov., *Met.*, XIV, 330, so *Mamers* is derived with the same dissimilatory loss of the first *r* from *Marmar*, known from the *Carmen Arvale*, which is therefore an especially early form of the name of the god Mars, but the relation of *Mavors*, *Maurs*, *Mars* to *Mamers* is still unexplained.—*Frutex-fruticō*: *frutico*, the denominative to *frutex*, with the sense 'put forth shoots,' and *fructifico* 'bear fruit' are close in meaning and both were frequently employed by Christian writers in figurative uses. This kinship of meaning, along with the weakening of the etymological sense of the second element of compounds in *-ficare*, and also the assimilation of the group *-ct-* to *-t(t)-*, led to extensive confusion between *fruticare* and *fructificare*, a confusion reflected in many manuscript variants in texts of the later Empire.—(*H*)*abundō-habeō*: *abundo*, having weakened its meaning from 'overflow, be full to excess' to 'possess in quantity,' came to be felt as an augmentative to *habeo* and to be sometimes used as a transitive verb with an accusative object. The process was assisted by the disappearance of the sound of *h* in *habeo* and was at the same time reflected by the introduction of an unetymological *h* in *habundo*.—*Tyrrhenus* chez *Virgile* is on the probable Etruscan origin of the word *tuba* in association with which Vergil uses the epithet *Tyrrhenus* (*Aen.*, VIII, 526, *Tyrrhenusque tubae mugire per aethera clangor*), and also of *lituus* and *calceus*, all of which had, at least originally, meanings which belonged especially to religious ritual.

On page 66, note 1, the reference to *Revue de Philologie* should be to the year 1947 instead of 1945. On page 83, tenth line, for *homos mas* read *homo mas*. On page 89 in the passage from the *Georgics* read *Napaeas* for *Nymphas*. On page 92, note 2, the reference to the *Georgics* should be IV, 39. On page 209 in Verg., *Aen.*, VII, 707, for *nominis instar* read *agminis instar*; in 708 *Claudia nunc* for *Claudiaque nunc*; in 709 *data Roma* for *Roma data*. Except for this last error the passage was correctly printed in the original version in *Studi etruschi*, XXIV (1956), p. 311.

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BOOKS RECEIVED.

(It is impossible to review all books submitted to the JOURNAL, but all pertaining to the classical field are listed under BOOKS RECEIVED. Contributions sent for review or notice are not returnable.)

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